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Abstract 
The thesis consists of four core essays which focus on important issues relating to 
international trade, growth and inequality. The first essay examines the determinants of 
trade based on global production sharing (network trade) by building a theoretical 
framework and empirically testing it using a panel dataset covering 44 countries over 
the period 1996 to 2013. Over the past four decades, network trade has grown at a much 
faster rate than total world manufacturing trade. Identification of the determinants of 
this emerging trade pattern is, therefore, important for informing trade policy debates. 
The model used in the empirical analysis captures a number of important explanatory 
variables ignored in the previous literature.  A range of panel data estimation techniques 
are used in the model.  The results suggest that technology, institutions and 
macroeconomic stability all play a significant role in determining inter-country 
differences in network trade.  The paper concludes with a discussion on the challenges 
for policy makers in their attempt to reap gains from global production sharing.   
The second essay studies the transmission of exchange rate changes into import prices 
(exchange rate pass-through) in the presence of global production sharing. The chapter 
builds and simulates a model, which postulates that exchange rate pass-through is lower 
for network trade compared to final goods trade.  It is hypothesised that trade in parts 
and components, within network trade, is relatively sheltered from exchange rate 
movements because network trade is largely ‘relationship-specific,' including intra-firm 
trade. Empirically, exchange rate pass-through is examined using a new dataset of 
manufacturing import prices compiled from the trade price database of the US Bureau 
of Labour Statistics.  The findings indicate that the degree of exchange rate pass-through 
into the import prices of parts and components is considerably lower than that for 
import prices of final goods. These results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests.  
The third essay examines patterns and determinants of global production sharing with 
an emphasis on how Australian manufacturing fits into global production sharing. 
Though Australia is a minor player in global production sharing, there is evidence that 
Australian manufacturing has a distinct competitive edge in specialised, skill-intensive 
tasks in several industries including aircraft, medical devices, machine tools, measuring 
and scientific equipment and photographic equipment. Specialisation within global 
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production sharing in high-value-to-weight components and final goods, which are 
suitable for air transport, helps Australian manufacturing to overcome the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ in world trade.  Being predominantly ‘relationship-specific’, Australian network 
trade exports are not significantly susceptible to real exchange rate appreciation. 
Institutions and technological base also give Australia a competitive edge within global 
production sharing.  
The last essay examines the impact of inequality and poverty on economic growth. 
Recent research has highlighted a negative impact of inequality on economic growth. 
The paper re-evaluates this hypothesis, focusing on both inequality and poverty and 
their interaction. The econometric model controls for standard growth covariates 
including education, investment, trade, population growth and redistribution. The paper 
initially replicates previous results, showing that inequality has a negative impact on 
growth. However, it is shown that after taking into account both inequality and poverty, 
the negative effect of inequality on growth appears to be concentrated amongst 
countries with high poverty. This finding makes a case for policies targeted towards 
alleviating poverty, rather than policies that redistribute without addressing absolute 
poverty.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Context 
This thesis studies the subjects of global production sharing, exchange rate pass-through, 
inequality and economic growth. Each of these fields of study have important policy 
implications. Research insights from the fields mentioned above are frequently 
translated into hypotheses that can be tested and policy recommendations that can be 
applied to countries for improving welfare and increasing economic growth. In addition, 
recent research on topics related to global production sharing and inequality have 
generated renewed economic discussions. This thesis contributes new data and 
empirical methods that have a close link to theory and relevance to policy. I also develop 
a theoretical model for analysing exchange rate pass-through in the presence of global 
production sharing.  
The thesis consists of five chapters. After this introductory chapter, Chapter two deals 
with the determinants of global production sharing, with an emphasis on institutional 
quality, technology and macroeconomic stability. The paper builds on the Jones and 
Kierzkowski (1990) theory of ‘service links’. This is followed by extensive empirical 
investigation based on a dataset of 44 countries, covering the period 1996 to 2013. All 
countries which individually account for at least 0.01% of total world manufacturing 
exports are included. These countries account for over 98% of total world manufacturing 
exports. 
There is no extensive examination in the literature of exchange rate pass-through (the 
responsiveness of import prices to exchange rate movements) in the presence of global 
production sharing. This is the topic for the third essay.  Using a theoretical model and 
a novel, disaggregated dataset for the US, this paper studies both the parts and 
components trade and final assembly, within global production sharing. Empirically, 
exchange rate pass-through is examined by analysing various import price indices based 
   Chapter 1 Introduction 
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on their share of parts and components trade for the US. This paper uses the US as a 
case study as it has the most disaggregated import price data available.   
The purpose of the fourth chapter is to examine the implications of global production 
sharing for Australian manufacturing. This has important policy implications, as Australia 
is transitioning to a post-mining boom period.  It is noteworthy that the significance of 
Australia’s integrating into global production networks and the related policy issues 
have not been systematically explored. The paper undertakes an econometric study to 
examine the determinants of global production sharing and identifies parts and 
components categories where Australia has a comparative advantage.   
The fifth chapter focuses on inequality, poverty and economic growth. The paper 
contributes to the literature by asking whether inequality and poverty jointly impact 
economic growth and examining the interaction between the two. We focus on extreme, 
absolute poverty as measured by two or three dollars per day income. Empirically, the 
paper asks two simple questions: is the negative relationship between income inequality 
and economic growth robust to the inclusion of poverty? And, is the relationship 
between inequality and economic growth related to the level of poverty?  
The policy implications and important conclusions are given at the end of each 
respective chapter. The following sections give brief summaries of each chapter.  
Global Production Sharing:  Patterns and Determinants  
There is evidence that trade based on global production sharing (that is, trade in parts 
and components and final assembly within global production networks, also referred to 
as  ‘network trade’ or global production sharing) has grown at a much faster rate than 
total world manufacturing trade over the past four decades. This expansion (Yeats, 1998, 
Yi, 2003) has been enabled by rapid advancements in production technology, 
technological innovations in communication and transportation and improved speed 
and efficiency with which firms can coordinate across geographically dispersed 
production locations.  Further, liberalisation and policy reforms in both home and host 
countries have considerably removed barriers to trade and investment. These factors 
have led to the fragmentation of production across international borders.  
   Chapter 1 Introduction 
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In this study, the determinants of global production sharing are examined by extending 
the Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) framework. In particular, variables that have helped 
proliferate global production sharing are analysed.  As global production sharing 
becomes more prominent, its impacts on international trade, economic growth and 
integration of the world economy are likely to have important national and global policy 
implications.  
On the empirical side, this study makes several contributions to the literature.  Firstly, 
an extensive dataset of 44 countries engaged in global production sharing and covering 
18 years (1996 to 2013) is constructed to undertake an in-depth analysis of global 
production sharing. Any country which has at least 0.01% share in total manufacturing 
is included in the data.  Secondly, this paper examines important macroeconomic 
variables, which have so far been ignored in the literature such as regulatory institutions, 
macroeconomic stability, technology and stages of development. Thirdly, this paper 
improves on the specification of the economic mass variables (Baldwin and Taglioni, 
2011) and tailors the economic mass variables to global production sharing in the gravity 
model framework. Lastly, I incorporate the Mundalk transformation/random correlated 
effect (RCE), in addition to using Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimation and random effects 
(RE), in the regressions to extensively test for robustness of the results.  The focus in the 
empirical section is on trade in parts and components in global production sharing.  
The results reported in the paper suggest that the average level of institutional quality, 
technology level in a country and macroeconomic stability play important roles in global 
production sharing. There is also evidence that global production sharing has a quadratic 
relationship with the stages of development. This partly reflects the fact that as 
economies develop, they transition out of manufacturing and into services, thereby 
reducing parts and components manufactured in their respective economies.  
Exchange Rate Pass-Through for Manufacturing Imports in the Presence of 
Global Production Networks 
This study examines exchange rate pass-through in the presence of global production 
sharing. There is likely to be heterogeneity in exchange rate pass-through between 
network trade and final goods trade. This partly reflects the fact that most of the trade 
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in global production sharing is relationship specific, including intra-firm transactions 
(Chen et al., 2005, Bridgman, 2012, Helpman, 2011, Hummels et al., 2001). Given this, 
global production sharing is likely to be shielded from fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
This heterogeneity of exchange rate pass-through is expected to be more prominent for 
countries that have a high share of the network trade.   
This paper adds to the literature in three novel ways. First, the study develops a model 
to examine the exchange rate pass-through in the presence of global production sharing. 
Secondly, this model is simulated with various scenarios to show that an increase in 
network trade does indeed cause exchange rate pass-through to be lower. Lastly, the 
paper empirically investigates the above-mentioned claim using a vector autoregression 
(VAR) methodology and a unique dataset created for the US. This paper uses the US as 
a case study because the US has the most disaggregated import price data available. The 
theoretical part of this paper looks at both parts and components trade and final 
assembly within global production sharing. However, the empirical side of the paper is 
limited to parts and components because price data is only available for products traded 
and not final assembly.  
The theoretical model of this paper shows how exchange rate pass-through is lower 
under global production sharing. This result is further endorsed by simulating the model 
and by empirical analysis. Using impulse response functions from the VAR analysis, this 
study demonstrates that a one standard deviation shock (depreciation) in the exchange 
rate shows no statistically and economically significant impact on the import prices of 
goods with high composition of part and components trade, while goods with low 
composition of parts and components trade reveal an incomplete pass-through, with 
the impact lasting about 11 months.  
Global Production Sharing: Exploring Australia’s Competitive Edge 
The purpose of this essay is to examine implications for Australian manufacturing of 
global production sharing. This is particularly important as Australia is transitioning to a 
post-mining boom period. It is important to note that the implications of the ongoing 
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process of global production sharing and the related policy issues have not been 
systematically explored for Australia.  
Australia is a small player in world manufacturing trade, accounting for around 0.28% of 
total manufacturing exports. However, the share of global production sharing products 
in total Australia manufacturing exports, increased from 0.22% to 0.25% between 
1990/01 and 2012/13. This was underpinned by an increase in the share of parts and 
components, from 0.25% to 0.28%. Australia’s share of total manufacturing exports to 
OECD countries increased from 0.35% to 0.54% between these years, with the share of 
global production sharing exports increasing from 0.27% to 0.36%.  In terms of the 
relative importance of global production sharing products, Australia’s export 
composition is similar to that of the OECD countries. One notable difference, which is 
relevant for the subsequent analysis in this paper, relates to parts and components 
exports. The share of parts and components in Australian exports has increased 
continuously, from 25.5% in 2005/06 to 27.2% in 2012/13, whereas in the OECD 
countries this share has declined from 31.1% to 25.4%.     
Using trade data from the UN Comtrade, this essay identifies products where Australia 
has a comparative advantage within global production sharing and then undertakes an 
extensive econometric study to analyse Australia’s strengths and weaknesses within 
global production sharing.   
The results suggest that Australia seems to have a distinct competitive edge in parts and 
components specialisation in the following product categories: aircraft and associated 
equipment, internal-combustion machines, machine tools, miscellaneous machinery, 
taps and valves, computers, measuring equipment, machine parts, photographic 
equipment and electrical machinery.  The results of the study also demonstrate that the 
‘tyranny of distance’ is not a binding constraint on exporting specialised parts and 
components and some final assembly goods from Australia. The evidence also suggests 
that domestic technological capabilities are relatively more important, compared to the 
average global experience, in determining components exports from Australia. Further 
being predominantly relationship-specific, Australian exports of parts and components 
trade are not significantly susceptible to real exchange rate appreciation. 
   Chapter 1 Introduction 
6 
Inequality or Poverty: Which is Bad for Growth? 
This paper studies an important link between inequality and economic growth. Recent 
research has re-focused attention on the impact of income inequality on economic 
growth. This paper analyses whether inequality and poverty jointly impact economic 
growth. The paper focuses on extreme, absolute poverty as measured by the proportion 
of people living below two or three dollars per day income. Inequality is measured using 
the Gini Coefficient from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database. 
The paper asks two simple questions: is the negative relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth robust to the inclusion of poverty as an explanatory 
variable for economic growth? And, is the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth related to the level of poverty?  
Economic growth regressions which control for average incomes and inequality may fail 
to capture the disadvantage of poverty that harms growth. By adding the percentage of 
people below the poverty line, the paper additionally controls for the concentration of 
disadvantage in the population. Theory suggests that poverty can relate to economic 
growth through health and human capital accumulation. These effects might be distinct 
from and in addition to the effects of low average incomes and inequality. 
The paper finds that including poverty does matter. Specifically, results show that the 
negative impact of inequality on economic growth is related to the level of poverty. 
When poverty is low (less than 25% or so), the paper finds a statistically insignificant 
relationship between inequality and economic growth. For higher levels of poverty, 
inequality negatively impacts economic growth, and the magnitude of this negative 
effect increases as poverty rises. The policy implication is clear: promote growth by 
attacking poverty rather than by redistributing incomes.
 7 
Chapter 2  
Global Production Sharing: Patterns and Determinants  
 
1 Introduction 
The rise of global production sharing has changed international trade in a substantial 
manner (Chen et al., 2005, Bridgman, 2012, Helpman, 2011, Hummels et al., 2001). 
Global production sharing can be defined as the splitting of the production process into 
discrete activities which are then located across countries to gain a cost advantage2.  
There is evidence that over the past four decades, trade based on global production 
sharing (that is trade in parts and components and final assembly within global 
production networks (GPN), also referred to as network trade) has grown at a much 
faster rate than total world manufacturing trade.   
This rapid growth of global production sharing has been underpinned by three mutually 
reinforcing developments (Yeats, 1998, Yi, 2003, Bridgman, 2012, Helpman, 2011). First, 
rapid advancements in production technology have enabled industries to slice the value 
chain into finer, ‘portable’, components. Second, technological innovations in 
communication and transportation have shrunk the distance that once separated the 
world’s nations, and improved the speed and efficiency with which firms can coordinate 
across geographically dispersed production locations. This has facilitated the 
establishment of ‘services links’ to combine various fragments of the production process 
in a timely and cost efficient manner. There is an important two-way link between the 
improvement in communication technology and the expansion of fragmentation-based 
specialisation within global industries.  The latter results in the lowering of the cost of 
production and rapid market penetration of the final products through enhanced price 
competitiveness. In turn, scale economies resulting in market expansion encourage new 
                                                          
2 Global production sharing is also known as network trade, global production networks, 
production fragmentation, parts and components trade, vertical specialization, production 
sharing, intra-product specialization and slicing up the value chain. These terms are used 
interchangeably  
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technological efforts, thus enabling further product fragmentation.  This two-way link 
has set the stage for ‘fragmentation trade’ to increase more rapidly, compared to 
conventional commodity-based trade. Third, liberalisation policy reforms in both home 
and host countries have considerably removed barriers to trade and investment.  
Trade in parts and components behaves differently to trade in final goods. For instance, 
variables that may play an important role in the standard trade analysis, such as home 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and the exchange rate, may not be as relevant 
in explaining global production sharing. Furthermore, ‘service links’ play a vital role in 
global production sharing (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990).  Jones and Kierzkowski define 
service link activities - and their associated costs – to include communication, 
transportation, information gathering and the cost of coordinating production activities 
across countries (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990, Plümper and Troeger, 2007). Given this, 
modelling aggregate international trade flows without explicitly modelling network 
trade can be misleading. This is particularly important for countries with a high 
proportion of parts and components trade in their total share of trade.  
As global production sharing becomes more prominent, its impact on international trade, 
economic growth and world’s economic integration into the world economy is likely to 
have important national and global policy implications.  Network trade opens up 
opportunities for countries to specialise in different segments (slices) of the value chain 
in line with their relative cost advantage.   Developing countries get the opportunity to 
specialise in labour intensive segments. This leads to employment generation and hence 
poverty alleviation.  Most of the trade within global production networks is relationship 
specific, and therefore takes the form of intra-firm transactions and trade based on 
contractual arrangements between the lead-MNEs and contract manufacturers (Hanson 
et al 2005, Surgeon 2002, Stergeon and Kawamami 2012). Given this, global production 
sharing is likely to have firm-level implications, such as cost reductions.   
The contributions of this paper include theory, empirics and using a new dataset. On the 
theory side, the paper further extends Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) model to analyse 
how macroeconomic variables affect firms involved in global production sharing. While 
on the empirical side the paper uses new methodology including correlated random 
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effects and incorporates macroeconomic variables, ignored so far by the literature, like 
technology and macroeconomics stability. The next two paragraphs further expand on 
these contributions.  
In this paper, the determinants of global production sharing are studied by adopting the 
Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) framework to incorporate macroeconomic variables that 
are postulated to be important for global production sharing. In particular, variables 
including institutional quality, technology and macroeconomic stability are analysed. 
On the empirical side, this paper makes several contributions to the literature.  Firstly, 
an extensive dataset of 44 countries engaged in global production sharing and covering 
18 years (1996 to 2013) is constructed to analyse global production sharing. All countries 
which individually account for at least 0.01% of total world manufacturing exports are 
included in the country list.  Secondly, a number of relevant macroeconomic variables 
which have so far been ignored in the literature, including institutions, macroeconomic 
stability, technology and stage of development are incorporated in the empirical model. 
Thirdly, the specifications of the economic mass variables in the gravity model 
framework are carefully specified by taking into account the methodological issues 
raised by Baldwin and Taglioni (2011). Lastly, the Mundalk transformation/random 
correlated effect (RCE) is used, in addition to using Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimation and 
random effects (RE) to extensively test for the robustness of the results.  The focus in 
the empirical section is on trade in parts and components, the most ubiquitous facet of 
global production sharing.  
This paper finds that institutional quality and level of technology play important roles in 
determining network trade. Macroeconomic stability is also found to have a significant 
role in fostering global production sharing; this may reflect the fact that most of the 
trade in parts and components is dominated by multinationals which may be sensitive 
to the macroeconomic stability of the country. Lastly, there is evidence that global 
production sharing has a quadratic relationship with the stages of development. This 
partly reflects the fact that as economies develop, they transition out of manufacturing 
and into services, thereby reducing the parts and components manufactured in their 
economies.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of global 
production sharing, while Section 3 extends existing theories on global production 
sharing, Section 4 discusses data, Section 5 examines the patterns within global 
production sharing, Section 6 discusses the estimation methodology used to analyse the 
determinants of global production sharing, Section 7 gives empirical results and 
Section 8 concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
Global production sharing is not a new phenomenon. Network trade has been an 
important process dating back to the industrial revolution (Athukorala, 2014). Its 
importance in world trade has been highlighted since the early 1970’s. However, the 
modern process of global production sharing is different in that it intensively involves 
developing countries and the magnitude of global production sharing is now significantly 
higher compared to historical standards (Yeats 2001).  
Over the past four decades, global production sharing has evolved from a simple process 
between two or so countries to a multi-stage and multi-country process. For instance, a 
firm’s headquarter may be in the US and involved in headquarter functions such as R&D, 
service linkages and coordination, while parts and components are produced in 
countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia before being shipped off to China for 
final assembly. The following examples illustrate the process of global production 
sharing.  Linden et al. (2009) analyse the production of the iPod by the US-based firm 
Apple. According to the industrial organisation of Apple, the product design and 
software development are done in the US, while hard drive, display module, mainboard 
PCB and memory are produced in countries like Japan and Taiwan and final assembly 
takes place in China (Linden et al 2007 & 2009).  
 Another example of global production sharing is the Barbie doll (Tempest, 1996). Plastic 
and the hair for the doll are acquired from Taiwan and Japan, China provides cotton 
cloth for the dresses, while molds and paint come from the US and assembly is in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and China. Most of this trade is relationship specific.   
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Given this, the conventional approach of treating international trade as ‘cloth for wine’  
(that is, the assumption that countries trade in goods produced from beginning to the 
end in a given country) needs to be altered to take account of global production sharing, 
especially as the share of trade in parts and components has become significant.   
Factors including the proliferation of globalisation, reductions in transport and 
communication costs, trade liberalisation and advancements in technology, have 
promoted global production sharing and its importance in international trade. For 
instance, trade in parts and components has grown at a faster rate than trade in final 
goods (Yeats, 1998). Between 1970 and 1990, increases in exports associated with global 
production sharing accounted for one-third of world economic growth (Yi, 2003). This 
process has expanded to include a wide range of products including automobiles, 
televisions, smart phones, sports and footwear items, sewing machines, cameras, office 
equipment, watches, etc. (Athukorala, 2011). The impact of global production sharing 
on different industries has varied. Industries that trade in high value-to-weight goods 
and ones where technologically it is feasible to slice up the production process, have 
been better able to take advantage of global production sharing.  
The role of service linkage costs, for connecting the various production units located 
across countries, play an important part in global production sharing (Jones and 
Kierzkowski, 1990). As these service linkage costs decline, due to reductions in transport 
and communications costs, technological breakthroughs and trade liberalisation, 
production fragmentation would further endorse global production sharing. In the Jones 
and Kierszkowski’s model scale economy is achieved by increasing production, while the 
service link costs remain fixed.  
In addition, global production networks have expanded throughout the world. US, 
Canada and Mexican firms have strong connections in the parts and components trade. 
It is estimated that around $250 million dollars worth of parts and components are 
traded through the Ambassador Bridge that connects Detriot (US) with Windsor (Canada) 
alone (Hanson et al., 2005). In addition, the East Asia regional share in total network 
exports increased from 22.0 % in 1992/93 to 45.7% in 2005/06 (Athukorala, 2011). There 
are also increased linkages in production networks amongst European countries. In 
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contrast to this, regions such as South Asia and Africa have not seen a strong presence 
of global production sharing. Given this, global production sharing’s impact has varied 
between industries and regions.  
Jones and Kirezkowski (1990), Arndt (1997), Venables (1999), Jones and Kirezkowski 
(2001a), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007), 
have developed frameworks and extended standard trade theory to global production 
sharing. Arndt (1997) looks at the impact of global production sharing on employment 
and wages. He uses the neoclassical trade theory to decipher the impact of vertical 
specialisation on wages and employment. One problem with his framework is that it 
does not explicitly include the costs of linking the various stages of production like 
transportation, communication, trade and transaction costs.  Feenstra and Hanson 
(1995) and (1997), build a model with a continuum of inputs over the unit interval to 
analyse global production sharing. However, their model also does not address fixed 
costs and sunk costs that are pertinent for setting up multiple production plants across 
several countries (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990, Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001).  
Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) focus on the role of services link costs in determining 
global production sharing. Their paper describes how increasing output levels, 
increasing returns to scale and the advantages of specialisation of factors within a firm 
can lead to a fragmented production process. They further postulate that trade 
liberalisation and declines in the cost of transportation and communications have 
enhanced production fragmentation by reducing service link cost. Jones and Kierzkowski 
(1990) use the following diagram to explain their main ideas about global production 
sharing.   
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Figure 2.1  Fragmented Production Process and Service Link Costs 
 
Line H in the above diagram gives the total cost of producing the whole product in one 
production block in a given country; this includes fixed costs and marginal costs. If a firm 
is to slice the production chain and locate across two or more locations, then it will incur 
service link costs. As mentioned before, service link activities - and their associated costs 
– involve communication, transportation, information gathering and the cost of 
coordinating production activities.  Line H’ shows the added costs of service links when 
the production blocks are in the same country.  
Line M shows lower marginal costs by undertaking global production sharing and cost 
savings by having two production blocks and moving one of the production blocks to a 
foreign country. This lower marginal cost comes from the assumption that the foreign 
country has lower production costs for the second production block. Line M’ shows 
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increased services costs by producing in a foreign country. This can include planning, 
coordination and transport costs, among others.  
Service link costs can be shown to be increasing with output by showing steeper H’ and 
M’ lines. Furthermore, increased setup costs for the global production sharing process 
can be shown by increasing the intercept of the line M to a higher point than ‘a’. Given 
this, total costs under global production sharing are given by the line M’, while the line 
H shows total costs in the absence of global production sharing. Using this diagram, it is 
clear that if output is higher than Y1, then even with higher service link costs, it would 
be profitable for the firm to fragment their production process, leading to an increase 
in the parts and components trade.  
2.1 Industrial Organization Model 
Some recent papers have also analysed global production sharing in the context of 
industrial organisation (Baye and Beil, 2006, Antràs, 2003, Majumdar and Ramaswamy, 
1994, Yamashita, 2010, Monteverde and Teece, 1982).  These theories look at the 
options available for the firm to produce its various stages of production. Following are 
the options: 
 Spot exchange; 
 Acquire inputs under a contract; and 
 Produce the inputs internally in various countries, while taking advantage of each 
country’s comparative advantage. 
Under spot exchange, there is an informal relationship between a buyer and a seller and 
in which neither party is obligated to adhere to specific terms of exchange. This type of 
mechanism works best when the products or services to be exchanged are standardised. 
However, the problem with this type of exchange is that firms that need specialised 
goods and services are not able to get highly customised products and services. This 
problem is overcome when firms acquire sub-components and services, either under 
contract or produce them internally.  
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Acquiring subcomponents under contract allows firms to allocate factors according to 
comparative advantage, often known as arm’s length transaction. This method of 
obtaining contracts works well where it is easy and not costly to write contracts. 
However, there can be high transaction costs for writing up contracts – for example, 
time involved in writing contracts and legal fees – especially when the nature of the 
product is complex and there is a high degree of customization required (Baye and Beil, 
2006). In addition, transaction costs at arm’s length can cause hold ups and often 
contracts are not complete - they can miss important contingencies which can lead to 
complications.  
Internally producing the components can help firms to overcome these transaction costs. 
Firms that require a higher degree of sophistication on average, prefer intra-firm 
transactions as opposed to transactions at an arm’s length (Antràs, 2003). However, in 
this process, the firm needs to incur extra fixed costs to set up manufacturing plants for 
the various stages of production in a number of countries. Vertical integration can also 
lead to increased bureaucratic costs (Baye and Beil, 2006).  
3 Analytical Framework 
In this section, the Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) model is extended to analyse global 
production sharing. Variables that explicitly determine service link cost in Jones and 
Kirezkowski methodology and other important variables that determine network trade 
are included.  These variables include technological changes that allow for finer slicing 
of production sharing, institutions, infrastructure, stages of development and the 
macroeconomic stability of the economy. 
3.1 Determinants of Global Production Sharing 
An efficient global production process can be created if each slice of the production 
process is located to match the factor intensity of components to the factor abundance 
of countries. To analyse this phenomenon and its determinants, this study begins by 
looking at the production process of a firm. 
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The case analysed in this section has one final good called F1, that is composed of two 
subcomponents called G1 and G2, we have two factors of production Capital, K, and 
Labour, L, and we have 2 countries – home country (called country A) and a foreign 
country (called country B); or more succinctly a case of 1*2*2 (one final good, two 
factors of production and two countries). The home country A is capital intensive, and 
the foreign country is labour intensive. The two subcomponents have different factor 
intensities. G1 is capital intensive and G2 is labour intensive. To produce F1, the firms 
need to produce G1 and G2 and combine them using final assembly. Final assembly is 
assumed to be labour intensive. It is also assumed that G1 and G2 are used in a fixed 
ratio to produce F1, hence the production function is assumed to exhibit a Leontief 
production process. The marginal costs of producing G1, G2 and final assembly are 
assumed to be constant – i.e. constant returns to scale. However, service links are 
assumed to exhibit increasing returns to scale. These assumptions should not affect the 
results, but rather they make the analysis more straightforward.  
Initially, suppose that both G1 and G2 are produced in the home country A.  Total 
marginal cost for producing F1 at the home country A is given by ‘MC original’. Assume 
now that the firm relocates the labour intensive component to foreign country B, and 
keeps the production of the capital intensive component in home country A. 
Furthermore, assume that relocating the production of components yields cost savings.  
In the new production process, the capital intensive good is produced in the capital 
abundant country (where capital is cheaper) while labour intensive good is produced in 
the labour intensive country (where labour is cheaper).  
The marginal costs of each subcomponent under global production sharing are given by 
MCf1 and MCf2. The total marginal cost of producing both components is given by MCfr, 
which is the summation of MCf1  +  MCf2. 
MCfr, = MCf1  +  MCf2. 
The final marginal cost of the good, under fragmentation, is given by MCft. MCft includes 
MCf1, MCf2 and service linkage costs including transportation, coordination and 
communication costs. Thus yielding MCfr<MCft (Equation 3.1.1). It can also reflect 
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assembly cost, but for simplicity at this stage we assume that assembly costs are 
negligible compared to other costs. By locating the labour intensive component to the 
labour abundant country and the capital intensive component to the capital abundant 
country, global production sharing can yield cost savings, Equation (3.1.2).   
MCfr<MCft     (3.1.1) 
MCft<MC original     (3.1.2) 
However, it should be noted that Equation 3.1.2 shows a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the firm to embark on global production sharing. To look at the sufficiency 
condition, we need to analyse total costs.  
Figure 3.1 Fragmented Production Process and Necessary Conditions 
 
The figure above extends the Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) diagram and is similar to 
Figure 2.1. Line A, TC1 in Figure 3.1 is the same as H in Figure 2.1 and line B, TC2 in 
Figure 3.1 is the same as M’ in figure 2.1. Therefore in the figure above, it is assumed 
that line B includes service linkage costs. In figure 3.1, output level beyond y1 makes it 
feasible for the firm to relocate its production process to obtain cost savings, Equation 
3.1.3 (where Y* denotes the actual production level of the firm).  To summarise, along 
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with the necessary condition of Equation 3.1.2, we need the sufficiency condition of 
Equation 3.1.3 to make global production sharing feasible.  
Y1<Y*    (3.1.3) 
Further explanation of the diagram above is as follows. Line A represents totals costs 
when all production takes place in one production block.  It depicts how total cost 
expands when output increases, the slope of the line shows marginal cost.  Line B, on 
the other hand, shows how total cost varies when production blocks are located in 
different countries. The higher intercept for the line B reflects the fact that having more 
production block incurs higher fixed costs, as more production plants need to be built 
and thus, there are higher service link costs. The flatter slope of line B, compared to 
line A, is based on lower marginal costs due to allocating good G2  to a country where it 
is cheaper to produce it. The capital intensive component G1 is still produced in country 
A, where capital is cheaper. 
It would be helpful to draw similarities between Figure 3.1 and Equations 3.1.4 and 
3.1.5. Marginal cost, MC original, when production is located only in the home country is 
given by the slope of line A, TC1 in Figure 3.1. Similarly, total marginal cost under global 
production sharing is given by MCft in Figure 3.1, which is equivalent to the slope of line B 
in Figure 3.1. 
Mathematically, line A and B can be written down respectively as: 
TC1 = a + by                           (3.1.4)  
TC2 = c + dy      (3.1.5) 
Where a and c are fixed set up costs for production in a single country and fragmented 
production process across two countries, respectively. Variable b is the marginal cost 
when production is undertaken in only one block, while d is the marginal cost of global 
production sharing involving two countries. These results can be generalised to more 
than one country.  
To look at the determinants of global production sharing, we equate 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 and 
solve for y. 
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a + by  = c + dy 
y= 
𝑎−𝑐
𝑑−𝑏
       (3.1.6) 
So any variable that affects a, c, b and d, would affect the process of production 
fragmentation and the level of output at which global production sharing becomes 
feasible. More precisely, Equation (3.1.6) says that the output level at which global 
production sharing becomes feasible depends on the ratio of relative fixed cost over 
relative marginal costs. The lower the marginal cost 3  that a firm can achieve by 
relocating production of some goods overseas and the lower the fixed costs of setting 
of production plants in a foreign country, the more profitable it is to engage in global 
production sharing.  
So far we have assumed that the production process is Leontief. But we only need the 
production process of the final good, F1, to be Leontief, while the production process 
for subcomponents, G1 and G2, can exhibit substitutability in inputs. To put it another 
way, F1 requires a fixed ratio between G1, G2 and final assembly, while G1 and G2 
themselves can be made by various combinations of capital and labour bundles. 
Equation 3.1.7 gives the total cost of F1, it is another version of Equations 3.1.4 and 3.1.5. 
A more important interpretation of Equation 3.1.7 is that it gives us a family of isocost 
lines. The coefficients of G1 and G2 give the marginal cost of producing G1 and G2.  The 
coefficients embody the capital and labour costs in producing G1 and G2, respectively. 
While P gives the final assembly cost of F1. For simplicity, we assume p is negligible for 
this section; this assumption can hold without loss of generality.  
To work with this model, initially assume the firm is producing only in the home country. 
Furthermore, assume that the firm wants to produce a given level of output for the final 
product - call that level Y*, given by the isoquant, IQY*, in the Figure (3.2). Given the 
level of the output, the firm wants to minimise its costs. Say it does that by incurring a 
cost of TC*, given by the isocost line c1 in the Figure (3.2).  
TCF1= a1G1 + a2G2 + PF1    (3.1.7) 
                                                          
3 Marginal costs and fixed costs can both include service links costs over here.  
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Now assume that the firm undertakes global production sharing and is able to cut down 
labour costs in producing good G2. This means that the coefficient of G2 changes to a 
lower value say, a2*. Given this, the isocost line pivots and the horizontal intercept shifts 
to the new point given by x2. Now the isocost line is given by c2. In order to produce the 
same level of output, the firm moves to a lower isocost line (a parallel shift down from 
c2), to a line like c3. Given this, we can see that the firm reduces costs by undertaking 
global production sharing. These cost reductions are given by the distance Y1-Y2 in the 
Figure 3.1.7.  
Where intercepts are given by the following: 
Y1=TC*/a1      (3.1.8) 
X1= TC*/a2      (3.1.9) 
X2= TC*/a2*      (3.1.10) 
Cost saving is given by: 
Cost savings = Y1-Y2      (3.1.11) 
 
Figure 3.2 Cost Reductions Using Isocost Lines  
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Variables such as infrastructure, transportation costs and tax regimes, technology, 
institutions, and macroeconomic stability can affect fixed costs and marginal costs of a 
firm (specifically, they can affect a, c, b and d in Equation (3.1.6)). These variables have 
been largely ignored in the literature for global production sharing.  The rest of this 
section briefly shows how these variables can affect global production sharing.  
Technological advancements that allow for finer slicing of the production chain can help 
amplify global production sharing. To analyse this, for instance, assume that the capital 
intensive good G1, due to technological advancement, can be further broken into two 
sub-components. Where one is relatively capital intensive (call it G1,1) and the other is 
labour intensive (call it G1,2). Then the firm will allow for further fragmentation of the 
production process if it finds it cheaper do so. The following diagram draws such a 
scenario where the firm achieves cost savings by relocating the production process of 
the labour intensive G1,2 component to country B where labour costs are cheaper, while 
producing capital-intensive G1,1 in the home country where it is cheaper to produce 
capital-intensive goods.  
Another venue through which advancements in technology are likely to augment global 
production sharing is by reducing transport and other service link costs. Given this, any 
empirical model designed to capture global production sharing must include a variable 
on technology.  
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Figure 3.3 Cost Reductions Due to Fragmentation 
 
Figure 3.3 is the counterpart of Figure 3.1. In this figure, line A and B are the same as 
they were in Figure 3.1. However, line C represents cost reductions due to further 
fragmentation of the production of G1 and lower transport and service link costs. The 
flatter slope of line C represents lower marginal costs of producing good F, which is due 
to further fragmentation of the production of G1 and having G1,2 produced in country B. 
Y2 < Y1    (3.2.2) 
It is interesting to note is that the intersection of lines A and C is at a much lower output 
level than the intersection of lines A and B. Therefore, it becomes feasible to fragment 
at a lower production level due to the technological advancement that allows the firm 
to break up G1 into further sub-components.  
This diagram analysis shows that there can be increased trade between two or more 
nations due to technological innovations, even if the GDP of each nation does not 
change. This divorce of the home country’s and destination country’s GDP means that 
we need to augment the standard gravity model with a relevant variable for technology.  
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Moreover, better infrastructure can lower transportation costs which are a crucial factor 
for global production sharing. Technological advances in services link sectors (e.g. 
transportation and communication) and friendly tax regimes can also lower the costs of 
production. All these factors can curtail the marginal costs associated with global 
production sharing. Diagrammatically, this means that as the marginal cost declines, the 
slope of line B in Figure 3.3 becomes flatter. Line C, which is flatter than line B, in 
Figure 3.3 can also be used to represent the new marginal costs associated with cost 
reductions due to better infrastructure, reduction in transportation costs and 
communication costs, and reduction in tariffs.  We can see that under these cost 
reductions, global production sharing becomes feasible at a lower level of output Y2, 
compared to Y1. Based on this, countries that have better infrastructure, cheaper 
service linkage costs and more friendly tax regimes are likely to capture a higher share 
of global production sharing.  
Macroeconomic instability can also induce extra costs, limiting the ability of various 
countries to take part in global production sharing. This is particularly true when 
volatility incurs extra costs for the firm, say in terms of menu costs, higher transaction 
and adjustment costs, or the costs of needing to keep extra capital to compensate for 
uncertainty. This increased cost reduces the feasibility of global production sharing.  
Institutions can make a significant impact on production fragmentation outcomes. Both 
the fixed and marginal costs of production can be a function of institutions. For instance, 
political instability can deter business investments by creating uncertainty and 
increasing the cost of insurance for businesses. Also, bad institutions can deter 
investment by making regulatory framework less business friendly and by creating an 
environment where corruption can impact businesses and their cost structures. Let’s 
assume that business friendly institutions decrease fixed costs (it is easier to start 
businesses and the business do not have to pay bribes to officials to buy land, get the 
company registered, etc.). In Figure 3.4, lines A and B are the same as in Figure 3.3.  
A business-friendly regulatory framework can reduce setup costs, as mentioned before. 
This can be shown by a decrease in the intercept from O3 to O2. As a result, lines C and 
A intersects at a lower output level, y1. This means that firms producing between Y1 and 
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Y2 will now also be able to take advantage of lower labour costs in country B and will 
fragment their production process. If in addition, improvements in institutions also 
decrease marginal costs, then the slope of the total cost line will become flatter, further 
augmenting global production sharing.   
Figure 3.4 Cost Reductions in Global Production Sharing 
 
4 Data  
The dataset covers 44 countries, which individually accounted for at least 0.01% of total 
manufacturing exports in 2000.  The time coverage is from 1996 to 2013 (18 years). 
There are 32,710 observations in the data relating to network trade. A list of the 
countries is given in the appendix.  Summary of variable statistics is given in table 4.1. 
This paper follows Athukorala and Menon (1994a), Athukorala (2011), Athukorala and 
Yamashita (2006), Yeats (1998) in using the UN Comtrade database to delineate trade in 
parts and components from the final goods. Parts and components are delineated from 
the trade data using a list based on the UN Broad Economic Classification (BEC). This list 
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uses the 5-dgit level of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). The 
nominal dollar value trade data are converted into real terms, using import price indices 
from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS).  The parts and components list is given in 
Athukorala and Talgaswatta 2015, Appendix A-1.  
The price index for parts and components is constructed by using global trade weights 
from the UN Comtrade database. Data on GDP, manufacturing value added, logistic 
performance index (LPI), investment, patent applications, communications, inflation 
and the exchange rate is taken from the World Development Indicator (WDI)4. To look 
at the impact of institutions on trade and global production sharing, this study uses the 
variable from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) on political stability. However, the 
values for WGI are missing for 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2012, but given that institutions 
don’t change rapidly, we have used previous year’s values to fill these gaps. 
Panels A, B and C in Figure 4.1 give scatter plots depicting the relationships between 
parts and components exports and technology, institutions and macroeconomic stability, 
respectively.  Panels A and B show that technology and higher quality institutions are 
positively correlated with exports of parts and components. Panel C,  shows that higher 
macroeconomic instability has a negative correlation with parts and components 
exports.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4Data for manufacturing is missing for some of the countries for the initial years. 
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Figure 4.1 Scatterplots of Parts and Components and Important Variables. 
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Note: Variable descriptions are detailed in the data section.  
 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
        
Log of parts and components exports 55,068 9.96 3.23 -5.84 18.47 
Log of manufacturing exports 56,498 11.72 2.84 -4.19 19.58 
Log of home country manufacturing value added 45,603 24.41 1.48 20.64 28.21 
Log of partner country manufacturing value added 45,698 24.40 1.49 20.64 28.21 
Log of home country GDP per capita 59,977 9.35 1.37 5.56 11.36 
Log of home country GDP per capita squared 59,977 89.34 24.03 30.96 129.13 
Log of communication infrastructure - internet users 
per 100 people  57,399 2.26 2.44 -9.86 4.59 
Log of total patent applications by residents  58,125 7.08 2.24 2.08 13.47 
Standard deviation of inflation rate.  47,072 3.46 4.96 0.49 30.07 
Log of real exchange rate 56,040 -0.02 3.60 -10.33 10.33 
Log of logistic performance indicator  61,991 1.22 0.15 0.83 1.43 
Institutions variable based on political stability 47,653 0.34 0.97 -2.81 1.67 
Regional trade agreements 60,420 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Colony 61,991 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Log of distance  61,991 8.59 0.97 5.08 9.88 
Contiguity of border 61,991 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Common ethnic language 61,991 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
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5 Patterns 
Between 1996 and 2013, world exports of parts and components increased by an 
average rate of 5.83 per cent to $2.57 trillion. Figure 5.1 shows strong upward trends in 
both total manufacturing and parts and components trade. The Global Financial Crises 
in 2008/2009 adversely affected both these trade categories. However, since 2010, the 
trade values have reached higher than the pre-crises levels.  
Figure 5.1 World Manufacturing Exports 
 
Source: Comtrade Database 
The share of parts and components in total manufacturing trade has remained around 
30 per cent. In addition, compared to total manufacturing trade, parts and components 
trade was more than disproportionately affected by the Global Financial Crises 
(Figure 5.2). This may reflect the composition of parts and components trade, which is 
often concentrated in electronic goods such as computers, TVs, tablets and 
smartphones and these goods may have a high elasticity to income. Due to this, when 
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incomes around the world decreased during the Global Financial Crises, parts and 
components trade was more than proportionately affected.  
Figure 5.2 Share of Parts and Components in total manufacturing trade 
 
Source: Comtrade Database 
The patterns of the parts and components exports vary significantly by country. 
Figure 5.3 shows the trends in the top five countries involved in parts and components 
trade. The most discernible feature of this graph is the significant increase in parts and 
components exports from China. Barring the financial crises, Germany has also seen a 
sustained increase in parts and components trade. However, countries such as the UK, 
US and Japan do not show a clear trend. Their trade levels have fluctuated around their 
respective means – similar to a random walk. As the UK, the US and Japan, all have a 
comparative advantage in headquarter services (e.g. R&D, management and 
communications) their headquarter related network trade may well have increased, 
even if parts and components trade did not.  
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Figure 5.3 Parts and Components Exports 
 
Source: Comtrade Database 
 
6 Econometric Approach 
6.1 The Econometric Model  
This section develops the empirical model for examining the determinants of global 
production. The empirical side of the paper focuses on trade in parts and components, 
as they can be directly captured from the UN Comtrade database and because parts and 
components are the most ubiquitous part of network trade.   
The empirical model is formulated by augmenting the standard gravity model through 
adding the relevant variables identified within the analytical framework developed in 
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the previous sections5.  These variables include supply base variable, demand base 
variable6, distance, real exchange rate, GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, stander 
deviations of inflation rate, institutions, technology, logistic performance index and 
geography and culture based variables (See table 6.1) The basis of this paper’s model 
starts with the standard gravity equation7.   
lnExpijt= α + β1lnSBVit + β2lnDBVjt + β3l7Distwijt + β4lnRERijt + 
β5lnGDPPCit + β6lnGDPPC2it  +  β7CIit  + β8SDinfrateit +   β9Insit + 
β10lnTechit+β12lnLPIit +  φ’Locij + ηi + ηt + ϵijt     (4.1.1) 
The subscript i indexes home country, while subscript j indexes partner country and the 
subscript t indexes years. The letter “ln” in Equation 4.1.1 represents the natural log of 
the relevant variables. Natural log is taken to provide an elasticity-type interpretation to 
the coefficients. The natural log can also linearize variables such as trade and real GDPs.   
The variables in the Equation 4.1.1 are defined in Table 6.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5  Previous applications of the gravity model to examine determiants of netwrok trade include 
Athukorala and Yamashita, 2009, Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006, Baldwin and Taglioni, 2011, Hanson 
et al., 2005) 
6 Further explained below, including a discussion of why these variables are included.  
7 (Athukorala and Menon, 2010, Athukorala and Yamashita, 2009, Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006, 
Baldwin and Taglioni, 2011, Hanson et al., 2005 
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Table 6.1 Variable List 
LnExp Exports (Ex) from country i to country j at time t 
SBVi Country i supply base variable 
DBVj Country j demand base variable 
Distw Population weighted distance 
RER Real exchange rate 
SDinfrate Standard deviation of home country’s inflation rate 
GDPPC GDP per capita 
GDPPC2 GDP per capita squared 
CI Communication infrastructure 
Ins Institutional quality  
Tech Technology captured by patent application of home country 
LPI Logistic Performance Index 
LOC Vector of geography and culture based variables  
ηc Country fixed effect 
ηt Time fixed effect 
ϵ Error term 
β k(K=1 to 8) Relevant coefficients of the explanatory variables.  
Φ Vector of coefficients for geography and culture based variables.   
Α Constant term 
 
In the standard gravity model (Chaney, 2013, Feenstra et al., 2001, Head and Mayer, 
2013, Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2001, Feenstra, 2003), the demand base of the 
partner country and the supply base of the home country are captured by real GDP. The 
standard economic reasoning is that as income of the partner country – as measured by 
real GDP – increases,  then it will consume more of all normal goods including imported 
goods, while the home country’s real GDP is a good measure of what the home country 
can produce. 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2011) argue that within global production sharing often demand 
for parts and components is generated by the third country where the final good will be 
consumed. As such, they argue that the GDPs of both the home and partner countries 
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will have diminished explanatory power in the presence of global production sharing. 
They suggest that the home country manufacturing production and import from other 
countries of parts and components should be used to augment the gravity model. In the 
presence of global production sharing, they show that the home country’s 
manufacturing value added, along with imported parts and components, is a more 
appropriate measure of its supply base, while the partner country’s GDP plus the import 
of network trade from other countries is an appropriate measure of the demand base. 
This paper uses home country manufacturing value added, along with the partner 
country manufacturing value added, to capture the supply and demand base variables 
for global production sharing, respectively. This measure is conceptually more 
appropriate because the Baldwin and Taglioni measure sums value added figure of 
manufacturing with the gross sales value of imported parts and components. In addition, 
as this paper uses annual data, incorporating the Baldwin and Talgnoi specification will 
induce simultaneity bias in our results if not properly accounted for, because imports of 
parts and components are likely to be processed within a year and exported to other 
countries.  Moreover, as our preferred estimation technique is  the correlated random 
effect, whose results are exactly the same as fixed effects, the Baldwin and Talgnoi 
critique is not relevant to our specification (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2011). Lastly, the 
Baldwin and Talgnoi specification is highly correlated (above 95 per cent) with the 
manufacturing valued added variable, see Table 4.2. As such, manufacturing value 
added can serve as an appropriate substitute for the Baldwin and Talgnoi specification. 
Given these reasons, we prefer using manufacturing value added as the economic mass 
variables for our regression analysis.  For completeness, this paper uses the Baldwin and 
Taglioni specification along with the standard home country and partner country real 
GDPs to check for robustness in our regression8.  
lnExpijt= α + β1lnMVAit+ β2lnMVAjt+ β3lnRERijt + β4lnGDPPCit + 
β5lnGDPPCit2  +  β7CIit  + β8SDinfrateit + β9l7Distwijt +  β10Insit + 
β11lnTechit+β12lnLPIit +  φ’Locij + ηi + ηt + ϵijt           (4.1.2) 
                                                          
8 Results can be provided on request 
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MVAi Country i’s manufacturing value added in real terms. 
MVAj Country j’s manufacturing value added in real terms.  
 Remaining variables same as equation 4.1.1 
 
Table 6.2 Correlation Matrix 
 h_supply_bt h_man_real p_demand_bt p_man__real 
h_supply_bt 1 0.994497 - - 
h_man_real 0.994497 1 - - 
p_demand_bt - - 1 0.955594 
p_man__real - - 0.955594 1 
     
Notes: h and p stand for home and partner country respectively, man_real stands for manufacturing value added in real terms and 
supply_bt and demand_bt stand for Baldwin and Talgoni specification of supply and demand variables.  
Population weighted distance is used as a proxy for transport cost and other associated 
time lags. As network trade involves multiple border crossings, this paper hypothesises 
that global production sharing exports are likely to be sensitive to transportation costs.    
Infrastructure, both for physical goods and communications, are important variables in 
our regression. In Section 3.1, we saw that infrastructure improvement could augment 
global production sharing by reducing transport costs. Moreover, in recent years, this 
variable has received increased importance in trade regressions (Athukorala, 2011, 
Athukorala and Menon, 2010, Athukorala and Yamashita, 2009, Mundlak, 1978).  Given 
this, this study includes LPI (Logistic Performance Index) as an explanatory variable. LPI 
is an index that measures physical goods trade-related infrastructure of the relevant 
country (Athukorala, 2011, Athukorala and Menon, 2010, Athukorala and Nasir, 2012, 
Arvis, 2010). In addition to this, infrastructure related to communications and service 
link costs is essential to global production sharing, so this paper uses communications 
infrastructure to capture this variable. Data for communications infrastructure and costs 
is not readily available. Therefore, to proxy for communications infrastructure, this 
paper uses internet users per hundred people. 
GDP per capita is a standard variable used in gravity models to capture levels of 
development in an economy and is likely to have a quadratic relationship in 
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Equation (4.2.3).  This is based on the fact that growth in economies leads to a transition 
away from manufacturing into services and the fact that rising wages will decrease the 
competitiveness of manufacturing industries.  GDP per capita squared is used to capture 
this quadratic functional form. 
In order, to look at the sensitivity of network trade to macroeconomic stability, we 
include the standard deviation of the home country inflation rate. Section 3.1 explained 
how macroeconomic instability is likely to reduce the feasibility of global production 
sharing. We can hypothesise that trade in parts and components will be more sensitive 
to a high standard deviation in the inflation rate.  
The real exchange rate (RER) is incorporated to capture the impact of the 
competitiveness of tradable goods production on trade flows. We expect the RER to 
have a more pronounced impact on final goods, however, as trade in global production 
sharing is mostly relationship specific, including intra-firm, it is less likely to be affected 
by international prices (Jones, 2000a, Jones, 2000b, Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001, 
Burstein et al., 2008). The reasons to expect the impact of the RER appreciation to be 
much weaker (or even zero) in GPN  include the fact that (Jones and Kierzkowski 2004; 
Jones 2000, Arndt and Huemer 2007, Burstein et al 2008, Athukorala and Khan 2015) 
the production units of the value chain located in different countries normally specialize 
in specific tasks. Therefore, the substitutability of parts and components sourced from 
various sources is rather limited. In addition, setting up of overseas production bases 
and establishing the services links entail high fixed costs. Once such fixed costs are 
incurred, relative price/cost changes become less important in business decision making.  
Changes in exchange rates also have offsetting effects on imports and exports and thus, 
the net effect of the changes in the exchange rate changes on exports within production 
networks can tend to be weaker than in the standard case of producing the entire 
product in a given country.   
This paper also examines the role of institutions within global production sharing and  it 
is expected that institutions will play a significant role in global production sharing by 
providing a more conducive environment to doing business. This is primarily because 
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most of the trade in global production sharing is dominated by MNEs, which are likely 
to prefer investing in stable countries.  
Weak political institutions are likely to lead to higher uncertainty and increased setup 
and running costs for business. This is likely to directly increase the cost of doing 
business. Weak political institutions may also lead to corruption. Section 3.1 showed 
how setup costs, running costs, regulatory framework and other associated costs can 
discourage global production sharing in particular and businesses in general. An 
improvement in institutions is also likely to make the production process more efficient. 
Based on this, we would expect that improvements in institutions are likely to increase 
exports in both network and final goods trade in manufacturing. To capture institutions 
we use political stability and absence of violence as a measure – as taken from world 
governance indicators.  
Advancements in technology can both enable the production process to be sliced into 
smaller sections and reduce transport costs. Both of these processes enhance global 
production sharing. To capture this effect, we include a technology variable in our 
regression, where patent application9  by resident population is used as a proxy for 
innovation.  We also include standard geographic and cultural variables in our gravity 
model in both final goods and parts and components trade equations.  
6.2 Estimation  
The regressions are run separately, both for manufacturing and parts and components 
exports.  This paper employs the correlated random effect (CRE), Hausman-Taylor (HT) 
and random effect methods to estimate the empirical models (Dascal et al., 2002, 
Wooldridge, 2005, Athukorala and Nasir, 2012, Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2001, 
Wooldridge, 2012). The Hausman test favours CRE of the three estimation techniques.   
There is a growing literature on using time-invariant variables in panel data approach 
(Krishnakumar, 2006, Mundlak, 1978, Oaxaca and Geisler, 2003, Wooldridge, 2012). 
                                                          
9 The patent variable is a better measure of technological capability of the country than 
internet users which is more of a proxy for communications infrastructure.  
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Given this, this study employs the CRE approach to capture time-invariant variables.10 
The coefficients estimated using the CRE are the same as fixed effects (FE), with the 
added advantage that time-invariant variables are not cancelled out.  Moreover, CRE 
allows us to control for marginal improvements, as well as the average levels of the 
variables that we are interested in. The other main advantages of using the CRE 
approach is that it allows us to test the assumptions used in the HT and RE estimations, 
using the Hausman Test. However, one of the problems with CRE is that because of 
multicollinearity, its estimates can be less precise. As such, it would be useful to 
supplement the CRE results with the HT and RE estimates.  
The HT approach is widely used in estimating the gravity model (Chaney, 2013, Feenstra 
et al., 2001). It can control endogeneity in RE and Pooled OLS methodologies.  In both 
the RE and pooled OLS approaches, there can be time-invariant country-specific effects 
not accounted for in the regression, that are correlated with the independent variable. 
The HT approach controls for endogeneity by using an internal instrument approach (see 
appendix 1B for further discussion) The HT approach does not control for all the 
endogeneity. 11   However, the results remain robust when we use CRE, HT and RE. 
Together this points to the fact that the results are not sensitive to the estimation 
methodology used.  
This study follows the standard practice of allowing for economic mass variables and 
RTA (regional trade agreements) to be endogenous in our HT approach (Feenstra et al., 
2001) .  Additional variables used - such as GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, 
technology and institutions 12  - can also be endogenous to time-invariant country-
specific effects. This paper also presents RE for comparison and robustness of the results. 
                                                          
10 The CRE approach is explained in Appendix 1B 
11There is reverse causality from exports to economic mass variables which has largely been ignored in 
the literature. The reason why the reverse causality is not given so much attention is mostly because the 
reverse causality due to bilateral trade is a very small part of GDP, as such the reverse causality is not 
very large. This paper checks for robustness of results by explicitly taking into account of this reverse 
causality. In particular, we lag economic mass variables where our identification assumption is that 
current trade value cannot impact appropriately lagged past values of the GDP and manufacturing value 
added.  These results are produced in the Appendix 1c and show that our main results are still robust 
after accounting for the reverse causality.  
12 These variables are treated as endogenous in the HT approach.  
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Furthermore, using a panel data approach allows us to capture the relationship between 
relevant variables over a longer period of time, thus allowing us to identify the role of 
the overall business cycles over this period. Given that the global financial crises (GFC) 
and the Asian financial crises (AFC) happened during the time frame of our dataset, 
accounting for business cycles is important.   
7 Results and Robustness Tests 
7.1 Results 
This section summarises the main results for both parts and components and 
manufacturing goods trade. The estimated trade equations are reported in Table 7.2. 
Columns 1 and 2 in the table present the results based on CRE. While Column 3 to 6 
examine robustness tests. Specifically, Columns 3 and 4 give results based on the HT 
estimation and Columns 5 and 6 give results based on the RE estimation. The discussion 
in this section focuses on the CRE estimates - this paper’s preferred estimation 
technique.  
The manufacturing output of the home country and partner country is statistically 
significant (at the one-percent level), with the expected sign in all our regressions. The 
coefficient of manufacturing output, both as a supply base variable and demand base 
variable, lies in the range of previous studies for both final goods manufacturing exports 
and parts and components exports (Athukorala, 2005, Athukorala, 2011, Athukorala and 
Menon, 2010, Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006, Baldwin and Taglioni, 2011).  
More specifically, for parts and components, a one per cent increase in manufacturing 
value added of the home country increases parts and components exports by 1.58 per 
cent. The elasticity of the partner country manufacturing value added is also statistically 
significant at the one per cent level and in the range of previous studies for parts and 
components. In particular, a one per cent increase in partner country manufacturing 
value added implies a 1.16 per cent increase for parts and components exports.13     
                                                          
13 Elasticities with regards to manufacturing value added are slightly on the higher side compared to the 
literature, however the HT and RE estimates are more towards the average of what most studies find.  
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For total manufacturing exports, a one per cent increase in manufacturing value added 
for the home country increases final goods manufacturing exports by 1.48 per cent and 
while a similar increase in partner country manufacturing value added increases final 
goods manufacturing exports by 1.00 per cent. A sensitivity analysis based on HT and RE 
estimations yields qualitatively similar results for both total manufacturing and parts 
and components trade.  
GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared have the expected signs and are significant 
at the one per cent level for both parts and components exports and manufacturing final 
goods exports. The coefficient on GDP per capita is positive, while the coefficient on GDP 
per capita squared is negative, showing that the relationship between exports and GDP 
per capita is quadratic. This is in line with the theory that as countries develop, services 
sector gains in share of the GDP and crowds out the manufacturing sector. These results 
remain robust to HT and RE specifications.  
The coefficient on distance is highly significant, with the expected negative, in all of our 
regressions. This indicates that transport costs play an important role in trade flow for 
both manufacturing final good and parts and components exports. The absolute value 
on the coefficient of distance is higher for parts and components than it is for final goods 
– which shows that parts and components trade is relatively more sensitive to transport 
costs. This partly reflects the fact that in network trade, parts and components have to 
cross multiple borders to reach the final stages of production.  
Based on the CRE results, institutions play an important role in parts and components 
exports. Ceteris paribus, a one unit increase in the institution index increases parts and 
components exports by approximately 9 per cent for all the countries. This result 
remains fairly similar for the HT and RE estimations.  
Based on CRE estimates, one per cent increase in the patent applications by residents, 
increases exports by 0.16 per cent for parts and components. This coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.  Moreover, estimates based on HT and RE 
yield statistically significant estimates for the technology variable at the 1 per cent level. 
These estimates are in line with this study’s theory that advocates that technological 
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growth will lead to finer slices of the production process causing an increase in global 
production sharing. Another reason why technology plays a more significant role in 
network trade is that improvement in technology reduces transport and communication 
costs which are central to service link costs (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990).  
For manufacturing final goods exports, technology plays a relatively less important role 
and for the CRE estimates the technology variable is not even significant.  Also 
noteworthy is that the technology variable is highly correlated with GDP per capita and 
part of the technology impact on parts and components exports and final goods exports 
may be captured by GDP per capita.  
The coefficient of the standard deviation of the domestic inflation rate has the expected 
sign and is significant at the one per cent level for parts and components. Ceteris paribus, 
a one unit increase in standard deviation of inflation decreases parts and components 
exports by approximately 3 per cent. Also, results of the HT and RE approaches 
consistently show a negative relationship between the standard deviation of domestic 
inflation and exports of parts and components. This confirms our hypothesis that 
macroeconomic stability is important for global production sharing. In particular, as the 
parts and components trade is dominated by multinationals, a stable and conducive 
macroeconomic environment provides a safe investment atmosphere for multinationals 
which in turn helps to augment the parts and components trade.  
The coefficient of LPI is positive but insignificant for the CRE estimates. This may reflect 
collinearity with the mean values14.  However, the results for the HT and RE estimation 
techniques show that infrastructure plays an important role in supporting the parts and 
components trade. The coefficient for communications has the expected sign and is 
significant at the one per cent level. A one percent increase in this variable increases 
global production sharing exports by 0.07 per cent. As this variable is a proxy for 
                                                          
14 As the LPI data has gaps, as such missing values were filled by the closest years. This may 
induce collinearity issues with the mean values. This is also evident as the mean value of LPI is 
highly significant and positive.  The insignificance of the variable, may also reflect the 
multicollinearity between GDP per capita and LPI. 
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communication infrastructure, it shows that services link costs are important 
determinants for global production sharing.  
For parts and components regression, RER is not statistically significant at the 
conventional levels. As a significant portion of network trade is relationship specific, 
including intra-firm and hence shielded by exchange rate fluctuations, RER does not 
seem to be an important determinant for parts and components trade.  This is an 
important result, because it shows movements of international prices do affect trade 
flows within network trade.  
Results for RTA shows that trade agreements are important for both the parts and 
components and the final goods trade. Moreover, similar to previous studies, the results 
for other geographic variables are comparable to previous studies on manufacturing and 
the parts and components trade (Athukorala, 2005, Mundlak, 1978). 
Table 7.1 Variable List 
lhmva Log of home country manufacturing value added 
lpmva Log of partner country manufacturing value added 
politicalstability Institutions variable based on political stability 
ltotalpa_res Technology captured by log of patent application (residents) 
l_CI Communications infrastructure 
LPI Logistic performance index 
LOC Vector of geography and culture based variables  
Ldistw Log of Distance 
GDPPC Gross domestic product per capita 
l Letter ‘l’ before a variable signifies natural log 
p and h  Letter p before a variable signifies partner country and letter h signifies 
home country.  
Chapter 2 Global Production Sharing: Patterns and Determinants 
42 
Table 7.2 Results and Robustness Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES PC RCE MNF RCE PC HT MNF HT PC RE MNF RE 
       
Log of home country supply 
base variable  
1.58*** 1.48*** 1.08*** 1.13*** 1.07*** 1.10*** 
 (11.20) (12.63) (35.74) (51.10) (21.56) (27.93) 
Log of partner country demand 
base variable 
1.16*** 1.00*** 1.17*** 1.06*** 0.99*** 0.91*** 
 (14.37) (17.70) (39.97) (52.30) (28.15) (30.63) 
Log of home country GDP per 
capita 
1.89*** 1.32*** 1.60*** 1.25*** 2.71*** 0.93*** 
 (2.64) (2.72) (5.60) (6.39) (6.09) (2.59) 
Log of home country GDP per 
capita squared 
-0.16*** -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.16*** -0.07*** 
 (-3.93) (-4.62) (-5.16) (-7.03) (-6.24) (-3.19) 
Log of communication 
infrastructure  
0.07** 0.05** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 
 (2.52) (2.57) (8.15) (6.04) (3.70) (4.92) 
Log of total patent applications 
by residents  
0.16*** 0.02 0.16*** 0.03*** 0.11*** 0.01 
 (4.50) (0.97) (11.99) (3.30) (3.59) (0.55) 
Standard deviation of inflation 
rate.  
-0.03*** -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05*** 
 (-4.41) (-3.04) (-5.31) (-6.75) (-9.94) (-9.06) 
Log of real exchange rate -0.01 0.01 -0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES PC RCE MNF RCE PC HT MNF HT PC RE MNF RE 
 (-1.35) (0.77) (-1.99) (2.18) (0.20) (2.12) 
Log of logistic performance 
indicator  
0.35 0.21 0.34** -0.05 1.67*** 0.84*** 
 (1.08) (0.92) (2.05) (-0.46) (5.52) (3.81) 
Institution based on political 
stability 
0.09** 0.05* 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.13*** 0.05* 
 (2.30) (1.95) (4.24) (3.28) (3.24) (1.80) 
Regional trade agreements 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 
 (4.94) (6.86) (12.76) (18.94) (5.52) (7.06) 
Colony 0.42** 0.34** 0.39 0.36 0.27 0.26 
 (2.36) (2.10) (1.24) (1.45) (1.32) (1.41) 
Log of distance  -1.07*** -1.02*** -1.16*** -1.14*** -1.07*** -1.03*** 
 (-28.74) (-33.67) (-19.06) (-23.64) (-26.36) (-31.82) 
Contiguity of border -0.16 0.09 -0.47 -0.41* -0.31 -0.10 
 (-0.86) (0.64) (-1.55) (-1.69) (-1.54) (-0.70) 
Common ethnic language  0.74*** 0.73*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.83*** 
 (5.27) (6.39) (4.60) (5.70) (5.63) (6.82) 
Mean of log of home country 
supply base variable 
-0.42*** -0.64***     
 (-2.65) (-4.85)     
Mean of log of partner country 
demand base variable 
-0.30*** -0.20***     
 (-3.64) (-3.39)     
Mean of log of home country 0.15 -1.21**     
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES PC RCE MNF RCE PC HT MNF HT PC RE MNF RE 
GDP per capita 
 (0.17) (-2.17)     
Mean of log of home country 
GDP per capita squared 
-0.01 0.10***     
 (-0.25) (3.19)     
Mean of log of communication 
infrastructure 
0.69***      
 (5.19)      
Mean of log of total patent 
applications by residents 
-0.20*** 0.04     
 (-3.34) (1.00)     
Mean of log of real exchange 
rate 
0.09*** 0.06***     
 (6.24) (5.57)     
Mean of log of logistic 
performance indicator 
6.73*** 5.11***     
 (10.35) (9.80)     
Mean of institution based on 
political stability 
0.16 -0.13     
 (1.32) (-1.50)     
Mean of regional trade 
agreements 
-0.28* -0.48***     
 (-1.91) (-4.22)     
All financial crises dummies   -0.12** -0.08**   
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES PC RCE MNF RCE PC HT MNF HT PC RE MNF RE 
   (-2.10) (-2.19)   
Constant -44.56*** -25.24*** -44.19*** -36.70*** -45.30*** -32.50*** 
 (-16.51) (-14.03) (-27.70) (-32.85) (-18.90) (-16.46) 
       
Observations 24,629 24,849 32,710 33,315 24,629 24,849 
Number of pairid 1,673 1,675 2,201 2,203 1,673 1,675 
 Note: PC stand for parts and components, while MNF stands for final manufacturing
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8 Conclusion 
Global production sharing has become prominent in international trade. This paper 
examines determinants of trade based on global production sharing, by building a 
theoretical framework and empirically testing it uses a panel dataset of 44 countries, 
covering 18 years from 1996 to 2013.  The model captures a number of explanatory 
variables ignored in the previous literature.   This study uses a battery of estimation 
techniques including CRE, HT and RE to test the robustness of these results.  
The evidence in the paper suggests that institutions play an important role in parts and 
components trade. Macroeconomic stability also plays a significant role in augmenting 
global production sharing.  These are important results, with policy implications for 
countries that want to capture part of the growing network trade. In particular, these 
results suggest that providing with a business friendly and conducive environment is 
important for attracting investment from multinationals which dominate parts and 
components trade.    
The results also support the hypothesis that technological improvements play an 
influential role in augmenting network trade. Given this, as technological innovations 
continue, we would expect a further proliferation of global production sharing. 
Technological advancements augment global production sharing by enabling the 
production process to be sliced up into smaller sections and allocated across the world, 
based on comparative advantage. Transport costs were found to be a significant and 
robust determinant of network trade. Given this, it can be argued that reducing trade-
related costs by reducing transport costs or signing trade agreements can augment 
bilateral trade flows between countries.  
The results of the study have several policy implications for countries which want to 
increase exports and capture part of the network trade.  In order to reap gains from 
network trade, countries need to reduce service link costs by improving both physical 
and communications infrastructure. As network trade is dominated by multinationals, 
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thus, in order to be a part of the global production sharing process, countries need to 
improve institutions, provide a stable macroeconomic environment and create a 
conducive investment environment to attract multinationals.  Attracting multinationals 
will also help these countries gain access to the global innovations required to foster 
global production sharing.  
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Appendix 1 A Data 
Full dataset. Country Names 
Argentina Mexico 
Australia Netherlands 
Bangladesh Norway 
Belgium Pakistan 
Brazil Philippines 
Canada Poland 
China Portugal 
China, Hong Kong SAR Rep. of Korea 
Costa Rica Russian Federation 
Czech Rep. Singapore 
Denmark Slovakia 
Finland Slovenia 
France South Africa 
Germany Spain 
Hungary Sri Lanka 
India Sweden 
Indonesia Switzerland 
Ireland Thailand 
Israel Turkey 
Italy United Kingdom 
Japan USA 
Malaysia Viet Nam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 Global Production Sharing: Patterns and Determinants 
49 
Appendix 1 B.1  Correlated Random Effect (CRE). 
This section briefly explains the CRE approach. For a detailed description see Wooldridge 
(2012).  To explain the CRE, this section follows  Wooldridge (2012). Assume, for 
simplicity, a case of one explanatory variable. Where ai are unobserved country fixed 
effects.  
Yijt= α + X’i1t β1+ ai+ ϵijt ϵijt   (B.1.1) 
The average of the above equation is: 
?̅?ijt= α + ?̅?’i1t β1+ ai+ 𝜖 i̅jt   (B.1.2) 
Since ai is by definition constant over time, it is correlated with the average level of 
explanatory variable ?̅? . Following Wooldridge (2012), assume a simple linear 
relationship.  
ai= δ + ?̅?’i1t β1+ +𝑟I (B.1.3) 
Then the original equation becomes: 
Yijt= α + X’it β1 + δ + ?̅?’it β1 +𝑟i + ϵijt                               (CRE1) 
Assume that 𝑟i is uncorrelated with X’it  and because ?̅?’i is a linear function of X’it, then:  
Cov(?̅?’it, 𝑟i)   = 0   
As Cov(Xit, 𝑎i)= 0 holds and as ϵijt is assumed to be uncorrelated with X’it and ?̅?’I, then we 
can estimate (CRE1) using random effects. So CRE1 is like RE estimation with the addition 
of ?̅?’I. 
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Appendix 1 B.2  Hausman-Taylor (HT) 
The HT regression distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous variables.  The 
individual effect model is written as follows: 
Yijt= α + X’i1t β1+ X’i2t β2+Zi1’β3+ Zi1’β3+ ηi+ ϵijt   (B.2.1) 
Where X variables denote time variant variables and Z variables denote time-invariant 
variables. Furthermore, this approach assumes the following: 
E(Zi1,   ηi)   =0      and E(X’i1t,   ηi)   = 0  but Zi2     and  X’i2t are  assumed to be correlated 
with  ηi. HT is based on a Random Effect type transformation as follows: 
Yijt= α +X̃’i1t β1+ X̃’i2t β2+Z̃i1’β3+ Z̃i2’β3+?̃?i+ 𝜖̃ijt ϵijt   (B.2.2) 
Where X̃i1t = X̃i1t- ɣX̅i1 .This transformation ensures that time-invariant variables are not 
dropped.  Now to deal with the correlation between ?̃? i2t and ?̃? i2 with ?̃? i. The HT 
approach uses IVs. For X̃i2t the instrument used is Ẍi2t= Xi2t-?̅?2i, for Z̃2 the instrument 
usedis X̅i1 . The variable uses Ẍi1t as an instrument for X̃i1t and Zi1 as an instrument for 
Z̃i1 (Wooldridge, 2012, Krishnakumar, 2006, Oaxaca and Geisler, 2003). 
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Appendix 1 C Robustness Test Using Lagged Supply Base and 
Demand Base Variables.  
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES PC 
  
ltotalpa 0.02 
 (1.33) 
lrer 0.02*** 
 (3.13) 
l_h_lpi 1.10*** 
 (5.43) 
L.lhmva 1.37*** 
 (38.77) 
L.lpmva 1.12*** 
 (28.95) 
rta 0.28*** 
 (6.22) 
h_ins_corr 0.20*** 
 (5.72) 
sdinfrate -0.07*** 
 (-4.60) 
colony -0.55 
 (-1.20) 
ldistw -1.20*** 
 (-13.08) 
contig -0.28 
 (-0.69) 
comlang_ethno 1.25*** 
 (4.88) 
Constant -35.00*** 
 (-23.41) 
  
Observations 17,977 
Number of pairid 1,711 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 3  
Exchange Rate Pass-Through for Manufactured Goods in the 
Presence of Network Trade 
 
1 Introduction 
The fragmentation of the production process across international borders, known as 
global production networks (GPN)15, has changed international trade in a substantial 
manner (Bridgman, 2012, Helpman, 2011, Hummels et al., 2001, Chen et al., 2005). 
Network trade – trade within GPN –  has grown at a much faster rate than total world 
manufacturing trade over the past four decades (Yeats, 1998, Yi, 2003, Majeed, 2012, 
Bridgman, 2012). Using a theoretical model and a novel and disaggregated dataset, this 
paper studies exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) under the presence of network trade. 
Movements in exchange rates are likely to impact import prices and domestic prices. 
ERPT measures how responsive domestic prices are to changes in exchanges rates. This 
pass-through of the exchange rate to import and domestics prices is often found to be 
incomplete (Burstein and Gopinath, 2013).  
There is likely to be heterogeneity in the ERPT between network trade and final goods 
trade. Partly reflecting the fact that most of the trade in global production sharing is 
relationship specific, including intra-firm trade (Chen et al., 2005, Bridgman, 2012, 
Helpman, 2011, Hummels et al., 2001). Given this, global production sharing is likely to 
be shielded from fluctuations in the exchange rate. This heterogeneity of ERPT is 
expected to be more prominent for countries that have a high share of the parts and 
components trade.  
There is a vast literature on ERPT (Burstein and Gopinath, 2013, Campa and Goldberg, 
2005b, Choudhri et al., 2005, Dornbusch, 1987, Faruqee, 2006). These papers have 
focused on aggregated import and domestic prices, overlooking the impact of global 
                                                          
15 Also called global production sharing. 
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production sharing. Given the increase in global production sharing, this is a major gap 
in the literature.  
The study of ERPT in the presence of network trade has been limited by data availability. 
The only study that has tried to examine16 this link empirically uses data based on the 
restrictive assumptions  of Input-output tables (IOT)17  (Powers and Riker, 2013). My 
study overcomes the problems faced by IOTs, by creating a unique import price 
database for the US18. 
The study adds to the literature in three novel ways. First, a model is developed to 
explain why the ERPT may be lower under global production sharing. Drawing on 
Dornbusch (1987), the model captures relationship specificity using intra-firm trade. 
Secondly, this model is simulated with various scenarios showing that an increase in 
network trade does indeed cause ERPT to be lower. Lastly, an empirical investigation is 
undertaken using a vector autoregression (VAR) methodology and a unique dataset 
created for the US.  
The theoretical part of this paper looks at both the parts and components trade and the 
final assembly, within global production sharing. However, the empirical analysis of the 
paper focuses only on parts and components because price data is not available for final 
assembly. The empirical investigation is undertaken by looking at various import price 
indices based on their share of the parts and components trade for the US. The US is 
used as a case study because it has the most disaggregated import price data available.   
To preview the results, theoretically, the model in this paper shows how ERPT is lower 
under global production sharing. This result is further endorsed by simulating the model. 
The final sections of this paper empirically prove the above-mentioned claim. The paper 
is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature, Section 3 builds the theoretical 
                                                          
16 To the best of our knowledge, (Powers and Riker, 2013) is the only study on ERPT focusing on network 
trade.  
17 IOT assume conformity across several countries, industries and over the time. For an activity like 
network trade that has been shaped by rapid technological growth and has proliferated various 
industries and countries in different ways, the IOT assumptions are often restrictive. 
18 The US is used as a case study because it has the most disaggregated import price data available. 
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model, Section 4 simulates the model, Section 5 describes the empirical strategy, 
Section 6 analyses data, Section 7 gives the results and Section 8 concludes.  
2 Literature Review 
Study on ERPT for global production sharing has been limited. However, several papers 
have concentrated on ERPT more broadly. The following section reviews the literature.  
There have been several theoretical frameworks developed to look at ERPT. Some 
models have looked at interactions between firms in an imperfect competition 
framework (Krugman, 1986), while Froot and Klemperer (1989) focus on the trade-off 
firms face between market shares and profits due to exchange rate movements. They 
use a dynamic model to investigate this relationship. Moreover, competition between 
foreign and domestic firms can also help explain some of the dynamics in ERPT  
(Dornbusch, 1987). Dornbusch (1987) also highlights some of the microeconomic 
fundamentals such as market structure, product substitutability and the relative number 
of foreign to domestic firms, as factors explaining the dynamics of ERPT. Pricing to 
market, or local currency pricing, can also be important both for market shares and ERPT 
dynamics.  
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) use a framework of monopolistic competition and nominal 
prices to analyse ERPT.  They examine the case where imports of intermediate goods 
have to undergo either further production or distribution before being consumed. This 
process of further production or distribution can mitigate ERPT. Campa and Goldberg 
(2002) and (Campa and Goldberg, 2005b) also focus on microeconomic variables to 
explain ERPT.  
There are also macroeconomic reasons why ERPT displays dynamics. These include 
enhanced credibility attached to monetary policy (Taylor, 2000, McCarthy, 2007) and 
the role of the inflationary environment (Choudhri and Hakura, 2006).  
There have been some studies looking at ERPT specifically for manufacturing prices 
(Athukorala and Menon, 1994b, Yang, 1997).   Yang (1997) looks at the pass-through 
elasticities of various manufacturing industries. His analysis finds that the average short-
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run pass-through is about 0.32 and the average long-run pass-through is 0.42.  
Athukorala and Menon (1994b) find that for the Japanese manufacturing sector, a one 
percentage point change in Yen would result in a 0.67 per cent change in foreign 
currency export prices in the long run.  
Several papers have tried to analyse empirically the impact of ERPT in a broader and 
more aggregated sense. Below is a brief summary of these studies. Burstein and 
Gopinath (2015) highlight some of the main findings for ERPT. They emphasise that ERPT 
into consumer price is lower than into border prices. Moreover, according to their study 
and literature survey, ERPT usually displays dynamics, is typically incomplete in the long 
run and varies considerably across countries.  Moreover, they find that ERPT is lower for 
consumer prices than it is for border prices.  
There have been other studies examining this relationship (Campa and Goldberg, 2002, 
Campa and Goldberg, 2005a, Choudhri et al., 2005, Faruqee, 2006, McCarthy, 2007, 
Taylor, 2000, Aleem and Lahiani, 2014). McCarthy (2007) uses a vector autoregression 
(VAR) methodology and incorporates distribution chain of pricing19 to study ERPT for 
United States (US), Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherland, 
Sweden and Switzerland. He finds that ERPT has a smaller effect on domestic inflation, 
but has a bigger impact on import prices.  He also finds that ERPT is larger in countries 
with bigger import shares and more persistent exchange rates and import prices. For 
empirical purposes, this paper also follows the literature and uses distribution chain of 
pricing.   
Kim (2003) uses a Vector error correction model (VECM) model to study the relationship 
between stock prices, industrial production, real exchange rate, interest rate and 
inflation in the US.  His analysis reveals that stock prices, industrial production and 
inflation are the three variables in this relationship that adjust to error correct the 
disequilibrium.  
                                                          
19 The idea of the distribution chain is that import prices affect producer prices which in turn affect 
consumer prices. 
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Choudhri et al. (2005) study the performance of various new open economy models in 
explaining ERPT for various prices. They compare the performance of these studies using 
a VAR methodology. Choudhri et al. (2005) find that the models based on local currency 
pricing are better able to predict the movements in domestics prices and wages when 
these models incorporate distribution costs for imports.  
3 Theoretical Framework.  
In this section, I build a model to look at how ERPT behaves in the presence of global 
production sharing. The model shows how slicing up the production process reduces 
ERPT - this is a direct result of intra-firm transactions20 being partly shielded by exchange 
rate movements. The theoretical methodology is based on the model of Dornbusch 
(1987). The model built for ERPT under global production sharing is compared with a 
scenario where there is no global production sharing and products are only imported.  
To analyse ERPT, we assume that there are two countries - home and foreign. There are 
n foreign firms that are involved in the export of final goods to the home country (which 
is the complete production of the good in the foreign country or non-network trade 
firms) and there are n* firms that are involved in global production sharing. The n* firms 
have their production processes located in both countries (headquarters in the home 
country and final assembly in the foreign country) and the final good produced by the 
n* companies is also imported into the home country. Examples of this are the car 
manufacturing industry in the US that has headquarters in the US and factories for 
assembly in Mexico like Ford (Sarmiento, 2012). Another example is Apple, with 
headquarters in the US and some production and assembly in China.  
To analyse ERPT, I look at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and derive price elasticity.    
𝑄 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝           (1) 
𝑄 = 𝑛𝑞 + 𝑛∗𝑞∗           (2) 
                                                          
20 Intra-firm transections reflect relationship specific agreements within global production sharing.   
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𝜋𝑖  = 𝑝𝑞𝑖 − 𝑚𝑒𝑞𝑖           (3) 
𝜋 𝑖
∗ = 𝑝𝑞𝑖
∗ − 𝛾(𝑚1 + 𝑚2𝑒)𝑞𝑖
∗21 .            (4) 
Where Q is total output produced by n and n* firms, p is price, 𝜋𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋 𝑖
∗  are profits 
for foreign and global production sharing firms respectively, while  𝑞𝑖  and 𝑞𝑖
∗  denote 
output by foreign and global production sharing firms respectively, m are costs that vary 
with level of output for the foreign firm and e is exchange rate. For network trade related 
firms, m1 denotes costs that are denominated in headquarter country terms. This may 
include the marginal cost of production in the home country, the cost of borrowing 
capital both for home and foreign country plants (Satariano, November, 2013) 22 , 
transportation costs, employees  who are paid costs in terms of headquarter pricing, 
quality control, after sale service, professionals hired by headquarters with joint 
responsibility for home and foreign plants23; and other service costs that vary with 
production level and are denominated in headquarter country’s currency. Next, m2 is 
the cost of production and assembly of global production sharing firms in the foreign 
country and 𝛾 denotes the cost competiveness of global production sharing firms.  
The way in which the process mentioned above captures ERPT within network trade is 
by creating an example of how a firm (n*) splits its production function across two 
countries. Where its production process in the foreign factory includes making parts and 
components. The example will show below (including with simulations) when parts and 
components costs captured by m2 increase as a proportion of total costs, ERPT falls.    
Moreover, when firms allocate production factors based on comparative advantage of 
different countries they receive cost reductions. For instance, when labour intensive 
costs are shifted to labour abundant countries then there can be a substantial reduction 
is wage costs. This cost reduction is of efficient allocation of the factors of production 
                                                          
21 This model can be extended to include multiple countries in the production sharing of global 
production sharing firms.  
22 To stimulate this thought following examples may be helpful, if Ford wants to set up a plant than it 
more likely to seek funding in the US financial markets rather to go to Mexico’s financial markets, or if 
apple wants to set up a plant in Malaysia or China then it is more likely to get funding organized in the 
US.  
23 Examples of this may include Apple Hardware engineers who are based in the US but are jointly 
involved in monitoring projects in Asia’s factories.  
Chapter 3 Exchange rate pass-through for manufactured goods in the presence of network trade  
58 
and production centres is captured by gamma (𝛾).  The higher the cost competiveness 
of the network trade firms, the lower gamma (𝛾) is. Moreover, weak axiom of cost 
minimization (WACM) is used, (Varian, 1992, Varian and Repcheck, 2010, Mas-Colell et 
al., 1995), according to which Equation (5) holds. Combined, Equation (5) and WACM 
indicates that the choice of firm production process reveals cost minimization 
behaviour. In essence, if a firm undertakes network trade, then it must be because 
network trade yields a lower cost compared to producing in only one country.    
𝛾(𝑚1 + 𝑚2𝑒) ≤  𝑚𝑒                (5) 
Using Equation (2) and (3), I get (6). 
𝜋𝑖  =
(𝑎− 𝑞𝑖−∑ 𝑞𝑗 −𝑛
∗𝑞𝑖
∗)(𝑞𝑖)
𝑏
+ 𝑚𝑒𝑞𝑖            (6) 
Where i,j = 1,2,3,…,n; i≠j 
Maximization of profit yields the following FOC: 
𝑞𝑖  =
𝑎− 𝑛∗𝑞𝑖
∗−𝑚𝑒𝑏
1+𝑛
           (7) 
Similarly, for global production sharing firms, profit is given by: 
𝜋 𝑖
∗  =
(𝑎− 𝑞𝑖
∗−∑ 𝑞𝑗
∗ −𝑛𝑞𝑖)(𝑞𝑖
∗)
𝑏
+ (𝑚1 + 𝑚2𝑒) 𝑞𝑖
∗         (8) 
Taking FOC to get: 
𝑞𝑖
∗  =
𝑎− 𝑛𝑞𝑖−∅𝑏
1+𝑛∗
           (9) 
Where ∅ =  𝛾(𝑚1 + 𝑚2𝑒) 
Equations (7) and (9) give us reaction functions respectively. Using the reactions 
functions to get: 
𝑞𝑖 =
𝑎−𝑚𝑒𝑏
1+𝑛
−  
𝑛∗ (𝑎− 𝑛𝑞𝑖−∅𝑏)
(1+𝑛)(1+𝑛∗)
          (8) 
This can be simplified to get: 
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𝑞𝑖  =
𝑎−𝑚𝑒𝑏 (1+𝑛∗)+∅𝑏𝑛∗
(1+𝑛+𝑛∗)
           (9) 
Similarly for 𝑞𝑖
∗:  
𝑞𝑖  =
𝑎−∅𝑏 (1+𝑛)+𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑏)
(1+𝑛+𝑛∗)
           (10) 
Deriving an equation for price using Equations (1), (9) and (10) to get:  
𝑝 =
a
b
 –
{
𝑛[a – meb(1+𝑛∗)+ ∅𝑏𝑛∗]
N
+
𝑛∗[a –  ∅𝑏(1+𝑛)+ 𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑛]
N
 }
𝑏
        (11) 
Where N = 1 + 𝑛 + 𝑛∗ 
Simplifying we get: 
𝑝 =
a
bN
+
[𝛾𝑚1𝑛∗+𝑒(𝑛𝑚+𝛾𝑛∗m2)]
𝑁
          (12) 
The elasticity of equilibrium prices with respect to exchange rate is given by: 
𝜕𝑝 𝑒
𝜕𝑒 𝑝
=
[𝑚𝑛+𝛾𝑚2𝑛∗]𝑒
𝑁𝑝
            (13) 
Where 𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛∗ can be seen as a proxy for supply variables.  
Next,  I compare the elasticity of prices with respect to exchange rate in the simple case 
where the good is imported into the home country and is produced completely in the 
foreign country by foreign firms – i.e., there is no global production sharing. We assume 
?̃? for number of foreign firm, exporting to the home country. To make the analysis 
comparable it is assumed that ?̃? =  𝑛 + 𝑛∗. The cost and profit functions are similar to 
exporting firms in the previous set up.  For completeness, I reprint the equations below.  
𝑄 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝            (14) 
𝜋′𝑖  = 𝑝𝑞′𝑖 − 𝑚𝑒𝑞′𝑖           (15) 
Where subscript ‘ represents the scenario where there are only foreign firms exporting 
to the home country. Thus FOC w.r.t. to  𝑞′𝑖 yields 
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𝑞′𝑖
∗  =
𝑎−𝑏𝑒𝑚
1+?̃?
            (16) 
Substituting into Equation (14) and rearranging gives: 
𝑝 =
a
b
 –
?̃?𝑎
𝑏(?̃?+1)
+  
?̃?𝑏𝑒𝑚
𝑏(?̃?+1)
           (17) 
Price elasticity w.r.t to e gives  
𝜕𝑝 𝑒
𝜕𝑒 𝑝
̃
=
(𝑚?̃?)𝑒
(?̃?+1)𝑝
            (18) 
Where 
𝜕𝑝 𝑒
𝜕𝑒 𝑝
̃
 is the elasticity of prices with respect to the exchange rate in the scenario 
where the good is imported into the home country completely produced by foreign 
firms. It can be shown that price elasticity with respect to exchange rate is smaller under 
global production sharing than the case where the good is completely imported into 
home country, or in other words, Equation (18) is less than Equation (13) for the same 
values of e and p.  
Proof:  
I prove by contradiction.  For the same values of e and p, if Equations (18) > (13) then: 
[𝑚𝑛+𝛾𝑚2𝑛∗]
𝑁
>  
(𝑚?̃?)
(?̃?+1)
   
Plugging in ?̃? =  𝑛 + 𝑛∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 N =  1 + 𝑛 + 𝑛∗ gives 
[𝑚𝑛+𝛾𝑚2𝑛∗]
1+𝑛+𝑛∗
>  
𝑚(𝑛+𝑛∗ )
(𝑛+𝑛∗ +1)
   
Next, simplifying and rearranging gives: 
 
𝛾𝑚2𝑛∗
1+𝑛+𝑛∗
>  
𝑚𝑛+𝑚𝑛∗− 𝑚𝑛
(𝑛+𝑛∗ +1)
                  
This means that 
𝛾𝑚2𝑛∗
1+𝑛+𝑛∗
>  
𝑚𝑛∗
(𝑛+𝑛∗ +1)
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is a contradiction as m2 < m and 0 < 𝛾 < 1. 
Hence, this proves that  
𝜕𝑝 𝑒
𝜕𝑒 𝑝
̃
>
𝜕𝑝 𝑒
𝜕𝑒 𝑝
  - that is ERPT is mitigated under global production 
sharing.  
Based on the model above and previous  ERPT models (Blanchard and Quah, 1988, 
McCarthy, 2000, Dornbusch, 1987) and adjusting for global production sharing 
(Athukorala, 2014) we can see that import price elasticities depend on Equation (2.1)  
p𝑖 = 𝑓 (𝑆, 𝐷, 𝑒, p𝑝 p𝑐 p𝑤 )  
Where p𝑖   is import prices , S is used to capture supply shock,   D is demand shock,  𝑒 is 
trade weighted exchange rate, p𝑝, p𝑐 , p𝑤 are domestic producer prices, consumer 
prices and trade wieghted world manufacturing producer prices, respectively. 
4 Simulation  
In this section, I simulate the model developed in Section 3 to show how an increase in 
global production sharing can reduce the extent of ERPT.  I do this by altering three 
aspects in the model presented above. First, I increase the number of firms involved in 
global production sharing, while holding firms not involved in network trade constant. 
Secondly, I increase the share of output for firms involved in global production sharing 
by making them more competitive (reducing 𝛾). In both cases, the simulation shows how 
ERPT decreases as the extent of global production sharing increases. Lastly, I show how 
increasing the proportion of headquarter cost reduces ERPT.  
I start the analysis by simulating the case where the number of global production sharing  
firms varies between 0 and 20, while holding the number of the other firms fixed. As the 
number of firms involved in global production sharing increases, the ERPT drops as 
illustrated by the price elasticity to exchange rate in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Simulation 1
 
Data does not exist for global production sharing firms to calibrate most of the values of 
the model in section 2. As such we use a set of sensible values for the above simulation 
(Table 3.1). The value of n* is varied between 0 and 20. Changing the values of Table 4.1 
does not qualitatively change the results of our analysis.  
Table 4.1 Calibration Variables 
Variable name Value 
A 500 
B 2 
E 1 
N 10 
M 50 
𝛾 1 
 
Secondly, we increase the share of global production sharing output by making the firms 
more competitive. We do this by varying 𝛾 between 0 and 1. n* is fixed at 10, while other 
values remain the same as in Table 4.1.  The lower the value of 𝛾 the more competitive 
the firms are under global production sharing. As the firms involved in global production 
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sharing become more cost competitive, their share of output rises and ERPT falls 
(figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
Figure 4.2 Simulation 2 
 
Figure 4.3 Simulation 3 
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Furthermore, in the model above, if we increase the proportion of headquarter costs for 
global production sharing firms then ERPT also falls (figure 4.4). As the proportion of the 
headquarter costs of these global production sharing firms rise, ERPT displays a steady 
decline. In order to vary costs denominated in headquarter costs, I vary m1 between 0 
and 50. n* is fixed at 10, while other values remain the same as table 4.1.  
Figure 4.4 Simulation 4 
 
The above analysis shows various ways in which ERPT can be mitigated under global 
production sharing. In fact, Figures 4.1 – 4.3 show how increasing the extent of global 
production sharing will always lower ERPT.  
The next section shows empirically that ERPT is indeed lower under global production 
sharing. As mentioned before, that while data does not exist on the marginal costs of 
firms involved in global production sharing, headquarter costs, the number of firms 
involved in global production sharing, we can still look at product categories that are 
involved in global production sharing and their respective prices to look at the extent of 
ERPT.  
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5 Empirical Methodology  
To estimate the sensitivity of prices to the exchange rate, Equation (5.1) is estimated. 
Where ∆p𝑡 is the change in prices,  ∆𝑒𝑡−𝑘  is the change in exchange rate and 𝑋𝑡 is a 
vector of control variables that includes the output gap of GDP to capture demand in 
the economy, output gap of industrial activity to capture supply, percentage change in 
manufacturing prices, percentage changes in producer prices, consumer prices, trade 
weighted world manufacturing prices and dummies to capture recessions during the 
sample period.  
∆p𝑡 =  ά𝑖 + ∑ ?́?𝑘 ∆𝑒𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 +  𝜇𝑡𝑋𝑡 + έ𝑡    (5.1)                 
I employ a VAR modelling framework24 to analyse the relationship in Equation 5.1. The 
VAR framework has several important advantages over other methodologies. For one, 
it can be used to analyse both the short-term and long-term impacts of ERPT. Moreover, 
it can account for the simultaneity of variables. There have been several studies that 
have used either a VAR or VECM methodology to study ERPT (An and Wang, 2012, 
Choudhri et al., 2005, Faruqee, 2006, Kim, 2003, McCarthy, 2007, Burstein and 
Gopinath, 2013, Choudhri and Hakura, 2015). A significant number of the papers use the 
distribution chain within the framework of a VAR (Clark, 1999, McCarthy, 2007). The 
idea of the distribution chain is that import prices affect producer prices, which in turn 
affect consumer prices. For empirical purposes, I also follow this literature and use 
distribution chain of pricing.  
The VAR system is given in Equation 5.2. ∆𝑝𝑡 is change in manufacturing import prices , 
S is used to capture supply using the output gap of US industrial activity, D is output gap 
of real GDP25, ∆e is percentage change in exchange rate, ∆Pp  is the inflation of domestic 
manufacturing producer prices, ∆Pc inflation in consumer prices, ∆Pw  is  inflation of 
                                                          
24 McCarthy, J. 2000. Pass-through of exchange rates and import prices to domestic inflation in some 
industrialized economies. FRB of New York Staff Report. proposed a VAR methodology to investigate 
ERPT 
25 Output gaps are tested using Hodrick-Prescott filter, robustness tests also use trend and quadratic 
measures to create output gaps.  
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trade weighted world manufacturing producer prices26, 𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑐 dummy for recessions in 
the US economy during the sample period and ɛi,t is the error term.  Where i subscript 
stands for total manufacturing import prices, t is subscript stands for time. For 
identification, a Cholesky decomposition is used in this study. The Cholesky 
decomposition assumes pricing along a distribution chain (McCarthy, 2007) (as 
discussed above). The order of the prices variables is: inflation in manufacturing import 
prices, inflation manufacturing producer prices, inflation in consumer prices. The results 
remain robust to changing the order of the variables27. The rest of the order of the 
variables is given in Equation 5.2  
Impulse response functions (Enders, 2008) are generated from the above VAR system 
examine the response of import prices. The shock is based on a one standard deviation 
(depreciation) shock to the exchange rate. 
∆p𝑖,𝑡 =  α𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑘,1 ∆𝑆,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑘,2 ∆𝐷,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑘,3 ∆𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 +
∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑘,4 ∆𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑘,5 ∆𝑃𝑝,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑘,6 ∆𝑃𝑐,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0  +
∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑛,𝑘,7  ∆𝑃𝑤,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 +  𝛽𝑛1𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑐 + ε𝑖,𝑡     (5.2)                 
Table 5.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
∆Pi Percentage change in total manufacturing import prices 
S Supply side – output gap of industrial activity is used to capture supply 
side variations.  
D  Demand side – output gap of US GDP is used to capture demand side 
variations. 
∆ei Percentage change in trade-weighted exchange rate 
∆Pp Inflation in manufacturing producer prices 
∆Pc Inflation in consumer prices 
∆Pw Inflation in trade-weighted world manufacturing producer prices 
                                                          
26 World manufacturing prices can be important for network trade. Removing the variable for world 
manufacturing prices does not change this paper’s results qualitatively.   
27 It is not clear whether the trade weighted world manufacturing producer prices should be put 
towards the start of the order or the end. However, the main results remain robust regardless to the 
ordering of the variable  
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𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑐 Dummy for recessions in the global and the US economies during the 
sample period  
ɛi,t Idiosyncratic error term.  
Notes: Where i subscript stands for total manufacturing import prices, t is subscript stands for time. 
To study at ERPT for parts and components imports,  the above VAR specification is 
modified by replacing inflation in manufacturing import prices, with the following  
rotating variables for manufacturing import prices for goods  with high composition of 
parts and components content (HC), import prices with medium composition of parts 
and components content (MC) and import prices with of goods with  low composition 
of parts and components content  (LC) (Equation 5.3). 
∆p𝑙,𝑡 =  α𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑛,𝑘,1 ∆𝑆,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑛,𝑘,2 ∆𝐷,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑛,𝑘,3 ∆𝑒𝑙,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 +
                       ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑛,𝑘,4 ∆𝑃𝑙,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 +   ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑛,𝑘,5 ∆𝑃𝑝,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑛,𝑘,6 ∆𝑃𝑐,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0 +
                       ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑛,𝑘,7  ∆𝑃𝑤,𝑡−𝑘 
𝑇
𝑘=0  +  𝛽8𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑐 + ε𝑙,𝑡    (5.3) 
Where l = HC, MC and LC. The following paragraphs explain the remaining variables. The 
output gap from the manufacturing activity index for the US captures supply. For 
robustness, I also try using the output gap from the rest of the world’s manufacturing 
activity – based on US’s trade partners. Capturing supply side shock from trade partners 
can be particularly important for parts and components trade where global production 
sharing plays an important role. Variables like oil price inflation and federal funds (FF) 
rate are also added as robustness checks. 
I use the output gap from the real GDP to capture demand side shocks. The output gap 
is constructed using the HP filter, but we also use linear and a quadratic trend estimate 
for robustness tests.  
Various specifications using different numbers of lags are tested to check for robustness. 
The Likelihood ratio (LR) test, Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and Final Prediction 
Error (FPE) all favour 12 lags, while the Schwarz criterion (SC) favours 2. This paper 
favours 12 lags. However, we also test with 2 lags, based on SC, to look for robustness. 
The paper finds that the results remain robust.  
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6 Data  
Data for this study is in monthly frequency and covers the period from December 1996 
to January 2014, giving a total of 206 observations. Variable names and data sources are 
given in Table 6.1. All the variables involving indices were converted so that 2005 
January is equal to 100. The rest of this section gives details of the variables and their 
sources28.  
Table 6.1 Variable Sources 
Variable  Source and definition 
p𝑝 
Producer Price Index (PPI) -excludes food and energy prices; Bureau of 
Labour Statistics 
p𝑐   
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -excludes food and energy prices; Bureau of 
Labour Statistics 
FF Federal funds effective rate - Federal Reserve 
e Trade weighed exchange rate - Federal Reserve  
S 
Manufacturing index - output gap is constructed using HP Filter; Bureau of 
Labour Statistics 
D  
Gross Domestic Product - output gap is constructed using HP Filter; Bureau 
of Economic Analysis 
Trade weights Comtrade database 
Total 
Manufacturing 
prices Import Prices for total manufacturing; Bureau of Labour Statistics 
HC  
Import prices with high content of network trade; Bureau of Labour 
Statistics 
MC 
Import prices with medium content of network trade; Bureau of Labour 
Statistics 
LC 
Import prices with low content of network trade; Bureau of Labour 
Statistics 
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) excludes food and energy prices and is extracted from 
Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). Food and energy prices are excluded as the pass-
through behaviour for these two categories differs from other products (Faruqee, 2006).  
Parts and components are delineated from the reported trade data using a list compiled 
by mapping parts and components in the UN Broad Economic Classification (BEC) with 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) at the five-digit level of commodity 
                                                          
28 Data on price changes, output gaps, federal funds rate and exchange rate changes are all stationary 
according Dicky Fuller and Phillip Person unit root tests. 
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disaggregation. The product list of the Word Trade Organization (WTO) Information. 
Technology Agreement Information was used to fill gaps in the BEC list of parts and 
components. 29  The data on import prices are compiled from the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics 30(BLS) database.   Four separate Import price indices31 are constructed by 
applying import trade weights at the four-digit level of the Harmonised System (HS)32.  
The first category is total manufactured goods. The second price category includes low 
composition (LC) of parts and components in the price indices, comprising 0 to 50 per 
cent of parts and components traded in the categories. This category is a proxy for final 
goods prices. The third category has medium composition (MC) share of parts and 
components in the price indices, containing price indices with 51 to 95 per cent of parts 
and components in the categories. Lastly, price indices involving more than 95 per cent 
composition of parts and components are called high composition (HC).    
The real gross domestic product is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
This variable is available quarterly, so I interpolated33 the data into monthly frequency. 
The manufacturing index, which was used to measure manufacturing activity in the US, 
was taken from BLS. Output gaps are constructed using Hodrick–Prescott filter. 
Following literature (Faruqee, 2006, McCarthy, 2000) and to remove nonlinearities, log 
of output gaps are used. Moreover, the output gap from the manufacturing indices for 
partner countries is included to capture overseas supply– which can be important for 
global production sharing. The overseas manufacturing index includes the same 
countries that are used to calculate the trade-weighted exchange rate34. 
The exchange rate series is constructed using the trade-weighted US bilateral exchange 
rates with Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, Malaysia, South Korea, Mexico, Japan, 
                                                          
29 The details for separating network trade from the published trade data see are given in Athukorala 
(2014). List of price categories is given in appendix A. The complete dataset is available on request.  
30 http://www.bls.gov/ 
31 Ideally, for network trade, we would like to have just two import price indices, one for final goods 
prices and one for network trade  prices.   But this is not possible became the BLS price indices for some 
4-digit HS categories cover both network trade goods and final goods. 
32 2005 as a base year. 
33 Linear interpolation was done using the time variable and the stata ipolate command.  
34 We create two series of overseas manufacturing index. One index includes China and the other 
excludes China. However, the main results exclude China, as its inclusion reduces the sample size. The 
results of this paper remain robust whether we involve china or not.  
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Canada and Euro Area35.  The import trade weights used for the construction of the four 
export price indices and exchange rate series were computed from the US 
manufacturing imports data extracted from the UN Comtrade World Integrated Trade 
Solutions database 36. For prices, inflation rates (percentage changes of the indices) is 
used as variables in the estimation equation (Faruqee, 2006) 
6.1 First Look at the Data 
Import Price inflation of various manufacturing categories is depicted in figure 6.1. Total, 
HC37 and LC content categories show a degree of co-movement. The standout category 
is MC, which shows substantial disinflation. The reason for this is that the MC category 
includes around 87 per cent of IT and communications sub-components. The IT and 
communications technology sectors have seen substantial productivity growth over the 
sample of this study and as such have seen significant disinflation. 
Figure 6.1 Monthly Changes Manufacturing Import Prices 
 
                                                          
35 As china is excluded from the overseas manufacturing index due to data limitations, the Renminbi is 
not made part of the real exchange rate index - to keep consistency between the lists of countries for 
exchange rate index and overseas manufacturing index. The results remain robust if we include the 
Renminbi in the exchange rate index.  
36 https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx 
37 HC category data is only available from Dec 1998 onwards. 
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Figure 6.2 shows the percentage change in the trade-weighted exchange rate and the 
output gaps of log industrial activity and log GDP. From the graph, we can see that 
industrial activity has a higher tendency to overshoot the GDP. Moreover, the decline in 
output during the Dot-Com bubble of 2001 and the global financial crises of 2007-8 
recessions are clearly visible in the graph. The graph also shows that there is volatility in 
the trade-weighted exchange rate. 
Figure 6.2 Exchange Rate and Output Gaps 
 
Movements of the federal funds rate and annual CPI and Producer Price Index (PPI) 
inflation are shown in Figure 6.3. We can see that annual PPI inflation is more volatile 
compared to CPI inflation. Moreover, the graph shows that the federal funds rate 
responds to changes in consumer prices. Another interesting feature of this graph is that 
the federal funds rate has been close to the zero since the global financial crises.  
Table 6.2 gives summary statistics.  
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Figure 6.3 CPI, PPI and Federal Funds Rate 
 
 
Table 6.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable  Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  Max 
Log output gap Manufacturing  204 .002 0.04 -0.12 0.08 
Log output gap GDP 201 .0007 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
Trade weighted exchange rate 
(percentage change) 204 0.36 4.81 -11.52 10.99 
Inflation CPI 204 2.05 0.48 0.61 2.93 
Inflation PPI 203 2.59 3.69 -9.97 12.55 
Inflation Manufacturing prices 194 -0.14 1.87 -4.54 4.24 
Inflation of  Parts and Components 
prices (High Composition) 182 -0.22 1.51 -4.41 4.39 
Inflation Medium Composition prices 204 -5.55 3.59 -14.02 0.65 
Inflation Final goods prices  (Low 
Composition) 194 1.03 2.26 -5.32 6.74 
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7 Empirical Results  
This section looks at pass-through. I start by analysing the exchange rate shock 38 
dynamics. Figure 7.1 shows that a typical shock of exchange rate to itself causes the 
exchange rate to peak in two months’ time with a magnitude of about 1.2 units and then 
gradually decline. The shock lasts for about 7 months.  
Figure 7.1 Response of Exchange Rate Shock to Itself  
 
7.1 Response to exchange rate shocks  
Figure 7.2 shows the response of various border prices to an exchange rate shock. The 
solid line in each graph shows the estimated response to the exchange rate shock, while 
the dashed lines give the confidence interval at the 95th percentile.  
As shown in figure 7.2A, after a one standard deviation shock (depreciation) in the 
exchange rate, the import prices of total manufactured goods increase immediately and 
peaks in around 8 months. The effect lasts 11 months. However, the ERPT is incomplete, 
as the response of the import prices is far less than that of the exchange rate to itself.  
Moreover, ERPT to import prices of manufacturing final goods or low content of global 
production sharing (LC) prices is also immediate, with the effect being higher than for 
total manufacturing goods and lasting ten months. This is consistent with the theory 
                                                          
38 Shock is measured using one standard deviation based on impulse response functions.  
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which predicts that prices for final goods will be more sensitive to exchange rate 
movements.  
As hypothesised, ERPT to import prices of traded goods with medium and high 
composition of parts and components trade (categories with more than 50 percent of 
network trade) items is statistically and economically insignificant (Figure 7.2 E and F). 
An exchange rate shock of one standard deviation does not cause import price inflation 
in these categories for even a single month, demonstrating that import prices for 
network trade are largely sheltered from exchange rate movements. These results 
confirm this study’s hypothesis that the exchange rate fluctuations are unlikely to have 
a major impact on prices for network trade related goods. This partly reflects that most 
of the network trade is relationship specific, including intra-firm trade (Chen et al., 2005, 
Bridgman, 2012, Helpman, 2011, Hummels et al., 2001) and hence sheltered from 
exchange rate movements.     
These results are also consistent with the recent study on the implications of global 
production sharing for the measurement of trade price elasticities (Athukorala and 
Khan, 2016), which show that imports of parts and components are insensitive to 
relative price changes.  
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Figure 7.2 Panels A to D show exchange rate pass-through, exhibiting how import prices respond to 
exchange rate shocks. 
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Table 7.1 Impulse Responses 
Variable 
Percentage 
of parts and 
components 
composition t=1 t=6  t=12 t=15 
Periods for 
which the 
impact stays 
significant 
Maximum 
response to 
exchange 
rate shock. 
Total manufacturing 
import prices  0 to 100% -0.00 0.24*** 0.23*** -0.05 11 0.27 
Final goods 
manufacturing 
import prices  0 to 50%  0.04*** 0.42*** 0.19 -0.11 10 0.42 
MC manufacturing 
import prices  51 to 95% -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.04 0 0.00 
HC manufacturing 
import prices  95 to 100% -0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0 0.00 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
8 Robustness  
In this section39, sensitivity analysis is undertaken to determine whether the results are 
sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of various variables and different lag length 
specifications. The first sensitivity analysis is to examine whether the results hold with 
different lag length specifications. As mentioned previously, SBC chooses 2 lags while 
AIC, FPE and LR tests choose 12 lags. The results with 2 lags remain robust. Import prices 
with a high content of parts and components trade items exhibit much lower ERPT 
compared to import prices of manufacturing final goods – the same as with the case of 
12 lags.  
Several pass-through papers include variables to capture domestic monetary policy (An 
and Wang, 2012, Clark, 1999). Given this, federal funds rate is included to see if it affects 
the results. Another sensitivity analysis is to determine if including trade-weighted 
manufacturing activity of partner countries40 makes a difference. This may be important 
in the context of global production sharing, where production networks span various 
                                                          
39 Results from this section could be produced on request. 
40 Because of lack of data, china is excluded from this measure. China can be included in this estimate, 
though the total number of observations will decrease. Since the results of this paper do not change 
much with the inclusion/exclusion of supply variables, it is unlikely that the results will change with the 
inclusion of China with fewer time series observations.  
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countries and this variable can be an important source of supply. The results remain 
robust to the inclusion of these variables.  
These results are also tested to see if they are sensitive to the exclusion of various 
relevant variables. The covariates are stripped to a baseline estimation where the supply 
and demand base variables are dropped.  The results remain robust to these tests as 
well, with the ERPT higher for final goods and significantly lower for parts and 
components.  
9 Conclusion 
This paper examines the implications of global production sharing for ERPT. A theoretical 
model is developed showing how ERPT is lower in the presence of global production 
sharing. Simulating the model with various scenarios adds to this evidence. Finally, 
empirical analysis confirms this hypothesis using a novel and detailed dataset based on 
the US.  
In particular, the results of this paper indicate that the degree of ERPT to final goods 
prices is substantially larger compared to parts and components trade prices. This is in 
line with the hypothesis that as GPN  trade is dominated by relationship-specific 
transactions (including intra-firm trade), network trade is likely to be sheltered from 
exchange rate movements.  
These results have several policy implications. Firstly, since parts and components 
import prices are shown to be not as responsive to exchange rate movements, trade 
flows pertaining to parts and components goods are also less likely to be sensitive to 
exchange rate movements.  An important policy implication of these results, is that 
countries that are prone to Dutch disease (i.e. Australia) may be better off focusing on 
GPN trade to allow for a vibrant manufacturing sector. Further, these findings also have 
important implications for the use of pass-through estimates, for total trade flows, in 
analysing the transmission of exchange rate shocks in the context where global 
production sharing has become prominent. These results are likely to have greater 
implications for countries and regions that have a high presence of global production 
sharing.    
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Appendix A 
List of components in various import price categories.  
Good with low 
composition of parts 
and components or final 
goods  
Good with medium 
composition of parts 
and components  
Goods with high 
composition of parts 
and components  or 
network trade items 
30 8409 8473 
38 8413 8411 
39 8471 8481 
40 8501 8536 
48 8517 8541 
61 8525 8542 
62   8708 
63     
64     
69     
70     
72     
76     
83     
8516     
8527     
8703     
90     
91     
94     
95     
96     
Source: Using Harmonized System of import price indexes from the BLS 
Note: Several price categories contained no part and components lists in them, as such 2 digit codes could be safely used for the 
low content network trade classification. For the medium and high content of parts and components trade we had to rely on 4 
digit Harmonized System. 
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Appendix B Robustness test 
Results shows that the impact of exchange rate on HC import prices is almost always 
insignificant (based on a sample of only pre-GFC observations.) 
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Appendix C VAR results for high content of parts and components  
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates      
 Date: 11/06/16   Time: 19:40      
 Sample (adjusted): 1999M12 2013M10     
 Included observations: 167 after adjustments     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]     
        
        
 LMAN_SA_HP LGDP_HP 
PERCCENT_E
R_TWI_A 
INFLATION_TO
TALPCPI_A 
INFLATION_M
NF_PPI_A 
INFLATION_CP
I_A 
INFLATION_W
P_A 
        
        LMAN_SA_HP(-1)  0.646730 -0.022287  16.77593  8.694905  0.680429  3.420862 -4.120614 
  (0.10978)  (0.02369)  (22.5910)  (9.29207)  (17.4833)  (1.97060)  (5.48235) 
 [ 5.89090] [-0.94097] [ 0.74259] [ 0.93573] [ 0.03892] [ 1.73595] [-0.75162] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-2)  0.432940  0.024036  18.83767 -9.560685  46.23985  1.179830  14.07515 
  (0.13633)  (0.02941)  (28.0540)  (11.5391)  (21.7111)  (2.44713)  (6.80809) 
 [ 3.17561] [ 0.81718] [ 0.67148] [-0.82855] [ 2.12978] [ 0.48213] [ 2.06742] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-3) -0.023890  0.078790  3.741452  20.74627 -50.03450 -1.168124 -17.96183 
  (0.14312)  (0.03088)  (29.4510)  (12.1137)  (22.7923)  (2.56899)  (7.14712) 
 [-0.16692] [ 2.55168] [ 0.12704] [ 1.71263] [-2.19524] [-0.45470] [-2.51316] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-4) -0.193359 -0.051281  6.990854 -12.58849  2.011511 -3.916838  1.433946 
  (0.15774)  (0.03403)  (32.4594)  (13.3511)  (25.1205)  (2.83141)  (7.87720) 
 [-1.22579] [-1.50684] [ 0.21537] [-0.94288] [ 0.08007] [-1.38335] [ 0.18204] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-5) -0.099850 -0.043005 -4.860429  0.579418  64.97700  1.981574  17.54541 
  (0.15936)  (0.03438)  (32.7921)  (13.4880)  (25.3780)  (2.86043)  (7.95793) 
 [-0.62657] [-1.25085] [-0.14822] [ 0.04296] [ 2.56037] [ 0.69275] [ 2.20477] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-6)  0.122026  0.011882  38.39100  8.004121 -2.681877 -0.054759  1.091445 
  (0.15644)  (0.03375)  (32.1915)  (13.2409)  (24.9132)  (2.80805)  (7.81219) 
 [ 0.78002] [ 0.35204] [ 1.19258] [ 0.60450] [-0.10765] [-0.01950] [ 0.13971] 
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LMAN_SA_HP(-7) -0.249310  0.020042 -38.11528  2.181303 -10.04699  1.905534 -5.585824 
  (0.15026)  (0.03242)  (30.9204)  (12.7181)  (23.9294)  (2.69716)  (7.50371) 
 [-1.65916] [ 0.61823] [-1.23269] [ 0.17151] [-0.41986] [ 0.70650] [-0.74441] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-8)  0.183400 -0.026180 -22.70087  4.925897 -47.34345 -1.943029 -19.37104 
  (0.14706)  (0.03173)  (30.2612)  (12.4469)  (23.4193)  (2.63966)  (7.34373) 
 [ 1.24712] [-0.82517] [-0.75017] [ 0.39575] [-2.02156] [-0.73609] [-2.63777] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-9)  0.152503  0.030904  28.03593 -3.230906  0.036953 -0.354157  7.243464 
  (0.15129)  (0.03264)  (31.1313)  (12.8049)  (24.0927)  (2.71556)  (7.55490) 
 [ 1.00803] [ 0.94684] [ 0.90057] [-0.25232] [ 0.00153] [-0.13042] [ 0.95878] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-10) -0.077634  0.010314 -6.949165 -3.090102  9.815565  1.803221 -1.178237 
  (0.15000)  (0.03236)  (30.8658)  (12.6956)  (23.8872)  (2.69240)  (7.49046) 
 [-0.51757] [ 0.31872] [-0.22514] [-0.24340] [ 0.41091] [ 0.66974] [-0.15730] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-11)  0.034501 -0.024584  46.54730  3.368659 -19.00976 -2.967818 -9.778448 
  (0.13580)  (0.02930)  (27.9446)  (11.4941)  (21.6265)  (2.43759)  (6.78155) 
 [ 0.25406] [-0.83908] [ 1.66570] [ 0.29308] [-0.87900] [-1.21752] [-1.44192] 
        
LMAN_SA_HP(-12) -0.173303 -0.005478 -58.45310 -9.834409  12.29382  2.398385  10.04480 
  (0.11092)  (0.02393)  (22.8257)  (9.38859)  (17.6649)  (1.99107)  (5.53929) 
 [-1.56234] [-0.22892] [-2.56085] [-1.04748] [ 0.69595] [ 1.20457] [ 1.81337] 
        
LGDP_HP(-1)  1.810752  1.828165  58.67536 -6.225901 -145.1610 -2.378958 -6.500646 
  (0.51588)  (0.11130)  (106.155)  (43.6632)  (82.1536)  (9.25979)  (25.7614) 
 [ 3.51006] [ 16.4260] [ 0.55273] [-0.14259] [-1.76695] [-0.25691] [-0.25234] 
        
LGDP_HP(-2) -1.971274 -0.895713 -164.7921  10.77118  121.1273 -11.50637 -7.142876 
  (1.03900)  (0.22416)  (213.801)  (87.9401)  (165.462)  (18.6497)  (51.8849) 
 [-1.89728] [-3.99590] [-0.77077] [ 0.12248] [ 0.73206] [-0.61697] [-0.13767] 
        
LGDP_HP(-3) -0.205019 -0.512985  29.42967 -45.57855  171.6931  17.60191  52.16713 
  (1.04517)  (0.22549)  (215.072)  (88.4627)  (166.445)  (18.7605)  (52.1932) 
 [-0.19616] [-2.27498] [ 0.13684] [-0.51523] [ 1.03153] [ 0.93824] [ 0.99950] 
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LGDP_HP(-4)  1.913839  0.939112  107.4160  44.51636 -292.9507 -8.572278 -46.37553 
  (1.00250)  (0.21628)  (206.290)  (84.8506)  (159.649)  (17.9945)  (50.0620) 
 [ 1.90907] [ 4.34206] [ 0.52070] [ 0.52464] [-1.83497] [-0.47638] [-0.92636] 
        
LGDP_HP(-5) -0.982435 -0.420049 -11.30304 -18.03180  164.5314  8.290160  43.69029 
  (1.12778)  (0.24331)  (232.070)  (95.4543)  (179.600)  (20.2433)  (56.3183) 
 [-0.87112] [-1.72638] [-0.04871] [-0.18891] [ 0.91610] [ 0.40953] [ 0.77577] 
        
LGDP_HP(-6) -1.477286 -0.097198 -158.8547 -50.81833 -81.11191 -10.13453 -64.21147 
  (1.11566)  (0.24070)  (229.576)  (94.4285)  (177.670)  (20.0257)  (55.7130) 
 [-1.32414] [-0.40382] [-0.69195] [-0.53817] [-0.45653] [-0.50608] [-1.15254] 
        
LGDP_HP(-7)  2.054367  0.180212 -175.3188  25.68435 -186.0522 -7.999158 -22.65322 
  (1.09785)  (0.23685)  (225.910)  (92.9207)  (174.833)  (19.7060)  (54.8235) 
 [ 1.87127] [ 0.76086] [-0.77606] [ 0.27641] [-1.06417] [-0.40593] [-0.41320] 
        
LGDP_HP(-8) -0.474945 -0.049610  416.4197  39.88867  368.6562  15.72894  141.6220 
  (1.09754)  (0.23679)  (225.846)  (92.8946)  (174.784)  (19.7004)  (54.8080) 
 [-0.43274] [-0.20951] [ 1.84382] [ 0.42940] [ 2.10921] [ 0.79841] [ 2.58397] 
        
LGDP_HP(-9) -0.523556 -0.294082 -282.9039 -71.73563 -136.0431  2.252587 -84.08191 
  (1.05216)  (0.22700)  (216.510)  (89.0543)  (167.558)  (18.8860)  (52.5423) 
 [-0.49760] [-1.29553] [-1.30666] [-0.80553] [-0.81192] [ 0.11927] [-1.60027] 
        
LGDP_HP(-10)  0.142611  0.544617  28.95895  7.312300 -296.3864 -1.618059 -69.30626 
  (1.03448)  (0.22318)  (212.870)  (87.5571)  (164.741)  (18.5685)  (51.6589) 
 [ 0.13786] [ 2.44024] [ 0.13604] [ 0.08351] [-1.79910] [-0.08714] [-1.34161] 
        
LGDP_HP(-11)  0.087387 -0.300060  35.78563  1.008700  559.6549 -9.345050  156.2252 
  (0.98989)  (0.21356)  (203.695)  (83.7832)  (157.640)  (17.7682)  (49.4323) 
 [ 0.08828] [-1.40502] [ 0.17568] [ 0.01204] [ 3.55020] [-0.52594] [ 3.16039] 
        
LGDP_HP(-12)  0.242825  0.085323  5.614162  30.05271 -240.1691  7.525112 -61.64661 
  (0.56287)  (0.12144)  (115.826)  (47.6411)  (89.6380)  (10.1034)  (28.1084) 
 [ 0.43140] [ 0.70261] [ 0.04847] [ 0.63081] [-2.67932] [ 0.74481] [-2.19318] 
Chapter 3 Exchange rate pass-through for manufactured goods in the presence of network trade  
83 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
1)  0.000585  0.000130  1.131958  0.122256  0.086672 -0.001940  0.008691 
  (0.00059)  (0.00013)  (0.12080)  (0.04969)  (0.09349)  (0.01054)  (0.02932) 
 [ 0.99706] [ 1.02746] [ 9.37058] [ 2.46053] [ 0.92711] [-0.18413] [ 0.29647] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
2)  0.000123 -0.000239 -0.227790 -0.108460  0.125788  0.033515  0.083603 
  (0.00081)  (0.00018)  (0.16729)  (0.06881)  (0.12946)  (0.01459)  (0.04060) 
 [ 0.15105] [-1.36500] [-1.36168] [-1.57628] [ 0.97161] [ 2.29678] [ 2.05935] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
3) -0.000607  0.000401  0.099464  0.006910 -0.020546 -0.010845 -0.001819 
  (0.00083)  (0.00018)  (0.17149)  (0.07054)  (0.13272)  (0.01496)  (0.04162) 
 [-0.72845] [ 2.23185] [ 0.58001] [ 0.09797] [-0.15481] [-0.72497] [-0.04372] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
4) -0.000362 -0.000274  0.066690 -0.079507 -0.110113 -0.016755 -0.074700 
  (0.00081)  (0.00018)  (0.16711)  (0.06874)  (0.12933)  (0.01458)  (0.04055) 
 [-0.44570] [-1.56223] [ 0.39908] [-1.15671] [-0.85142] [-1.14943] [-1.84198] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
5)  0.000764  0.000121 -0.047805  0.109922  0.011216 -0.007302  0.025011 
  (0.00078)  (0.00017)  (0.15974)  (0.06571)  (0.12363)  (0.01393)  (0.03877) 
 [ 0.98477] [ 0.72128] [-0.29926] [ 1.67295] [ 0.09073] [-0.52401] [ 0.64516] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
6)  0.000174 -8.69E-05 -0.096542 -0.015502  0.077588 -0.004697  0.030647 
  (0.00076)  (0.00016)  (0.15561)  (0.06401)  (0.12043)  (0.01357)  (0.03776) 
 [ 0.23059] [-0.53261] [-0.62040] [-0.24220] [ 0.64426] [-0.34606] [ 0.81154] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
7) -3.13E-05 -3.75E-05 -0.016199 -0.022111 -0.028214  0.008696  0.001022 
  (0.00074)  (0.00016)  (0.15325)  (0.06303)  (0.11860)  (0.01337)  (0.03719) 
 [-0.04201] [-0.23352] [-0.10570] [-0.35079] [-0.23789] [ 0.65055] [ 0.02749] 
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PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
8)  0.000134  0.000178 -0.146960  0.029846 -0.102352  3.27E-06 -0.018716 
  (0.00071)  (0.00015)  (0.14632)  (0.06019)  (0.11324)  (0.01276)  (0.03551) 
 [ 0.18908] [ 1.15868] [-1.00435] [ 0.49591] [-0.90385] [ 0.00026] [-0.52708] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
9) -0.000200 -0.000193  0.101042 -0.075200 -0.087607 -0.003619  0.008150 
  (0.00072)  (0.00015)  (0.14783)  (0.06081)  (0.11441)  (0.01290)  (0.03588) 
 [-0.27848] [-1.24227] [ 0.68349] [-1.23674] [-0.76575] [-0.28066] [ 0.22716] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
10) -0.000614  9.00E-05 -0.028863  0.072239  0.037262 -0.001965 -0.019713 
  (0.00074)  (0.00016)  (0.15167)  (0.06239)  (0.11738)  (0.01323)  (0.03681) 
 [-0.83246] [ 0.56587] [-0.19030] [ 1.15795] [ 0.31745] [-0.14854] [-0.53558] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
11)  0.000844 -0.000171 -0.011567 -0.082323 -0.059440 -0.008334 -0.016338 
  (0.00070)  (0.00015)  (0.14399)  (0.05923)  (0.11143)  (0.01256)  (0.03494) 
 [ 1.20620] [-1.13308] [-0.08033] [-1.38999] [-0.53340] [-0.66355] [-0.46757] 
        
PERCCENT_ER_TWI_A(-
12) -0.000303  0.000157 -0.082645  0.007916  0.211134  0.020755  0.103576 
  (0.00054)  (0.00012)  (0.11115)  (0.04572)  (0.08602)  (0.00970)  (0.02697) 
 [-0.56164] [ 1.34987] [-0.74357] [ 0.17315] [ 2.45457] [ 2.14076] [ 3.84002] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-1)  0.001437  0.000117 -0.096595  0.905023  0.220400 -0.017071  0.113410 
  (0.00148)  (0.00032)  (0.30355)  (0.12486)  (0.23492)  (0.02648)  (0.07367) 
 [ 0.97410] [ 0.36762] [-0.31822] [ 7.24856] [ 0.93819] [-0.64470] [ 1.53953] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-2)  0.000929 -0.000159 -0.251201 -0.123932 -0.540189 -0.061115 -0.119187 
  (0.00191)  (0.00041)  (0.39243)  (0.16141)  (0.30370)  (0.03423)  (0.09523) 
 [ 0.48711] [-0.38656] [-0.64012] [-0.76780] [-1.77869] [-1.78537] [-1.25152] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-3) -0.003773 -0.000267  0.025934 -0.005833  0.145983  0.084742  0.024191 
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  (0.00189)  (0.00041)  (0.38990)  (0.16037)  (0.30174)  (0.03401)  (0.09462) 
 [-1.99135] [-0.65229] [ 0.06651] [-0.03637] [ 0.48380] [ 2.49167] [ 0.25567] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-4)  0.002250 -0.000659 -0.198868  0.045469  0.390992 -0.029968  0.072641 
  (0.00190)  (0.00041)  (0.39159)  (0.16107)  (0.30306)  (0.03416)  (0.09503) 
 [ 1.18244] [-1.60547] [-0.50784] [ 0.28229] [ 1.29016] [-0.87732] [ 0.76439] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-5) -0.000275  0.001097 -0.024060 -0.124721  0.095504 -0.018057  0.146131 
  (0.00185)  (0.00040)  (0.38030)  (0.15642)  (0.29432)  (0.03317)  (0.09229) 
 [-0.14856] [ 2.75153] [-0.06327] [-0.79732] [ 0.32450] [-0.54431] [ 1.58339] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-6)  0.000710 -0.000406 -0.551053  0.098317 -0.574865  0.040622 -0.277004 
  (0.00187)  (0.00040)  (0.38504)  (0.15837)  (0.29798)  (0.03359)  (0.09344) 
 [ 0.37940] [-1.00691] [-1.43117] [ 0.62080] [-1.92919] [ 1.20947] [-2.96451] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-7)  0.001583  0.000757  0.428494  0.119929  0.073500 -0.062820  0.139060 
  (0.00194)  (0.00042)  (0.39954)  (0.16434)  (0.30921)  (0.03485)  (0.09696) 
 [ 0.81519] [ 1.80776] [ 1.07247] [ 0.72977] [ 0.23771] [-1.80250] [ 1.43420] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-8) -0.001985 -0.000516  0.685178 -0.244032  0.405775  0.044370  0.169663 
  (0.00192)  (0.00041)  (0.39518)  (0.16255)  (0.30584)  (0.03447)  (0.09590) 
 [-1.03354] [-1.24505] [ 1.73382] [-1.50131] [ 1.32678] [ 1.28714] [ 1.76912] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-9) -0.002219 -0.000739  0.003607 -0.071024  0.302365  0.024286 -0.002557 
  (0.00198)  (0.00043)  (0.40799)  (0.16781)  (0.31575)  (0.03559)  (0.09901) 
 [-1.11901] [-1.72824] [ 0.00884] [-0.42323] [ 0.95762] [ 0.68240] [-0.02582] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-10)  0.003458  0.001010 -0.768829  0.115168 -0.125815 -0.018040 -0.065265 
  (0.00191)  (0.00041)  (0.39375)  (0.16195)  (0.30472)  (0.03435)  (0.09555) 
 [ 1.80727] [ 2.44704] [-1.95260] [ 0.71111] [-0.41289] [-0.52525] [-0.68302] 
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INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-11)  0.000491 -0.000167 -0.107217 -0.037814 -0.997506 -0.053051 -0.187424 
  (0.00198)  (0.00043)  (0.40704)  (0.16742)  (0.31501)  (0.03551)  (0.09878) 
 [ 0.24810] [-0.39047] [-0.26341] [-0.22586] [-3.16659] [-1.49416] [-1.89740] 
        
INFLATION_TOTALPCPI_
A(-12) -0.001201 -0.000345  0.266248  0.039554  0.443797  0.016567  0.081682 
  (0.00134)  (0.00029)  (0.27601)  (0.11353)  (0.21360)  (0.02408)  (0.06698) 
 [-0.89552] [-1.19237] [ 0.96464] [ 0.34841] [ 2.07767] [ 0.68810] [ 1.21948] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
1) -0.001373 -0.000438 -0.289001 -0.077779  0.777980  0.000360  0.112268 
  (0.00100)  (0.00022)  (0.20602)  (0.08474)  (0.15944)  (0.01797)  (0.05000) 
 [-1.37095] [-2.02738] [-1.40275] [-0.91785] [ 4.87936] [ 0.02005] [ 2.24546] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
2)  0.000135  0.000184 -0.103982 -0.114147 -0.315663  3.72E-05 -0.235447 
  (0.00105)  (0.00023)  (0.21661)  (0.08910)  (0.16764)  (0.01889)  (0.05257) 
 [ 0.12830] [ 0.80844] [-0.48004] [-1.28116] [-1.88301] [ 0.00197] [-4.47899] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
3)  0.002353  0.000427 -0.173190  0.045921  0.037989 -0.018989  0.076559 
  (0.00106)  (0.00023)  (0.21892)  (0.09004)  (0.16942)  (0.01910)  (0.05313) 
 [ 2.21173] [ 1.86028] [-0.79112] [ 0.50998] [ 0.22423] [-0.99437] [ 1.44107] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
4)  0.000298 -0.000158 -0.004008 -0.044344  0.406875  0.014778  0.143301 
  (0.00105)  (0.00023)  (0.21652)  (0.08906)  (0.16756)  (0.01889)  (0.05254) 
 [ 0.28303] [-0.69637] [-0.01851] [-0.49793] [ 2.42819] [ 0.78247] [ 2.72726] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
5) -0.002133  5.13E-05  0.095721  0.073362 -0.213328  0.013752 -0.060798 
  (0.00106)  (0.00023)  (0.21813)  (0.08972)  (0.16881)  (0.01903)  (0.05293) 
 [-2.01191] [ 0.22438] [ 0.43883] [ 0.81768] [-1.26372] [ 0.72277] [-1.14854] 
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INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
6) -0.001325 -0.000145 -0.018705 -0.060398 -0.040675  0.007003 -0.048776 
  (0.00101)  (0.00022)  (0.20858)  (0.08579)  (0.16142)  (0.01819)  (0.05062) 
 [-1.30736] [-0.66462] [-0.08968] [-0.70401] [-0.25198] [ 0.38493] [-0.96363] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
7)  0.000642 -0.000113  0.136912  0.156030  0.279138 -0.005082  0.035835 
  (0.00100)  (0.00022)  (0.20591)  (0.08469)  (0.15935)  (0.01796)  (0.04997) 
 [ 0.64174] [-0.52546] [ 0.66493] [ 1.84232] [ 1.75172] [-0.28297] [ 0.71716] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
8)  0.000756  0.000123  0.024446 -0.050162 -0.049166  0.008272  0.026731 
  (0.00101)  (0.00022)  (0.20857)  (0.08579)  (0.16141)  (0.01819)  (0.05061) 
 [ 0.74621] [ 0.56029] [ 0.11721] [-0.58473] [-0.30460] [ 0.45469] [ 0.52812] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
9) -0.000838 -0.000154 -0.144639  0.088141 -0.085915  0.017837 -0.049779 
  (0.00099)  (0.00021)  (0.20398)  (0.08390)  (0.15786)  (0.01779)  (0.04950) 
 [-0.84572] [-0.72199] [-0.70907] [ 1.05052] [-0.54424] [ 1.00244] [-1.00559] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
10)  0.001864  0.000415  0.549743 -0.067427  0.066464 -3.35E-05  0.017683 
  (0.00100)  (0.00022)  (0.20542)  (0.08449)  (0.15898)  (0.01792)  (0.04985) 
 [ 1.86710] [ 1.92762] [ 2.67615] [-0.79801] [ 0.41807] [-0.00187] [ 0.35472] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
11) -0.001144 -4.16E-05 -0.287668 -0.054231  0.173310 -0.003207  0.119690 
  (0.00096)  (0.00021)  (0.19792)  (0.08141)  (0.15317)  (0.01726)  (0.04803) 
 [-1.18954] [-0.20025] [-1.45348] [-0.66618] [ 1.13149] [-0.18577] [ 2.49197] 
        
INFLATION_MNF_PPI_A(-
12)  7.14E-05 -0.000249 -0.219612  0.021923 -0.434122 -0.007782 -0.124877 
  (0.00074)  (0.00016)  (0.15238)  (0.06268)  (0.11793)  (0.01329)  (0.03698) 
 [ 0.09647] [-1.55653] [-1.44119] [ 0.34978] [-3.68120] [-0.58544] [-3.37688] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-1)  0.010837 -0.000696 -0.796254  0.277575  0.010004  0.879862  0.200698 
  (0.00601)  (0.00130)  (1.23700)  (0.50880)  (0.95732)  (0.10790)  (0.30019) 
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 [ 1.80268] [-0.53630] [-0.64370] [ 0.54555] [ 0.01045] [ 8.15424] [ 0.66857] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-2) -0.011027 -0.000713  0.024637  0.039585  0.178742 -0.022509  0.271243 
  (0.00821)  (0.00177)  (1.68955)  (0.69494)  (1.30755)  (0.14738)  (0.41002) 
 [-1.34302] [-0.40237] [ 0.01458] [ 0.05696] [ 0.13670] [-0.15273] [ 0.66154] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-3) -0.000291  0.002250  0.271332 -0.267784 -1.463154  0.077759 -0.715802 
  (0.00808)  (0.00174)  (1.66193)  (0.68358)  (1.28617)  (0.14497)  (0.40331) 
 [-0.03600] [ 1.29101] [ 0.16326] [-0.39174] [-1.13760] [ 0.53639] [-1.77480] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-4)  0.005512 -0.001218 -0.215423 -0.734551 -0.280288 -0.116844 -0.041082 
  (0.00803)  (0.00173)  (1.65183)  (0.67943)  (1.27836)  (0.14409)  (0.40086) 
 [ 0.68662] [-0.70301] [-0.13042] [-1.08114] [-0.21926] [-0.81092] [-0.10248] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-5) -0.001064  0.001038  1.546218  1.096284  2.139093  0.185426  0.649138 
  (0.00778)  (0.00168)  (1.60017)  (0.65818)  (1.23838)  (0.13958)  (0.38833) 
 [-0.13677] [ 0.61857] [ 0.96629] [ 1.66564] [ 1.72734] [ 1.32844] [ 1.67163] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-6) -0.006361 -0.001620  0.078368 -1.172365 -1.488025 -0.094102 -0.266133 
  (0.00774)  (0.00167)  (1.59346)  (0.65542)  (1.23318)  (0.13900)  (0.38670) 
 [-0.82143] [-0.96993] [ 0.04918] [-1.78873] [-1.20665] [-0.67701] [-0.68822] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-7)  0.009489  0.001026 -2.451581  0.731822  2.279706 -0.096996  0.365469 
  (0.00779)  (0.00168)  (1.60215)  (0.65899)  (1.23991)  (0.13975)  (0.38881) 
 [ 1.21869] [ 0.61072] [-1.53018] [ 1.11052] [ 1.83860] [-0.69405] [ 0.93997] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-8)  0.003361 -0.000101  1.014971 -0.446209 -1.512089  0.037982 -0.691372 
  (0.00809)  (0.00175)  (1.66512)  (0.68489)  (1.28864)  (0.14525)  (0.40409) 
 [ 0.41540] [-0.05809] [ 0.60955] [-0.65150] [-1.17340] [ 0.26150] [-1.71094] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-9) -0.010666  0.000915  0.011127  0.453615 -1.022487  0.207923  0.298479 
  (0.00792)  (0.00171)  (1.62967)  (0.67031)  (1.26121)  (0.14215)  (0.39548) 
 [-1.34683] [ 0.53552] [ 0.00683] [ 0.67672] [-0.81072] [ 1.46265] [ 0.75472] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-10) -0.005833 -0.001708 -3.271324  0.185295  1.311517 -0.173622 -0.469220 
  (0.00816)  (0.00176)  (1.68006)  (0.69104)  (1.30020)  (0.14655)  (0.40771) 
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 [-0.71438] [-0.96980] [-1.94715] [ 0.26814] [ 1.00870] [-1.18473] [-1.15086] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-11)  0.015158  0.000382  4.338552 -0.782306 -1.395178 -0.051198 -0.420514 
  (0.00855)  (0.00184)  (1.75880)  (0.72342)  (1.36114)  (0.15342)  (0.42682) 
 [ 1.77350] [ 0.20707] [ 2.46677] [-1.08139] [-1.02500] [-0.33371] [-0.98522] 
        
INFLATION_CPI_A(-12) -0.006054 -0.001078 -1.095832  0.120140  0.279860 -0.098934  0.826334 
  (0.00647)  (0.00140)  (1.33143)  (0.54764)  (1.03040)  (0.11614)  (0.32311) 
 [-0.93567] [-0.77234] [-0.82305] [ 0.21938] [ 0.27160] [-0.85186] [ 2.55745] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-1)  0.005705  0.000447  0.540987  0.119319  0.280331 -0.010125  1.030487 
  (0.00278)  (0.00060)  (0.57285)  (0.23562)  (0.44333)  (0.04997)  (0.13902) 
 [ 2.04941] [ 0.74443] [ 0.94438] [ 0.50639] [ 0.63233] [-0.20262] [ 7.41259] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-2) -0.008554 -0.000645  0.804183  0.308271  0.964298  0.013866  0.252096 
  (0.00384)  (0.00083)  (0.79062)  (0.32520)  (0.61187)  (0.06897)  (0.19187) 
 [-2.22644] [-0.77861] [ 1.01715] [ 0.94795] [ 1.57599] [ 0.20105] [ 1.31391] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-3) -0.002309 -0.001187 -0.278806 -0.361371 -1.147563  0.029198 -0.544624 
  (0.00371)  (0.00080)  (0.76265)  (0.31369)  (0.59022)  (0.06653)  (0.18508) 
 [-0.62313] [-1.48394] [-0.36558] [-1.15200] [-1.94431] [ 0.43891] [-2.94267] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-4)  0.004303  0.001703 -0.152143  0.207182 -0.142406 -0.001396  0.014797 
  (0.00356)  (0.00077)  (0.73356)  (0.30173)  (0.56770)  (0.06399)  (0.17802) 
 [ 1.20711] [ 2.21447] [-0.20740] [ 0.68666] [-0.25085] [-0.02181] [ 0.08312] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-5)  0.002072 -0.000919 -0.493713  0.015156 -0.304951 -0.162445  0.011448 
  (0.00360)  (0.00078)  (0.73985)  (0.30431)  (0.57257)  (0.06454)  (0.17955) 
 [ 0.57636] [-1.18458] [-0.66731] [ 0.04980] [-0.53260] [-2.51710] [ 0.06376] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-6) -0.001878  0.000170  0.204311  0.339949  0.264715  0.109975 -0.073325 
  (0.00348)  (0.00075)  (0.71631)  (0.29463)  (0.55436)  (0.06248)  (0.17383) 
 [-0.53942] [ 0.22641] [ 0.28523] [ 1.15381] [ 0.47752] [ 1.76007] [-0.42181] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-7)  0.002147 -3.60E-05  0.215043 -0.948472 -0.389635  0.032428 -0.077262 
  (0.00336)  (0.00073)  (0.69211)  (0.28468)  (0.53563)  (0.06037)  (0.16796) 
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 [ 0.63820] [-0.04962] [ 0.31071] [-3.33174] [-0.72743] [ 0.53713] [-0.46000] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-8)  9.94E-06  0.000969  0.100539  0.665357  0.610729  0.010124  0.338107 
  (0.00364)  (0.00078)  (0.74804)  (0.30768)  (0.57891)  (0.06525)  (0.18153) 
 [ 0.00273] [ 1.23585] [ 0.13440] [ 2.16250] [ 1.05497] [ 0.15516] [ 1.86252] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-9) -0.002143 -0.000426 -0.902007 -0.647760 -0.362272 -0.095296 -0.044497 
  (0.00378)  (0.00082)  (0.77868)  (0.32028)  (0.60262)  (0.06792)  (0.18897) 
 [-0.56643] [-0.52156] [-1.15839] [-2.02246] [-0.60116] [-1.40299] [-0.23547] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-10) -0.004839 -0.001309  0.448850  0.544210 -0.018225  0.004481 -0.440632 
  (0.00378)  (0.00082)  (0.77767)  (0.31987)  (0.60184)  (0.06784)  (0.18872) 
 [-1.28049] [-1.60522] [ 0.57717] [ 1.70136] [-0.03028] [ 0.06605] [-2.33481] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-11)  0.008276  0.000986  0.636466  0.124023  0.280486 -0.032271  0.198669 
  (0.00394)  (0.00085)  (0.81138)  (0.33373)  (0.62793)  (0.07078)  (0.19690) 
 [ 2.09897] [ 1.15926] [ 0.78443] [ 0.37163] [ 0.44669] [-0.45596] [ 1.00897] 
        
INFLATION_WP_A(-12) -0.003615  0.000102  0.252206 -0.045203  0.227205  0.067090  0.013585 
  (0.00248)  (0.00054)  (0.51122)  (0.21027)  (0.39563)  (0.04459)  (0.12406) 
 [-1.45498] [ 0.19025] [ 0.49335] [-0.21497] [ 0.57428] [ 1.50449] [ 0.10951] 
        
C -0.002514  0.003828 -0.557870  0.558379  2.274352  0.512520  0.482685 
  (0.00648)  (0.00140)  (1.33293)  (0.54826)  (1.03156)  (0.11627)  (0.32347) 
 [-0.38818] [ 2.73925] [-0.41853] [ 1.01846] [ 2.20477] [ 4.40800] [ 1.49220] 
        
DUMMY_REC -0.001779 -0.001231 -0.032732 -0.115711 -5.68E-05  0.017152  0.155818 
  (0.00230)  (0.00050)  (0.47270)  (0.19443)  (0.36583)  (0.04123)  (0.11471) 
 [-0.77437] [-2.48347] [-0.06925] [-0.59513] [-0.00016] [ 0.41598] [ 1.35831] 
        
         R-squared  0.992853  0.996895  0.971146  0.956801  0.978445  0.984654  0.994352 
 Adj. R-squared  0.985354  0.993637  0.940868  0.911468  0.955826  0.968550  0.988425 
 Sum sq. resids  0.002069  9.63E-05  87.59832  14.82006  52.46519  0.666531  5.158907 
 S.E. equation  0.005054  0.001090  1.039933  0.427743  0.804810  0.090713  0.252369 
 F-statistic  132.3883  305.9643  32.07375  21.10624  43.25730  61.14404  167.7684 
 Log likelihood  706.4875  962.6093 -183.0859 -34.72472 -140.2828  224.2630  53.38924 
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 Akaike AIC -7.430988 -10.49831  3.222585  1.445805  2.709973 -1.655845  0.390548 
 Schwarz SC -5.825315 -8.892641  4.828259  3.051479  4.315647 -0.050171  1.996222 
 Mean dependent -0.000883  0.000133  1.390291 -0.111751  3.103102  2.013136  2.388098 
 S.D. dependent  0.041759  0.013668  4.276548  1.437582  3.829217  0.511515  2.345723 
        
         Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  6.13E-16      
 Determinant resid covariance  3.87E-18      
 Log likelihood  1688.981      
 Akaike information criterion -13.01774      
 Schwarz criterion -1.778024      
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Chapter 4 
Global Production Sharing: Exploring Australia’s Competitive 
Edge 
 
1 Introduction 
The cross-border dispersion of production processes within vertically integrated global 
industries, known as global production sharing41, has been an increasingly important 
structural feature of economic globalisation in recent decades. This process of 
international division of labour opens up opportunities for countries to specialise in 
different slices (tasks) of the production process in line with their relative cost 
advantages. As the production processes are finely sliced across a wide range of 
industries, new opportunities for specialisation within global production networks 
(GPNs) are created.  Given this structural shift in global production, the conventional 
approach to analysing trade patterns, which treats international trade as an exchange 
of goods produced from beginning to end in a given trading partner, is rapidly losing its 
relevance.  With the rapid expansion of global production sharing, parts and 
components, technical and managerial know-how, and capital have become increasingly 
mobile across national boundaries, making trade patterns increasingly sensitive to inter-
country differences in trade and investment policies (Jones and  Kierzkowski 2004).  
The 787 Dreamliner ‘produced’ by the Boeing Corporation, USA, has become an eye-
catching illustrative case of how countries are engaging in an intricate web of 
production-sharing arrangements (Gapper 2007).  Offshore production accounts for 70% 
of the many thousands of parts used in assembling the jet. Boeing itself is responsible 
for only about 10% by value of the aircraft (tail fin and final assembly), but holds the 
rights to the 787 technology.  There are 43 parts and component suppliers spread over 
135 production sites around the world. The wings are produced in Japan, the engines in 
the United Kingdom and the United States, the flaps and ailerons in Australia and Canada, 
                                                          
41 The alternative terms used in the recent international trade literature include global production 
networks, network trade, international production fragmentation, intra-process trade, vertical 
specialization, slicing the value chain, and offshoring.  
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the fuselage in Japan, Italy and the United States, the horizontal stabiliser in Italy, the 
landing gear in France, and the doors in Sweden and France. Some parts are produced 
by foreign affiliates of the Boeing Corporation, while others are supplied under 
subcontracting arrangements. This pattern of ‘outsourced production’ around the world 
is in sharp contrast to Boeing’s previous emphasis on procuring components 
domestically: only about 1% of the Boeing 707 was built outside the US in the 1950s. 
Boeing is now focussing on its own specific advantages – design, supply chain 
management, marketing and branding – rather than in areas where others are bound to 
make inroads.  Airbus, Boeing’s competitor, followed Boeing’s lead for its A350 jet. It 
has closed down some component producing plants in Europe and is outsourcing work 
to China and elsewhere to produce this wide-body jet, which is positioned to compete 
with the Boeing 787. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the patterns and determinants of global 
production sharing with an emphasis on the implications for performance and structural 
change in Australian manufacturing. The study is motivated by the growing emphasis on 
the contemporary policy debate in Australia, on the country’s industrial future in the 
aftermath of the cessation of the commodity boom (ACOLA 2015, PC 2014, Withers et 
al 2015, CEDA 2014 & 2015, Government of Australia 2012).  Notwithstanding this policy 
emphasis, the implications of the ongoing process of global production sharing for 
effective integration of domestic manufacturing into GPNs and the related policy issues 
have not been systematically explored, this paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature.  
There are intrinsic aspects about the Australian GPN that make it interesting both for 
research purposes and government policy. For instance, even though the export share 
of manufacturing activities has declined, the share of GPN goods within manufacturing 
goods has increased for Australia (see Section 4 for a detailed description of the profile 
of Australian GPNS). Further, GPN goods show less volatility than total manufacturing 
goods. Another interesting feature of the Australian GPNs is that they are less integrated 
with Southeast economies, than the other Asian countries in the region. The rest of the 
paper explores and studies Australian GPNs in detail.  
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a stage-setting analytical overview 
of the process of global production sharing and emerging opportunities for countries to 
specialize in line with their relative cost advantage.  Section 3 discusses the methodology, 
the procedure followed in delineating trade based on global production sharing 
(henceforth referred to as ‘GPN trade’42) from total manufacturing trade flows, using 
data extracted from the United Nations (UN) trade database (UN Comtrade). Section 4 
undertakes a comparative analysis of Australia’s engagement in GPN trade, focusing on 
overall trends, commodity composition and directions of trade.  An econometric analysis 
is undertaken in Section 5 using the standard gravity modelling framework to examine 
the determinants of inter-country differences in GPN trade. Section 6 summarises the 
key findings and draws policy inferences.  
2 Global Production Sharing 
The phenomenon of global production sharing 
Global production sharing is not a new phenomenon. There is ample anecdotal evidence 
of evolving trade in parts and components within the branch networks of Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) dating back to the early 20th century (Wilkins1970). Kindleberger 
(1967) used the example of growing trade in ‘semi-finished material’ (parts and 
components) between the Ford plants at Limburg in Belgium and Cologne in Germany 
in the mid-1960s, to question the validity of the conventional approach to analyzing the 
trade-growth nexus, ‘developed almost entirely on the basis of trade in final products – 
that is, goods wholly produced in one country and consumed in another’ (p. 108-9). The 
affiliates of the US MNEs operating in the Australian automotive industry have been 
importing parts and components for local assembly operations and also exporting some 
parts and components produced in Australia within their global networks, from the early 
1950s (Hughes 1977, Brash 1966). 
What is unprecedented about the contemporary process of global production sharing is 
its wider and ever increasing product coverage, and its rapid spread from mature 
                                                          
42  Trade in parts and components and final assembly within production networks arising from global 
production sharing. 
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industrial countries to developing countries. Over the past four decades, production 
networks have gradually evolved to encompass many countries and spread to many 
industries such as sport footwear, automobiles, televisions and radio receivers, sewing 
machines, office equipment, electrical machinery, machine tools, cameras, watches, 
light emitting diodes, solar panels, and surgical and medical devices. 43  
Until about the early 1970s, production sharing was basically a two-way exchange 
between the home and host countries undertaken by MNEs. Parts and components 
were exported to the low-cost, host country for assembly and the assembled 
components were re-imported to the home country to be incorporated into the final 
product (Helleiner 1973, Grunwald and Flamm 1985, Brown and Linden 2005).  As supply 
networks of parts and components became firmly established, producers in advanced 
countries have begun to move final assembly of an increasing range of products (for 
example, computers, mobile phones and other hand-held devices, TV sets and 
automobiles) to developing countries (Krugman 2008). Many of the MNEs in electronics 
and related industries now undertake final assembly in developing-country locations, 
retaining only product design, marketing and coordination functions at home. 
MNE subsidiaries also started to subcontract some activities to local (host-country) firms, 
providing the latter with detailed specifications and even fragments of their own 
technology. Over time, many firms, which were not part of original MNE networks, have 
begun to undertake final assembly by procuring components globally through arm’s-
length trade, thus benefitting from the ongoing process of standardisation of parts and 
components.  
These developments suggest that an increase in production-sharing based trade in a 
given country can in some cases be decoupled from increases in the stock of foreign 
                                                          
43 In recent years, the popular press has begun to pay attention to the phenomenon of 
‘reshoring’ (also termed ‘reverse offshoring’ or ‘onshoring’), shifting back by MNEs of 
manufacturing facilities from overseas locations to the home country. However, whether this 
is a new structural phenomenon or simply media hype of some isolated cases against the 
backdrop of the political rhetoric in the USA of ‘bringing back manufacturing home’ is yet to be 
seen (Gray et al 2013).  
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direct investment (FDI) (Jones 2000, Brown et al. 2004). However, there is clear evidence 
that MNEs are still the leading vehicle for countries to enter global production networks. 
In particular, the presence of a major MNE in a particular country is vital, both as a 
signalling factor to other foreign firms less familiar with that country and as an 
agglomeration magnet for the development of new cluster-related activities and 
specialised support services (Dunning 2009, Ruwane and Gorg 2001, Wells and Wint 
2000).    
The expansion of global production sharing has been driven by three mutually 
reinforcing developments (Helpman 2010, Jones 2000, Jones and Kierzkowski 2004, Yi 
2003). First, rapid advancements in production technology have enabled the industry to 
slice up the value chain into finer, ‘portable’ components. Second, technological 
innovations in communication and transportation have shrunk the distance that once 
separated the world’s nations, and improved speed, efficiency and economy of 
coordinating geographically dispersed production processes. This has facilitated, and 
reduced the cost of establishing the ‘service links’ needed to combine various fragments 
of the production process across countries, in a timely and cost efficient manner. Third, 
liberalisation policy reforms across the world over the past four decades have 
considerably removed barriers to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Trade 
liberalisation is far more important for the expansion of GPN trade compared to the 
conventional horizontal trade. This is because, when a slice (task) of the production 
chain operates with a smaller price-cost margin, the profitability could be erased by even 
a small tariff.  
There is an important two-way link between improvement in technological innovations 
in communication and transportation, and the expansion of production sharing within 
global industries.  The latter contributes to lowering the cost of both production and 
rapid market penetration of the final products through enhanced price competitiveness. 
Scale economies resulting from market expansion in turn encourage new technological 
efforts, enabling further product fragmentation. This two-way link has set the stage for 
GPN trade to expand more rapidly, compared to conventional commodity-based trade. 
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Policy Issues 
Global production sharing opens up opportunities for countries to participate in a finer 
international division of labour. It may be that workers in a given country tend to have 
different skills from those in other countries, and the skills required in each production 
block differ, so that a dispersion of activity could lower marginal costs of production. 
Alternatively, it may be that the production blocks differ from each other in the 
proportion of different factors required, enabling firms to locate labour intensive 
production blocks in countries where the productivity-adjusted labour cost is relatively 
low.  In contrast, product design, the manufacture of key components (such as LCDs and 
memory chips) and the establishment of brand names all come with high entry barriers 
because such activities require substantial capital and a high level of manufacturing 
capabilities. 
Why should policy makers pay particular attention to global production sharing as part 
of an outward-oriented development strategy? The available evidence on the emerging 
patterns of global production sharing, when combined with the standard literature on 
gains from export-oriented development (Srinivasan 1999, Grossman and Helpman 
1993), suggests that growth prospects would be greatly enhanced through engaging in 
this form of international exchange.  
First, participation in GPNs is likely to have a favourable ‘atmosphere creation’ effect for 
domestic manufacturing. The very nature of the process of global production sharing is 
the continuous shake-up of the industry through the emergence of new products and 
production processes in place of old ones. Engaging in global production sharing is an 
effective way of linking domestic manufacturing to the dynamic global industries of 
electronics, electrical goods, medical devices and transport equipment, all of which are 
the incubators of new technology and managerial skills. Thus joining GPNs has the 
potential to yield growth externalities (spillover effects) through the transfer of 
technology and managerial know-how and skill development. 
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Second, GPN trade allows for considerable gains from economies of scale and scope that 
arise in wider markets. As GPN trade is often targeted to the world market, the demand 
for the product is not limited to one country. 
Third, specialisation in parts and components within production networks has the 
potential to help overcome the ‘tyranny of distance’ -  the trade cost disadvantage 
arising from the geographic distance to the major markets. The process of global 
production sharing opens up opportunities to specialise in high-value-to-weight 
components for which air shipment is the major mode of transport (Hummels 2009) 
The second and third considerations are particularly important for Australia. The 
performance of Australian manufacturing has historically been constrained by the small 
size of the domestic market and distance-related trade cost (Gregory 1993, Krause 1984, 
McLean 2013, Hutchinson 2014).   
3  Compilation of Trade Data 
A prerequisite for analysing the patterns and determinants of GPN trade is the 
systematic delineation of parts and components and final assembly from the standard 
(customs-records based) trade data. Following the seminal paper by Yeats (2001), it has 
become common practice to use data on parts and components to measure GPN trade. 
However, parts and components are only one facet of network trade. There has been a 
remarkable expansion of global production sharing of parts and components production 
and final assembly. In this study, we define network trade to incorporate both 
components and final (assembled) goods exchanged within the production networks. 
The data used in this study for all countries, except Taiwan, are compiled from the UN 
Comtrade database, based on Revision 3 of the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC Rev. 3). The data for Taiwan (a country which is not covered by the 
UN trade data reporting system) come from the database of the Council of Economic 
Planning and Development, Taipei. 
Parts and components are delineated from the reported trade data using a list compiled 
by mapping parts and components in the UN Broad Economic Classification (BEC) with 
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the SITC at the five-digit level of commodity disaggregation. The product list of the Word 
Trade Organization (WTO) Information Technology Agreement Information was used to 
fill gaps in the BEC list of parts and components.  The parts and components list is given 
in Athukorala and Talgaswatta 2015, Appendix A-1. 
It is important to note that parts and components, as defined here, are only a subset of 
intermediate goods, even though the two terms have been widely used interchangeably 
in the recent literature on global production sharing. Parts and components are inputs 
further along the production chain. Parts and components unlike the standard 
intermediate inputs, such as iron and steel, industrial chemicals and coal, are 
‘relationship- specific’ intermediate inputs; in most cases they do not have reference 
prices, and are not sold on exchanges and are more demanding on the contractual 
environment (Nunn 2007, Hummels 2002). Most (if not all) of parts and components 
also do not have a ‘commercial life’ on their own unless they are embodied in a final 
product.  
The BEC ‘intermediate goods’ list captures both the traditional intermediate goods (such 
as non-ferrous metal, iron and steel bars etc.) and components (‘middle products’ or 
‘goods in process’) germane to global production sharing. To get an accurate picture of 
global production sharing, what is relevant is only the latter (Hummels 2002). Mixing the 
two is particularly problematic for a trade data analysis for Australia because the 
standard intermediate goods historically account for a large share of total manufactured 
exports. 
There is no hard and fast rule for distinguishing in international trade data between 
products assembled within global production networks and other traded goods that are 
produced from beginning to the end in a given country. The only practical way of doing 
this is to focus on the specific product categories in which network trade is heavily 
concentrated. Once these product categories are identified, trade in final assembly can 
be approximately estimated as the difference between parts and components - directly 
identified based on our list - and the total trade of these product categories.  
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Guided by the available literature on production sharing,44 we identified seven product 
categories: office machines and automatic data processing machines (SITC 75), 
telecommunication and sound recording equipment (SITC 76), electrical machinery 
(SITC 77), road vehicles (SITC 78), other transport equipment (SITC 79), professional and 
scientific equipment (SITC 87) and photographic apparatus (SITC 88). It is quite 
reasonable to assume that these product categories contain virtually no products 
produced from start to finish in a given country (Krugman 2008).  The difference 
between the value of the total trade of these categories and the value of total parts and 
components falling under these categories is treated as the value of final assembly.  
Admittedly, the estimates based on this list do not provide full coverage of final 
assembly in world trade. For instance, outsourcing of final assembly does take place in 
various miscellaneous product categories such as clothing, furniture, sporting goods, 
and leather products. However, it is not possible to meaningfully delineate parts and 
components and assembled goods in reported trade in these product categories 
because they contain a significant (yet unknown) share of horizontal trade.  
A number of recent studies have analysed  trade patterns using ‘value added’ trade data 
derived by combining the standard (customs records based) trade data with national 
input-output tables (Productivity Commission 2014, Koopman et al. 2013, Johnson and 
Noguera 2012). The underlying rationale for using value added trade data is that, in the 
context of rapidly expanding cross-border trade in parts and components driven by 
global production sharing, the standard (gross) trade data (trade data based on customs 
records) tend to give a distorted picture of the bilateral trade imbalances of a given 
country45 and the geographic profile of its global trade linkages. In other words, value 
added trade data are useful only for the accurate measurement of bilateral trade 
imbalances and to measure the impact of economic shocks stemming from the final 
export destination countries on a  given trading nation.  
                                                          
44 See Krugman (2008) and the works cited therein. 
45 In fact, this was the reason why Pascal Lamy, the former Director General of WTO, took the 
lead in setting up the OECD/WTO TiVD database, which has now become the main data source 
for value added trade analysis (Lamy 2013).   
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This approach of using input-output tables to measure value added is not relevant for 
the present study, which aims to examine the patterns and determinants of production-
sharing-driven trade flows and opportunities for countries to engage in this form of 
international exchange. From the industry policy point of view, what is important for 
understanding a country’s engagement in global production sharing is gross trade, 
separated into parts and components (rather than intermediate goods in the 
conventional sense) and trade in final assembly.  Under global production sharing, a 
country specialises in a given slice (task) in the production chain, depending on the 
relative cost advantage and other factors, which determine its attractiveness as a 
production location. Trade and industry policies only have the potential to influence a 
country’s engagement in a given slice of the value chain.  Domestic value addition 
evolves over time as the country becomes well integrated into the value chain.46   
4 Australian Manufacturing in Global Production 
Networks  
Trends 
Data on manufacturing exports from Australia, disaggregated into components, final 
assembly and total GPN exports, are plotted in Figure 1. Between 1988/89 and 2000/01, 
total manufacturing exports recorded a fivefold increase, from A$5.6bn to 28.3bn, and 
the share of manufacturing in total merchandise trade increased from 13.4% to 23.1%. 
During the ensuing years, exports slowed, with a greater degree of volatility. By 2013/14 
the share of manufacturing in total exports had declined to 12.4%. Interestingly, exports 
of GPN products, however, remained less volatile during this period and have 
contributed disproportionately to export expansion in recent years. The share of these 
products in total manufacturing exports increased from 43.8% to 47.5%, between 
2009/10 and 2013/14. Within the GPN category, parts and components exports have 
increased at a faster rate compared than final assembly. In sum, GPN exports seem to 
                                                          
46 Even for analysing bilateral trade imbalances and analysing the spillover effects of exports on 
the domestic economy, the available valued-added trade data need to be treated with caution 
because of the well-known limitations of the available I-O data and the underlying restrictive 
assumptions of the estimation method (Yuskavage 2013).  
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have been remarkably resilient to the Dutch Disease effect, the possible adverse impact 
of exchange rate appreciation - during the commodity boom.  
Figure 1 Australian Manufacturing Exports, 1988-2014 (A$ million) 
 
Source:  Data compiled from UN Comtrade database. 
There are reasons to expect the impact of real exchange rate appreciation to be much 
weaker (or even zero) in GPN trade for the following reasons (Jones and Kierzkowski 
2004; Jones 2000, Arndt and Huemer 2007, Burstein et al 2008, Athukorala and Khan 
2015). First, the production units of the value chain located in different countries 
normally specialise in specific tasks. Therefore, the substitutability of parts and 
components sourced from various sources is rather limited. Second, setting up of 
overseas production bases and establishing the services links entail high fixed costs. 
Once such fixed costs are incurred, relative price/cost changes become less important 
in business decision making47.  Third, when a firm in a given country is engaged in a 
particular slice of production process, its export profitability depends not only on 
external demand and the domestic cost of production, but also on supply conditions in 
the countries supplying parts and components, the bilateral exchange rates between 
them, and the magnitude of the share of import content in the exported goods. Changes 
                                                          
47 Businesses may be more mobile if such fixed costs have not been incurred. 
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in exchange rates also have offsetting effects on imports and exports and thus, the net 
effect of the changes in the exchange rate changes on exports within production 
networks can tend to be weaker than in the standard case of production of the entire 
product in a given country.   
Australia is a small player in world manufacturing trade (Table 148). Its share in total 
world manufacturing remained around 0.28% during the period under study, without 
showing any trend. However, Australia’s share of world exports of GPN products 
increased from 0.22% to 0.25% between 1990/01 and 2012/13, underpinned by an 
increase in the share of parts and components, from 0.24% to 0.28%. Australia’s share 
of the total manufacturing exports of OECD countries increased from 0.35% to 0.54% 
between these years, with the share of GPN exports increasing from 0.27% to 0.36%.   
The share of parts and components in total manufacturing exports from Australia, varied 
in the range of 23-28% during 1988-2014, showing a clear upward trend from about 
2006 (Figure 2). In contrast, the share of final assembly declined continuously from 
about the early 2000s to 2010, and then continued to remain well below that of parts 
and components, notwithstanding a mild upward trend in the past three years. On the 
import side, we see the reverse pattern: the parts and components share has declined 
continuously over the past decade or so, with the share of assembly products remaining 
much higher (around 30%) with a mild upward trend (Figure 7 in Athukorala and 
Talgaswatta 2016). These contrasting patterns are consistent with the general factor 
proportion characteristic of parts and components production and the Australian 
resource endowment. Parts and components production is generally more capital and 
skill intensive compared to most final assembly undertaken within global production 
networks. Summary statistics for Australia is given in table 4.1 of this chapter, while 
summary statistics for the whole sample is given in chapter 2.  
 
 
                                                          
48 Tables are presented at the end of the chapter. 
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Figure 2 Parts and Components and Final Assembly in Australian Manufacturing Exports (%) 
 
Source: Data compiled from UN Comtrade database. 
 
Commodity Profile 
The data on the commodity profile of parts and components, and on final assembly 
exports from Australian manufacturing exports are summarised in Tables 2 and 349, in 
terms of three indicators: percentage composition, share in world trade and the 
revealed comparative advantage index (RCA).  The RCA index measures Australia’s 
export performance in a given product compared to its category’s overall performance 
in world trade.  It is simply the ratio of Australia’s world market share of a given product 
exported, to Australia’s share in total world manufacturing exports.50 
                                                          
49 At the end of the chapter 
50   RCA = (Xij/Xwj)/(Xit/Xwt) 
where, Xij denotes country i’s exports of commodity j, Xwj  is world exports of commodity j,  Xit is country 
i’s total exports, and Xwt  is total world exports.  When the value of RCA exceeds (is below) unity, 
country i is said to have a revealed comparative advantage (comparative disadvantage) in commodity j 
(Balassa 1965).   This measure must be used with some caution because domestic policy measures such 
as production subsidies, or foreign trade barriers or trade preferences that have nothing to do with 
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Among the parts and components exports, the product class for aircraft parts and 
components (SITC 7929) stands out for its impressive growth performance. Its share in 
Australia’s total parts and components exports increased from 8.2% in 2000/01 to 13.4% 
in 2012/13 (Table 2). In 2012/13, Australia accounted for 1.7% of total world exports of 
aircraft components, compared to 0.6% in 2000/01.  As  measured by the RCA index, in 
2012/13 Australia’s share of work exports of aircraft parts and components was almost 
6 times of the Australian share in world manufacturing exports, compared to  2.1 times 
in 1990/91.      
The emergence of aircraft components as a new dynamic item in Australia’s export 
composition has been underpinned by the consolidation of the presence of Boeing and 
Airbus, the world’s two major aircraft producers. Australia is well placed to benefit from 
the rapid global expansion of aircraft production networks, given the skill base and 
managerial talent developed over the past century, along with a highly successful public-
private collaborative effort, to gain a global niche in the production of carbon fibre 
composite materials over the past two decades (See Appendix). 
The other products that have indicated notable increases in export shares are parts for 
earth moving machines (SITC 7239), transmission apparatus for radio-telephony (SITC 
7643), mineral processing machines (SITC83) and various machine tools (SITC 7429). 
Automobile parts (SITC 7843) account for the second largest share in exports after 
aircraft parts, but this share declined from 10.8% to 8.8% between 2000/01 and 
20012/13.    
Overall, there has been an increase in the degree of concentration of parts and 
component exports in the more dynamic products listed above. Their share in total parts 
and component exports increased from 79.1% in 1990/91 to 92.7% in 2012/13. Also, in 
a comparison across all products, we can see a shift away from the conventional (mostly 
domestic resource based) parts and components (which are classified under SITC 
                                                          
comparative advantage, can influence its measured value. This limitation is not very important in its 
application to Australian manufacturing trade during the period under study, with the notable exception 
of the automobile industry. 
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Section 6) to more dynamic items belonging to machinery and transport equipment 
(SITC 7) - with the notable exception of automotive parts - and miscellaneous 
manufacturing (SITC 8). 
Among the final assembly exports, motor vehicles (SITC 7821: goods transport vehicles 
and 7812: passenger cars) still account for over half of the total assembly exports, but 
their share has declined in recent years. Also, the RCA index for automobiles is less than 
unity (Table 3). This evidence suggests that the export performance of the automotive 
industry is predominantly driven by industry assistance provided by the government, 
rather than the industry’s comparative advantage in world trade 51 . However, the 
Australian automotive industry seems to have a competitive edge in some specialised 
automotive parts such as parts of trucks for short distance transport (SITC 7441), vehicle 
rear-view mirrors (SITC 6648), engigne parts (SITC 7189) and valves (SITC 7429).   
GPN products relating to medical equipment andg measuring instruments also show 
notable gains in exports. Between 1990/01 and 2012/13, the share of mechanotherapy 
exports increased from 0.3% to 7.3%, and that of medical and surgical instruments 
increased from 2.5% to 5.6%. In 2012/13 Australia accounted for 5.5% of the total world 
exports of mechanotherapy appliances, up from 0.3% in 1990/91.  
The share of light aircraft (<2000kg) accounted for 3.6% of total final goods exports, 
compared to 1.2% in 1990/91. Australia’s share in world light aircraft exports increased 
from 1.1% to 3.6% between 1990/91 and 2012/13. 
 Various categories of measuring, scientific, and medical/surgical equipment have 
recorded increases in their shares in total GPN final exports from Australia, as well as in 
total world exports. As is the case with component exports, a comparison across all GPN 
final products shows a shift away from the conventional (mostly domestic resource 
based) products to more dynamic products within global production networks. There 
has also been an increase in the degree of commodity concentration of final assembly 
                                                          
51 The automobile industry has also been the largest beneficiary of various industry assistance programs 
of the Australian government (PC 2014). 
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exports. The share of unclassified products in Table 3 declines from 24.5% in 1990/01 to 
15.9% in 2012/13. 
Australia-OECD Export Similarity/Difference 
How does the commodity composition of GPN exports from Australia compare with that 
of OECD countries? The Finger-Kreinin export-similarity index is a useful summary 
measure for addressing this issue (Finger-Kreinin 1972). 52  The index calculated for 
Australian and OECD exports of total manufacturing, parts and components and final 
assembly, are plotted in Figure 3. The index is well below the level of perfect similarity 
(100) throughout, showing a notable difference in the commodity composition of 
Australia compared to the average patterns of OECD countries. The differences tended 
to narrow in the second half of the 1990s but have continuously widened since then. 
The prime driver behind the growing dissimilarities has been the emerging patterns of 
Australia’s parts and components exports. 
 
                                                          
52 The index is defined by the formula 
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where a and b denote two countries (or country group) exporting to market c, Xi(ac) is the share of commodity i in a’s exports to c, and Xi(bc) is the 
share of commodity i in b’s exports to c.  If the commodity distribution of a’s and b’s exports are identical (that is, Xi(ac) = Xi(bc)), the index will take 
on a value of 100.  If a’s and b’s export patterns are totally different (that is, for each are identical Xi(ac) > 0, Xi(bc)  = 0, and vice versa) the index will 
take on a value zero. The index intends to compare only patterns of exports across product categories; it is not influenced by the relative size or scale 
of total exports. 
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Figure 3 Finger-Kreinin Export Similarity Index:  Australia and OECD, 1988-2013 (%) 
 
Source: Based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade database. 
A comparison of the data on the commodity composition of Australian manufacturing 
exports (Tables 2 and 3) with that of OECD countries (Tables A-6 and A-7 in Athukorala 
and Talgaswatta 2016) helps us to understand the sources of the widening divergence 
of the Australian GPN exports patterns from the OECD patterns. Auto parts (SITC 7843) 
is the single most important item on the parts and components export list of OECD 
countries.  This item accounts for 15.5% of total parts and components exports from 
these countries, up from 12.9% in 1990/01. Auto parts still account for a significant share 
in Australian exports, but this share has declined over time. In contrast, the rapid 
increase in the share of aircraft parts is a unique feature of Australia’s engagement in 
global production networks.  
 In spite of the changes in the product mix noted earlier, resource-based manufacturing 
industries (products belonging to SITC 6) and heavy machinery industries (roughly SITC 
codes 71 to 75) still account for a larger share of Australian’s GPN final assembly exports. 
Products in which GPN trade has been heavy concentrated in OECD countries such as 
telecommunication and sound recording equipment (SITC 76), electrical machinery 
(SITC 77), professional and scientific equipment (SITC 87), and photographic equipment 
(SITC 88) still do not figure prominently in the Australian export product mix. Medical 
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and surgical equipment account for a relatively larger share of GPN final assembly 
exports from Australia compared to the OECD average patterns. 
Direction of Exports 
There has been a notable shift in the source-country composition of GPN trade from 
advanced industrial countries to countries in East Asia (Athukorala 2014). Has this 
structural shift been reflected in the geographic profile of Australian exports? This issue 
is central to the contemporary Australian policy focus on reaping gains from the East 
Asian economic dynamism.  
OECD countries still account for over half of total GPN exports, with the US continuing 
to remain the largest single destination (Figure 4), the East Asian share of total GPN 
exports from Australia is significantly larger (27.7% in 2012-13), when compared to the 
OECD average (16.2%).  Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a notable East Asian bias in 
GPN exports from Australia, given its proximity to the region. The East Asian share of 
Australian GPN exports has varied in the range of 27% to 33% over the period 2000-14, 
without showing any clear upward trend in line with East Asia’s growing importance in 
global production sharing. The share of exports to China has varied in the narrow range 
of 4% to 5.3% over the past years, notwithstanding that country’s role as the major 
importer of components in the region, to be used in final assembly within global 
production networks. Among the East Asian countries, the countries in Southeast Asia 
account for a much larger share of manufacturing exports compared to Northeast Asia 
(including China). 
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Figure 4 Australia: Direction of GPN Exports (%) 
 
Source: Based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade database. 
One notable feature of Australia’s final assembly exports is the significant share (24.4%) 
going to West Asia (Middle East oil rich countries). Disaggregated data shows that motor 
vehicles continue to account for a large share (over a half).  But exports of a number of 
other final GPN goods to these countries have also increased in recent years. The 
geographic profile of Australian manufacturing exports (both GPN products and other) 
shows a distinct Oceania bias, with New Zealand accounting for a much larger share of 
Australian exports relative to that country’s position in global trade. This pattern is 
consistent with the view that ‘remoteness’ from major trading centres in the world, in 
addition to the geographic distance, plays a role in determining bilateral trade flows 
(Head and Mayer 2014).  
5 Determinants of Exports 
In this section, we undertake an econometric analysis of the determinants of 
manufacturing exports, distinguishing among parts and components, final assembly and 
conventional (horizontal) products. The analysis is undertaken within the standard 
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gravity modelling framework, which has now become the ‘workhorse’ for modelling 
bilateral trade flows. 53  We estimate the export equation separately for total 
manufacturing and the three product categories by including intercept and slope 
dummy variables to examine how Australian performance differs from that of the other 
countries. This approach is equivalent to estimating separate regressions for Australia, 
but it has the added advantage of providing a direct test of the statistical significance of 
the differences between the estimated coefficients.   
Australia is likely to exhibit important differences in GPN compared to other countries 
as a results of tyranny of distance, fluctuations in the exchange rate caused by the 
commodity boom and due to relatively better institutions and human capital 
endowment compared to Asian countries involved in GPN in the region.  
After augmenting the basic gravity model by adding a number of explanatory variables, 
which have been found to improve the explanatory power in previous studies, the 
empirical model is specified as:  
 
lnEXPijt54= α + β1lnSBVit + β2lnDBVjt + β3DSTijt + β4lnPGDPit  + β5lnRERijt  + β6lnTECHit   
+ β7 FTA ij  + β8INSTit + + β9lnLPIijt + β10 ADJ ij+ β11 CMLij  + β12 CLK ij   + β13EUDij  + β14EAD ij  + 
β15AFCij  + β16GFC ij + ηt  + ϵijt     (1) 
 
where the subscripts i and j refer to the reporting (exporting) and the partner (importing)  
country, t is time (year) and ln denotes natural logarithms. The explanatory variables are 
listed and defined below, with the postulated sign of the regression coefficient in 
brackets. 
 
                                                          
53 The gravity model originated in Tinbergen (1962), purely as an attempt to capture empirical 
regularities in trade patterns.  For recent attempts to provide a theoretical justification for its 
formulation and applications to trade flow modelling, see various contributions in Bergeijk and 
Brakman (2010). Head and Mayer (2014) provide an extensive survey of the relevant literature. 
54 The dependent variable is the log of exports of country i to country j.  
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EXP Bilateral exports 
SBV Supply-base variable:  real manufacturing output (RMF) for parts and 
components and GDP for final assembly and total exports of country i (+) 
DBV Demand-base variable:  real manufacturing output (RMF) for parts and 
components and GDP for final assembly and total exports of country j (+) 
DST The distance between the economic centres of i and j (-) 
PGDP Real per capita GDP of country i and j (+ or -) 
RER Real bilateral exchange rate between i and j  (+) 
TECH Technological capabilities of i measured by resident patent registrations (+) 
INST Institutional quality of country i (+) 
FTA A binary dummy which is unity if both i and j belong to the same regional trade 
agreements (RTA) and 0 otherwise (+) 
LPI Quality of trade related logistics of country i and j (+) 
ADJ A binary dummy variable which takes the value one if i and j share a common 
land border and zero otherwise (+) 
CML A dummy variable which takes the value one if i and j have a common 
language (a measure of cultural affinity) and zero otherwise (+) 
CLK Colonial economic link dummy which takes the value one for country pairs 
with colonial links and zero otherwise (+) 
EUD A dummy variable for the European Union member countries (which takes the 
value one for EU member countries and zero for the other countries) 
EAD A dummy variable for the countries in East Asia (which takes the value one for 
the East Asian countries and zero for the other countries).   
AFC  A dummy (1 for 1997 and 1998 and zero otherwise) to capture trade 
disruption caused by the Asian financial crisis (-). 
GFC A dummy (1 for 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise) to capture trade 
disruption caused by the global financial crisis (-). 
 A constant term  
ηt A set of time dummy variables to capture year-specific fixed effects 
 A stochastic error term, representing the omitted influences on bilateral trade 
Description of Variables 
The three variables, SBV, DBV and DST, are the key gravity model variables. In the 
standard formulation of the model, the real GDP of the reporting and partner countries 
is used to represent SBV and DBV. The GDP of the reporting (exporting) country is used 
to represent its supply capacity, whereas that of the destination nation represents the 
capacity to absorb (demand). The larger countries have more variety to offer and absorb 
in international trade than do smaller countries (Tinbergen 1962). The use of this 
variable in our trade equation is also consistent with the theory of global production 
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sharing, which predicts that the optimal degree of fragmentation depends on the size of 
the market (Jones and Kierzkowski 2004, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2013). However, 
for modelling trade in parts and components - which are mostly inputs in the production 
process - the use of GDP, to represent supply and demand, is less appropriate (Baldwin 
and Taglioni 2011). For this reason, we use the real manufacturing output of the 
reporting and partner countries as the proxies for SBV and DBV in the parts and 
components equation.      
The geographic distance (DST) is a proxy measure of transport (shipping) costs and other 
costs associated with time lags in transportation including spoilage. Technological 
advances during the post-war era have contributed to the ‘death of distance’ when it 
comes to international communication costs (Cairncross 2001). However, there is 
evidence that geographical ‘distance’ is still a key factor in determining international 
transport costs, in particular shipping costs (Hummels 2007, Evans and Harrigan 2005). 
Transport cost could be a much more important influence on GPN trade than on the 
conventional horizontal trade, because of the multiple border-crossings involved, the 
need to meet delivery requirements for just-in-time production and the requirements 
for movement of managerial and technical manpower within global production 
networks.   
Relative per capita GDP (RPGDP) is considered a good surrogate variable for intercountry 
differences in the capital-labour ratio (Helpman 1987). There are also reasons to believe 
that relative GDP per capita has a positive effect on GPN trade because as countries 
grow richer, the scale and composition of industrial output can become more conducive 
to production sharing. More developed countries also have higher quality ports and 
communication systems that facilitate production sharing by reducing the cost of 
maintaining ‘services links’ (Golub et al. 2007).  
The real exchange rate (RER), measured as the domestic currency price of the trading 
partner currency adjusted for relative prices of the two countries, is included to capture 
the impact of international prices of tradable goods production on export performance.  
In the standard trade flow modelling, this variable is expected to have a positive impact 
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on bilateral trade flows.  However, as discussed in Section 3 of this chapter and 
Chapter 3, this study hypothesize this impact to be weaker (or even zero) for GPN trade.   
Technological capabilities (TECH) is a key determinant of a country’s ability to move from 
low-value assembly activities to high-value upstream and down-street activities within 
global production chains. This is particularly important for countries whose success in 
global production sharing does not depend on labour cost advantage. We measure TECH 
by the number of patent registrations by the residents of a given country. Further, 
technological improvements can be vital to the reduction of service link costs (Majeed 
2015). 
The free trade agreement dummy variable (FTA) is included to capture the impact of 
tariff concessions offered under these agreements. In theory, GPN trade is considered 
to be relatively more sensitive to tariff changes (under an FTA or otherwise) compared 
to the conventional horizontal trade, because normally a tariff is incurred each time a 
good in process crosses a border (Yi 2003). However, in reality, the trade effect of any 
FTA depends very much on the nature of the rules of origin (ROOs) built into it and the 
resultant increase in transaction costs involved in FTA implementation (Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboon 2013, Krishna 2006). Moreover, the process of global production sharing is 
characterised by the continuous emergence of new products. This naturally opens up 
room for unnecessary administrative delays, as well as the tweaking of rules as a means 
of disguised protection. 
The institutional quality index (INST) captures various aspects of governance that 
directly affect property rights, political instability, policy continuity and other factors 
which have a bearing on the ability to carry out business transactions. This may be an 
important factor to attract multinationals to invest in a country.  
The remaining variables represent various aspects of the cost of the service links 
involved in connecting production blocks/tasks within the global production networks.  
The logistic performance index (LPI) measures the quality of trade-related logistic 
provisions. Adjacency (ADJ), common business language (CML), and colonial links (CLK) 
can all facilitate trade by reducing transaction costs and through a better understanding 
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of each other’s culture and legal systems. The European Union dummy (EUD) is expected 
to capture the possible implications of economic integration among amount these 
countries for GNP trade. The East Asia dummy (EAD) is included to test whether the 
importance of the region as a center of regional production network’s still holds after 
controlling for other relevant variables. Finally, AFC and GFC dummy variables are 
included to control for the trade disruptions during the Asian financial crisis (AFC) and 
the recent global financial crisis (GFC). 
Data and the Estimation Method 
The model is estimated using annual data compiled from the exporter records in the UN 
trade data system (Comtrade database) during the period 1996-2013. The dataset 
covers export trade of 44 countries, each of which accounted for 0.01% or more of total 
world manufacturing exports in 2005. These countries account for over 98% of total 
world manufacturing exports.  The trade data in nominal US$ are converted into real 
terms using US import price indices extracted from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics 
database. The explanatory variables are listed along with details on variable 
construction and data sources in Table 4. 
Of the three standard panel data estimation methods (pooled OLS, random-effects, and 
fixed-effects estimators), the fixed effect estimator is not appropriate for estimating the 
model because it contains a number of time-invariant explanatory variables, which are 
central to our analysis. In experimental runs, we use both pooled OLS estimator and 
random-effects estimator (REE). The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test favours the 
use of RE over the OLS counterpart. However, the RE estimator can yield biased and 
inconsistent coefficient estimates if one or more explanatory variables are endogenous 
(that is, if they are jointly determined together with the dependent variable). In our case, 
there are reasons to suspect that FTA and reporting-country GDP are potentially 
endogenous (Brun et al 2005; Baier and Bergstrand 2007).  Given these concerns, we re-
estimate the model using the instrumental variable estimator proposed by Hausman 
and Tayler (1981) (henceforth HT estimator). The HTE redresses the endogeneity 
problem in cross-section gravity models by using instruments derived exclusively from 
inside the model to capture various dimensions of the data.  The superiority of HT 
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estimation over RE estimation in generating consistent coefficient estimates of the 
gravity model has been demonstrated by a number of recent studies55. To make the 
results comparable, we also present the correlated random effects (CRE) and the 
specification used in Chapter 2. The results remain quantitatively similar. In the CRE 
estimates, because of using Australian Dummy and mean values of the covariates, 
several variables are dropped because of perfect collinearity. 
General Inferences 
The preferred HT estimates of the trade equation are reported in Table 5. The coefficient 
estimates for Australia derived from the overall regression are given in Table 6.  Note 
that we have deleted the dummy variables for the Asian financial crisis and the global 
financial crisis (DAFC and DGFC)) from the final estimates because these two variables 
turn out to be statistically insignificant in experimental runs in all cases. It seems that 
the effects of the two crises are well captured in the model by the time dummies. The 
following interpretations of the regression results are arranged under two subheadings, 
general inferences and Australia-specific inferences. To make the results comparable 
with Chapter 2, and for further robustness tests, the alternative RE and CRE estimates 
are reported for comparison in Appendix Table A-1 and A-2. The results are qualitatively 
similar.  
The coefficients of the standard gravity variables (SBV, DBV and DST) are statistically 
significant with the expected signs in all equations. The magnitude of the coefficient of 
the distance, DST (between -0.81 to -1.09) is consistent with the results of previous 
gravity model applications for modelling trade flows (Head and Mayer 2014). 
The result for the relative per capita income variable (RPGDP) is mixed. The coefficient 
is statistically significant, with the negative sign in the parts and component equation 
suggesting a relative labour intensity bias associated with export expansion. The reverse 
impact seems to apply for final assembly as well, but the estimated impact is small in 
both cases (0.01).  
                                                          
55 See Egger (2005) and Serlenga and Shin (2007), and the works cited therein. 
Chapter 4 Global Production Sharing: Exploring Australia’s Competitive Edge 
117 
The results for the real exchange rate variable (RER) support our hypothesis that global 
production sharing weakens the link between international price changes and trade 
flows. The coefficient of RER is not statistically different from zero in the equation for 
parts and components. It is marginally significant in the equation for final assembly with 
the unexpected sign.  By contrast, the estimated effect of RER on horizontal exports (and 
hence on total exports) is highly significant with the expected (positive) sign.        
The coefficient of TECH is statistically significant in all four equations, suggesting that 
the domestic technology base is an important determinant of manufacturing export 
performance in general.   However, the coefficient of the parts and components (0.22) 
is much larger compared to that of final assembly (0.05).  This difference is consistent 
with the postulate that specialisation in parts and components within global production 
networks is generally more technology intensive compared to final assembly (see Box 2). 
The coefficient of the free trade agreement variable (FTA) is statistically significant in all 
four equations, but it is larger in magnitude in the two GPN exports equations. This result 
is consistent with the fact that tariffs on final electrical and transport equipment still 
remain high in most countries. The coefficient of this variable for parts and components 
is smaller (0.47) compared to that for final assembly (0.69). This result is consistent with 
the fact that almost all countries permit duty-free entry of parts and components as part 
of their export promotion policy package (WTO 2015). These results, however, need to 
be interpreted with care because it could well reflect co-existence, rather than causation: 
there is a general tendency for trading partners with historically well-established trade 
links to enter into FTAs than others.  
Institutional quality (INST)56 seems to have a positive and statistically significant effect 
only on parts and component exports. Strong and business friendly institutions are 
important for attracting MNEs to invest in the country. Further, this is consistent with 
the fact that institutional quality is closely associated with the service link costs involved 
                                                          
56  In experimental runs we used three other alternative indicators of institutional quality 
(governance), (rule of law, government effectiveness, control of corruption) from the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators database. The results were comparable in the standard 
OLS estimation. However, we were not able to use these indicators in FE and HT estimations 
because of data gaps. 
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in global production sharing. Timely delivery of parts and components is vital for the 
smooth functioning of closely-knit tasks within the value chain.  
The coefficient of the logistic performance variable (LPI) is statistically significant in all 
four equations. The magnitude of the coefficient of this variable for parts and 
components (1.02) and final assembly (1.16) is larger than that of conventional 
(horizontal) exports (0.79). This difference (which is statistically significant) is consistent 
with the view that the quality of trade related logistics is much more important for a 
country’s success in expanding GNP trade.  
 The common language variable (CML) seems to have a highly significant impact on parts 
and comment exports. The use of a common language generally reduces service link 
cost. Surprisingly, the coefficient of this variable is not statistically significant in the 
equation for final assembly export. This presumably reflects China’s dominance in the 
world final-assembly trade.  
Finally, the coefficient of the East-Asia dummy (EAS) is highly significant with the 
expected sign in all four regressions.  The coefficients for EAS in the two GPN equations 
are much larger than that in the horizontal export equation, indicating a strong GPN bias 
in intra-East Asian trade.  More specifically, the results suggest that Intra East-Asia 
exports of GPN products are five to six times larger (whereas horizontal exports are only 
three times larger) than predicted by the other explanatory variables in the model.57 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the EU dummy is not statistically significant in all four 
regressions.  It seems that there is no distinct intra-regional bias in EU exports (with the 
exception of parts and components) after controlling for the other explanatory variables, 
in particular, the FTA dummy. 
                                                          
57 Note that, as the model was estimated using all variables (other than the dummy variables), 
the comparable figure for any dummy coefficient is [exp(dummy coefficient) – 1].  Thus the 
comparable coefficients of ESA in the four equations are 4.4, 6.2, 5.0 and 3.0, in that order. 
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Australia-specific Inferences 
The coefficients of most of the dummy interaction variables are not statistically 
significant (Table 6). This suggests that the above inferences relating to these variables 
are generally applicable to exports from Australia as well.   
A notable Australia specific finding is that the ‘tyranny of distance’ is a significantly more 
binding constraint on exports of conventional (horizontal) goods and hence on total 
manufacturing exports. The coefficients of DST in the equations for horizontal goods 
(-4.30) and total manufacturing (-3.52) are highly significant58 and are more than three 
times larger in magnitude compared to the all-country coefficient (-0.95 and -0.86, 
respectively). By contrast,  the coefficient of DST in the equations for parts and 
components is not statistically significant, suggesting that distance does not place 
Australia at a specific disadvantage in exporting parts and components compared to the 
all-country experience. The coefficient of DST related to final assembly exports is 
marginally significant (at  the 10% level),  presumably, because shipping is the only mode 
of transport for some final assembly products such as motor vehicles and agricultural 
machinery.  However, overall, it seems that fitting into global production networks helps 
Australian manufacturing to circumvent the ‘tyranny of distance’.  
The coefficient of RGDP is statistically significant with the positive sign only in the 
component regression. This finding is consistent with the view that Australia has 
comparative advantage in the production of relatively more capital intensive parts and 
components within production networks compared to the other countries 
The coefficient of the real exchange rate variable (RER) in the final goods equation is not 
statistically different from zero. It is marginally statistically significant (at the 10% level) 
for components with the expected (positive) sign, but the magnitude of the coefficient 
is small (0.07). Thus, overall, the results are consistent with our postulate that relative 
price competitiveness is not a major determinant of GPN trade.   
                                                          
58 Both total manufacturing and horizontal goods exports are significant at the 1 per cent level, 
showing that transportation costs are more binding for these categories compared to parts 
and components trade.  
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The domestic technology base seems to give an edge to Australian manufacturing in 
exports of both parts and components and final assembly. The estimated Australian 
coefficient of TECH is statistically significant and its magnitude is much larger compared 
to the all-country coefficients. This is consistent with the notion that technological 
improvements help in fragmenting the production process across countries. Overall, the 
Australian results relating to TECH variables are consistent with the patterns revealed in 
our RCA analysis. The results for the FTA variable suggest that FTA membership59 has not 
so far helped the expansion of Australian manufacturing exports over and above the 
other determinants of trade flows.   
Institution quality (INST) seems to give Australian manufacturing a distinct competitive 
edge in parts and components exports over other countries. The coefficient of INST for 
Australia in the equation for parts and components is as large as 0.98, compared to the 
all-country coefficient of a mere 0.04. 
6 Concluding Remarks  
Global production sharing has become an integral part of the global economic landscape 
over the past few decades.  Australia is still a minor player in global production sharing, 
but at the disaggregated levels we can observe a number of promising signs. There are 
early signs of Australian manufacturing reaping gains from joining the global production 
networks, specifically focussing on specialised tasks which are generally consistent with 
the country’s comparative advantage in skill-intensive production.  Australia’s share of 
total OECD exports of GPN products has doubled over the past decade. 
Australia seems to have a distinct competitive edge in parts and components 
specialisation in several product categories: aircraft and associated equipment, internal-
combustion machines, machine tools, miscellaneous machinery, taps and valves, 
computers, measuring equipment, machine parts, photographic equipment and 
electrical machinery.  Among final assembly products, Australia seems to have a 
                                                          
59 During the period under study, Australia has been an FTA partner with New Zealand 
(throughout the entire period under study), Singapore (since 2004), Thailand (since 2005), and 
the USA (since 2005). 
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competitive edge in medical devices, measuring and scientific equipment and light 
aircraft. In sum, the findings of the commodity-level analysis suggest that the ongoing 
process of global production sharing has opened up opportunities for Australia to 
specialise in high-value-to-weight parts and components, and final assembly, which are 
not generally subject to the tyranny of distance in world trade because the main mode 
of transport is air shipment.  The ‘tyranny of distance’ is not a binding constraint on 
exporting specialised parts and components and some final assembly goods from 
Australia. There is also evidence that domestic technological capabilities are relatively 
more important, compared to the average global experience, in determining 
components exports from Australia.     
The econometric analysis and the analytical narrative of export patterns suggest that 
relative price competitiveness (captured in our analysis by the real exchange rate) does 
not seem to be an important determinant of GPN exports. These exports are 
predominantly ‘relation-specific’ and are based on long-term supplier-producer 
relationships. This evidence suggests that reaping gains from both Australia’s 
comparative advantage in primary commodity (resource-based) trade, as well as from 
specialisation in knowledge-intensive tasks within global production networks, are not 
conflicting policy goals for Australia.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with the message of a recent policy report by the 
Committee for Economic Development of Australia that ‘Rumours of the death of 
manufacturing in Australia, perpetuated by the media’s constant reporting of factory 
closures, and large multinationals exiting manufacturing, is generally exaggerated’ 
(CEDA 2014).  Effective policy making in this era of global production sharing needs to 
be based on the identification of specific manufacturing niches through a disaggregated 
analysis of trade patterns rather than looking at evidence depicting the broader picture.  
However, in the Australian policy debate to date the term ‘advanced manufacturing’ has 
been used in the conventional sense, without distinguishing GPN trade within overall 
manufacturing. Our disaggregated analysis of parts and components and final assembly 
exports within global production networks will also be helpful in identifying specific 
products within advanced manufacturing for policy attention.  
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The findings of this study give credence to the case made in a number of recent 
influential studies for further reforms to improve Australia’s export performance 
(Withers et al 2015, CEDA 2015, Government of Australia 2012).  Compared to the first 
four decades of the post-World War II era, Australia’s policy reforms since the early 
1980s have certainly achieved a great deal in unshackling the economy and integration 
into the world economy. However, as extensively discussed in these studies, there are 
still many unresolved problems relating to the overall investment climate.  Given the 
importance of ‘service link’ cost, the overall business climate of the host country is the 
ultimate draw for investors in this area: just offering incentives for investors cannot 
compensate for the lack of such a base.  
Finally, the ongoing process of global production sharing calls for a change in national 
data reporting systems and the analytical and statistical tools we use to measure and 
understand world trade and the trade-industry nexus. Linking trade data at the 
firm/establishment level with production data is vital for clearly identifying the niche 
areas of specialisation within global production systems and to monitor the 
achievement of the manufacturing industry in those areas. It is also important to 
improve/restructure the national data reporting system in order to better capture the 
growing importance of the role of services in manufacturing.   
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Table 1 Summary Data of Manufacturing Exports: Australia - OECD Comparison 
 
Total 
manufacturing 
Parts & 
components 
Final 
assembly  
GPN 
products 
Other 
manufacturing  
OECD share in world exports (%) 
1990/01 78.3 81.3 81.7 81.5 74.9 
2000/01 66.6 64.7 72.5 67.6 65.2 
2005/06 59.8 56.0 63.3 58.9 61.0 
2012/13 48.2 45.6 48.8 47.0 49.4 
Australia's share in world exports (%) 
1990/01 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.33 
2000/01 0.33 0.27 0.38 0.31 0.35 
2005/06 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.32 
2012/13 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.28 
Australia’s share in OECD exports  
1990/01 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.27 0.44 
2000/01 0.49 0.31 0.26 0.29 0.48 
2005/06 0.47 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.52 
2012/13 0.54 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.58 
OECD export composition (%) 
1990/01 100 30.3 23.4 53.7 46.3 
2000/01 100 34.5 23.1 57.6 42.4 
2005/06 100 31.1 22.6 53.7 46.3 
2012/13 100 25.4 21.8 47.3 52.7 
Australia's export composition (%) 
1990/01 100 26.0 15.9 41.9 58.1 
2000/01 100 29.3 24.8 54.1 45.9 
2005/06 100 25.5 23.2 48.8 51.2 
2012/13 100 27.2 18.7 45.9 54.1 
Note:  1. Countries which became OECD member before 1990. 
Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database in current US$
Chapter 4 Global Production Sharing: Exploring Australia’s Competitive Edge 
124 
Table 2 Parts and Components Exports from Australia: Composition, World Market Share and Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)1 (%) 
SITC code Product description Composition (%) Share of world exports (%) CRA index 
1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 
7929 Aircraft parts (excluding tyres and electrical parts)  8.2 7.6 13.3 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.1 2.9 5.8 
7843 Motor vehicle parts other than bodies 10.2 10.8 8.8 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.7 
7239 Parts of earth moving machines 3.1 2.8 8.6 0.6 0.8 1.4 2.1 2.4 4.7 
7599 Parts/accessories of data processing/storage machines 9.2 13.5 7.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.3 2.2 
7643 Transmission apparatus for radio-telephony 1.4 2.0 3.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 1.4 0.4 0.6 
7283 Parts of machines for mineral processing 0.9 1.3 2.9 1.1 2.7 3.0 3.8 7.8 10.3 
7132 Engines for propelling vehicles 9.8 4.6 2.4 1.0 0.6 0.3 3.4 1.8 1.0 
7429 Parts of pumps and liquid elevators 1.0 0.8 2.2 0.6 0.7 1.1 2.0 2.1 3.9 
7725 Electrical apparatus for switching/protecting electrical circuits 2.2 3.8 2.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.9 1.3 0.7 
6956 Plates, sticks and tips for tools 0.7 0.9 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.5 
7285 Parts of specialised industrial machinery 0.9 2.0 1.8 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.8 1.3 
7726 Boards and panels for electrical control 0.5 0.5 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.0 
7139 Parts for internal combustion engines 3.6 1.9 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 1.5 1.0 0.7 
7724 Reciprocating positive displacement pumps  1.2 1.0 1.6 0.8 1.3 1.3 2.7 3.7 4.6 
7478 Taps/cocks/valves  0.5 0.5 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9 
7919 Railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings 0.4 0.3 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.9 1.5 1.0 2.9 
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SITC code Product description Composition (%) Share of world exports (%) CRA index 
1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 
7523 Digital processing units 2.1 1.3 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.6 
7783 Accessories of motor vehicles except bodies 0.8 0.6 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.8 
7449 Parts for lifting, handling and loading machinery 0.9 0.8 1.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.7 
7529 Data-processing equipment 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.2 
7649 Parts of sound recording equipment 1.0 2.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.5 
6299 Hard rubber parts 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.1 
7763 Diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
7788 Parts of electrical machinery 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.2 1.0 1.4 0.8 
7731 Insulated wire, cable electric conductors 3.1 2.2 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.8 0.4 
7484 Gears and gearing and other speed changers 0.6 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.4 1.3 0.2 1.3 
7189 Engines and motors for electric rotary converters 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.5 3.5 
6648 Vehicle rear-view mirrors 1.0 0.9 0.8 4.5 4.2 2.1 16.1 12.3 7.2 
7728 Parts suitable for electrical apparatus 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.7 
7489 Parts of g=ars/flywheel/sclutches 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.6 2.2 
7526 Input or output units for automatic data-processing machines 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 
7439 Parts of centrifuges and purifying machines 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.4 
8741 Parts of surveying and navigating instruments 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.3 2.5 3.4 
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SITC code Product description Composition (%) Share of world exports (%) CRA index 
1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 1990/91 2000/01 2012/13 
7479 Parts of valves, taps and cocks 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.8 1.3 1.2 
7527 Data  storage units 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 
8912 Parts of military equipment 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.5 0.2 5.1 
8749 Parts and accessories for other machines and appliance 1.6 1.3 0.7 4.0 3.6 1.5 14.1 10.5 5.0 
7149 Parts of the engines and motors of reaction engines 1.5 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.3 
7499 Machinery parts, not containing electrical connectors 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.8 1.8 
7415 Air-conditioner parts 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.0 1.3 0.7 
7853 Parts and accessories of  cycles 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.6 1.0 
7148 Gas turbines 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.1 
7219 Parts of agricultural machinery 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 2.2 1.9 1.2 
7787 Parts of electrical machines and apparatus 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.4 1.3 1.9 1.3 
Other2 24.5 25.6 15.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.7 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.89 0.82 1.02 
Total  $ million      1628 4325 8032 
      
Notes:  (1) The revealed comparative advantage is an index used in international economics for calculating the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country in a certain class of goods or services as evidenced by 
trade flows. It is based on the Ricardian comparative advantage concept.  Products are listed in ascending order, based on export shares for 2012/13.   Figures are two-year averages. 
 (2)  Four-digit items, each of which accounts for less than 0.5% of the total value. 
Source: Compiled from the UN Comtrade database using the procedure discussed in Section 2 
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Table 3 Final Assembly Exports from Australia: Composition, World Market Share and Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)1 (%) 
SITC code Product description Composition (%) World export share (%) RCA index 
1990/01 2000/01 2012/13 1990/01 2000/01 2012/13 1990/01 2000/01 2012/13 
7821 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods 25.7 29.2 28.9 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.2 0.9 
7812 Passenger motor vehicles 24.5 28.3 25.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.9 
8723 Mechanotherapy appliances2 0.3 0.8 7.3 0.3 1.4 5.5 1.0 4.1 18.7 
8722 Medical, surgical or veterinary science instruments 2.5 3.4 5.6 0.4 0.8 0.6 1.3 2.3 1.9 
7921-22 Aircrafts  <2000kg  1.2 1.4 3.6 0.7 1.2 2.4 2.5 3.6 8.0 
8744 Instruments/apparatus for physical or chemical analysis  2.7 2.1 3.1 0.6 1.0 0.6 2.2 2.8 2.2 
7522 Digital automatic data-processing machines 3.5 0.6 2.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.3 0.3 
7788 Electrical machinery and equipment 0.9 1.3 2.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.2 1.1 
8742 Drawing, marking-out or mathematical calculating 
instruments  
0.5 0.6 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.3 
8741 hydrological, meteorological or geophysical instruments 0.3 0.8 1.6 0.1 0.8 1.0 0.4 2.2 3.4 
7931 Yachts and other vessels for pleasure or sports 5.0 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.6 0.9 6.9 4.8 3.1 
7638 Sound-recording/reproducing apparatus 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 
7648 Telecommunications equipment 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.3 
8745 Measuring, controlling and scientific instruments 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.9 2.5 
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SITC code Product description Composition (%) World export share (%) RCA index 
1990/01 2000/01 2012/13 1990/01 2000/01 2012/13 1990/01 2000/01 2012/13 
8746 Automatic regulating or controlling instruments  0.1 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.9 
8842 Drawing, marking-out or mathematical calculating 
instruments  
0.3 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.8 
7932 Ships, boats and other vessels 6.1 4.0 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.1 1.5 1.9 0.2 
7758 Electro-thermic appliances 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 
7741 Electro-diagnostic (other than radiological) apparatus  0.5 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 
7712 Microphones and stands therefore 1.2 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.3 0.4 0.4 
7642 Wrist watches, pocket watches and other watches  0.2 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 
7832 Semi-trailer tractors 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 
8743 Lenses, prisms, mirrors and other optical elements 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 
8747 Oscilloscopes, spectrum analysers and other instruments  0.9 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.9 1.7 0.9 
7822 Special-purpose motor vehicles 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.9 
 Other3 21.9 20.6 7.3 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.1 1.6 0.8 
Total 100 100 100 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.2 0.0 
   US$ million       1,331      5,096      7,193        
Notes:     (1)  Products are listed by ascending order based on export shares for 2012/13.   Figures are two-year averages. 
(2)  Appliances used for exercise prescribed for heel-drop exercises for Achilles tendon injury. 
(3)  Four-digit items, each of which accounts for less than 0.5% of the total value. 
Source: Compiled from the UN Comtrade database using the procedure discussed in Section 2 
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Table 4A Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Label Definition 
Data source/variable 
construction 
EXP Bilateral exports in US$ measured at constant (2000) price, for 44 
countries:   
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, 
Switzerland, China, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Germany,  
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hong Kong 
(China HKG), Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan,  Rep. of Korea, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Malaysia, Netherlands, 
Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Singapore,  Slovak Republic, Slovenia,  South Africa,  
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United States (USA)  and  Vietnam. 
Exports (at CIF price, 
US$): compiled from 
UN COMTRADE 
database. Exports 
values are deflated by 
US import price indices 
extracted from the US 
Bureau of Labour 
Statistics database 
(http://www.bls.gov/p
pi/home.htm).  
GDP, 
RMF, 
PGDP 
GDP, manufacturing output, and per capita GDP (at 2000 price). 
World Development 
Indicator database, The 
World Bank.  
DST Weighted distance measure of the French Institute for Research 
on the International Economy (CEPII), which measures the 
bilateral great-circle distance between major cities of each 
country.  
French Institute for 
Research on the 
International Economy 
(CEPII) database. 
RER  Real exchange rate:  
    
W
i
D
j
ijij
P
P
NERRER *  
where,  NER  is the nominal bilateral exchange rate index (value 
of country j’s currency in terms of country i’s currency), PW is 
price level of country j  measured by the producer price index and 
PD is the domestic price index of country i measured by the GDP 
deflator.  An increase (decrease) in RERij indicates improvement 
(deterioration) in country’s international competitiveness relative 
to country j.   
Constructed using data 
from World Bank, 
World development 
Indicators database. 
The mean-adjusted 
RER is used in the 
model.  This variable 
specification assumes 
that countries are in 
exchange rate 
equilibrium at the 
mean. 
TECH Technological capability proxied by patent applications by the 
residents of a given country. 
World Development 
Indicator, World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.
org/data-
catalog/world-
development-
indicators 
FTA A binary dummy variable which is unity if both country i and 
country j are signatories to a given regional trading agreement. 
CEPII database 
INS Institutional (governance) quality (by political stability and 
absence of violence) measured on a scale of -2.5 (worst 
performance) to 2.5 (best performance).  
World Governance 
Indicators database,  
World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.
org/data-
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catalog/worldwide-
governance-indicators 
LPI World Bank logistic performance index.  
Logistic quality of a country assessed on a scale of  1 (worst 
performance)  to 5 (best performance), based on six indicators: 
(1) efficiency of the clearance process by customs and other 
border agencies; (2) quality of transport and information 
technology infrastructure; (3) ease and affordability of arranging 
international shipments; (4) competence of the local logistics 
industry; (5) ability to track and trace international shipments; (6) 
domestic logistic costs; (7)  timeliness of shipment in reaching 
destination  (Arvis et al., 2007). 
LPI database, World 
Bank 
http://lpi.worldbank.org/ 
ADJ A binary dummy variable which is unity if country i and country j 
share a common land border and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII database 
CML A dummy variable which is unity if country i and country j have a 
common language and zero otherwise. 
CEPII database 
CLK A dummy variable which is unity for country pairs with colonial 
links and zero otherwise. 
CEPII database 
 
Table 4B Summary statistics for Australia  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Log of parts and components exports 1,151 9.422997 2.284659 0.011197 14.29554 
Log of manufacturing exports 1,153 10.93747 2.214998 1.696459 15.34037 
Log of home country manufacturing value 
added 1,008 24.95317 0.067682 24.80569 25.05169 
Log of partner country manufacturing value 
added 910 24.38126 1.500103 20.63938 28.21191 
Log of home country GDP per capita 1,278 10.32618 0.151598 10.08691 10.53187 
Log of home country GDP per capita squared 1,278 106.653 3.126177 101.7458 110.9203 
Log of communication infrastructure - internet 
users per 100 people  1,089 2.999099 1.674237 -0.53598 4.437461 
Log of total patent applications by residents  957 7.744845 0.172557 7.473069 8.026497 
Standard deviation of inflation rate.  959 1.118582 0.049854 0.735337 1.126728 
Log of real exchange rate 1,238 -2.15759 2.54414 -9.45623 1.125997 
Log of logistic performance indicator  1,329 1.332357 0.005822 1.316408 1.345472 
Institutions variable based on political stability 958 1.020011 0.156793 0.826966 1.333422 
Regional trade agreements 1,317 0.04404 0.205261 0 1 
Colony 1,329 0.020316 0.141132 0 1 
Log of distance  1,329 9.379516 0.406854 7.914384 9.77709 
Contiguity of border 1,329 0 0 0 0 
Common ethnic language  1,329 0.264108 0.441023 0 1 
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Table 5 Determinants of Manufacturing Exports1 
Variables Total 
manufacturing 
Parts & 
components 
Final 
assembly 
Conventional 
(horizontal) 
exports 
Ln Real SBV, reporter2 1.24*** 
(0.03) 
1.39*** 
(0.03) 
1.82*** 
(0.06) 
1.03*** 
(0.03) 
Ln Real SDB, partner3 1.38*** 
(0.03) 
1.10*** 
(0.03) 
2.14*** 
(0.06) 
1.19*** 
(0.03) 
Ln Distance (DST) -0.86*** 
(0.06) 
-0.80*** 
(0.10) 
-1.07*** 
(0.10) 
-0.95*** 
(0.05) 
Ln Relative per capital GDP (RPGDP) -0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Ln  Bilateral real exchange rate (RER) 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Ln  Technology base, reporter (TECH) 0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
FTA membership dummy (FTA) 0.34*** 
(0.02) 
0.47*** 
(0.04) 
0.69*** 
(0.05) 
0.22*** 
(0.02) 
Institutional quality (INST), reporter  -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Ln Logistic quality (LPI), reporter 0.93*** 
(0.12) 
1.02*** 
(0.18) 
1.16*** 
(0.24) 
0.79*** 
(0.13) 
Contiguity dummy (ADJ) -0.03 
(0.21) 
-0.44 
(0.35) 
-0.60* 
(0.36) 
0.11 
(0.18) 
Common language dummy (CML) 0.38*** 
(0.13) 
0.70*** 
(0.23) 
0.15 
(0.22) 
0.48*** 
(0.11) 
Colony dummy (CLK) -0.32 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.37) 
-0.93** 
(0.39) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
European Union dummy (EU) 0.22 
(0.15) 
0.88*** 
(0.24) 
0.42 
(0.27) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
East Asia dummy (EAS) 1.69*** 
(0.18) 
1.97*** 
(0.30) 
1.79*** 
(0.32) 
1.37*** 
(0.16) 
Constant -51.52*** 
(1.18) 
-47.14*** 
(1.31) 
-87.95*** 
(2.23) 
-40.75*** 
(1.17) 
Australia dummy (AD) variables     
AD*SBV, Australia -0.03 
(0.32) 
1.09 
(1.48) 
-1.22** 
(0.62) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
AD*DBV, partner -0.21 
(0.24) 
-0.23 
(0.21) 
-1.24*** 
(0.47) 
0.09 
(0.25) 
AD*DST -2.66*** 
(0.73) 
-1.14 
(1.17) 
-0.98 
(1.29) 
-3.35 
(0.66) 
AD*RPGDP -0.00 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
AD*RER 0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.07*** 
(0.03) 
AD*TECH 0.17 
(0.26) 
0.69 
(0.50) 
1.27** 
(0.50) 
0.40 
(0.27) 
AD*FTA -0.58*** 
(0.15) 
-0.56*** 
(0.20) 
-1.03*** 
(0.29) 
-0.52*** 
(0.15) 
AD*INST  0.27 
(0.18) 
0.94*** 
(0.28) 
0.32 
(0.35) 
0.14 
(0.19) 
AD*LPI 1.27 
(3.23) 
-2.74 
(5.12) 
7.36 
(6.36) 
3.45 
(3.40) 
AD*CML 0.26 
(0.60) 
0.41 
(1.03) 
0.88 
(1.05) 
0.08 
(0.53) 
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Variables Total 
manufacturing 
Parts & 
components 
Final 
assembly 
Conventional 
(horizontal) 
exports 
AD*CLK 0.70 
(1.74) 
0.90 
(2.72) 
1.41 
(3.06) 
0.36 
(1.56) 
AD 27.10*** 
(10.42) 
-13.09 
(33.24) 
54.24*** 
(19.62) 
16.96* 
(10.30) 
 
Observations 
 
30,570 
 
24,546 
 
30,100 
 
30,060 
Number of country pairs 1,845 1,672 1,843 1,838 
Notes:  
1. Heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors are given in brackets. The statistical significance of regression coefficients denoted 
as:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.   Real manufacturing output (RMF) for parts and components and GDP for final assembly and total exports of country i. 
3.   Real manufacturing output (RMF) for parts and components and GDP for final assembly and total exports of country j.  
 
Table 6 Determinants of Manufacturing Exports: Australia Specific Results1 
Variables Total 
manufacturing 
Parts & 
components 
Final 
assembly 
Conventional 
(horizontal) 
exports 
Ln Real SBV, Australia 1.20*** 
(0.32) 
2.43 
(1.48) 
0.60*** 
(0.22) 
1.16*** 
(0.33) 
Ln Real DBV, partner 1.17*** 
(0.24) 
0.86*** 
(0.21) 
0.90* 
(0.46) 
1.28*** 
(0.24)   
Ln Distance (DST) -3.52*** 
(0.73) 
-1.94 
(1.17) 
-2.05* 
(1.29) 
-4.30*** 
(0.66) 
Ln Relative per capital GDP (RPGDP) -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
Ln  Bilateral real exchange rate (RER) 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
Ln  Technology base, reporter (TECH) 0.14*** 
(0.02) 
0.43*** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.04) 
0.18*** 
(0.01) 
FTA membership dummy (FTA) -0.22 
(0.15) 
-0.06 
(0.20) 
-0.28 
(0.29) 
-0.30* 
(0.15) 
Institutional quality (INST), Australia  0.22 
(0.18) 
0.98*** 
(0.28) 
0.27 
(0.35) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
Ln Logistic quality (LPI), reporter 2.22 
(3.22) 
-1.76 
(5.11) 
8.52 
(6.35) 
4.23 
(3.39) 
Common language dummy (CML) 0.64  
(0.59)  
1.12 
(1.01) 
1.02 
(1.03) 
0.56 
(0.52) 
Colony dummy (CLK) 0.38 
(1.73) 
1.03 
(2.70) 
0.48 
(3.04) 
0.37 
(1.55) 
Notes:  
1.The results reported in this table are derived from the overall regressions reported in Table 6. The 
coefficients are the linear combinations of each of the base coefficients and the coefficient of the 
Australia dummy.  The standards errors (derived from the covariance of the two coefficients) are given 
in brackets. The statistical significance of the regression coefficients is denoted as *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
2.   Real manufacturing output (RMF) for parts and components and GDP for final assembly and total 
exports of country i. 
3.   Real manufacturing output (RMF) for parts and components and GDP for final assembly and total 
exports of country j.  
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Appendix  
Australian Aircraft Industry 
The recent expansion of the Australian aircraft industry through integration into the 
value chain of the world aircraft industry is based on manufacturing talents and 
technological capabilities developed over hundred years. It has also been aided by a 
successful collaborative initiative by the Australian government and private sector 
partners in developing domestic technology for the production of  carbon fibre 
composite materials (composites, for short).       
The history of aircraft production in Australia dates back to 1914-18 when the Australian 
government experimented with local production of military aircraft (Butlin 1955). Based 
on the lessons learned from this initial ineffectual effort, during the inter-war years the 
government adopted a policy of encouragement of private enterprise. A number of 
aircraft companies, mainly catering for the needs of the Royal Australian Air Force 
(RAAF), emerged during the next two decades. Of these, the only company which 
managed to survive the Great Depression was De Havilland Aircraft Proprietary Ltd 
(established in 1929).        
 In October 1936, the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC), a syndicate of private 
companies, was established for the manufacture of aircraft and engines. CAC joined 
hands with the RAAF to produce small military aircraft by modifying models from the US 
and the UK to permit the use of material readily obtainable in Australia. The aim was to 
archive self-sufficiency in the production of aircraft and to upgrade the RAAF’s strike 
capacity. The US and UK governments supported the Australian initiatives because the 
location of light aircraft construction in Australia, with service and repair facilities, 
helped achieve a degree of regional specialisation and conserve shipping space during 
the war years. A total of 3,486 aircraft were produced during 1939-1945. In the peak 
year of 1944, the industry employed over 44,000 workers. The expansion of aircraft 
production spawned a large network of subcontractors involved in producing 
components and providing specialist services (Butlin and Schedvin 1977).   
The lofty notion of self-sufficiency for the RAAF came to very little. Even during the war 
years the RAAF had to rely on American suppliers to meet Australian operational 
requirements. In the post-war era Australia could not compete in price or quality with 
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the large international civil aircraft manufacturers. However, a number of aircraft 
manufacturing firms continued to survive by providing repair and ancillary services to 
the RAAF, producing small passenger aircraft, and (from about the early 1970s) by  
undertaking component production for large overseas producers. Over the past decade 
or so, some of these companies have gained a new lease of life, having benefited from 
the expansion of production sharing arrangements in the world aircraft industry.  
The recent expansion of the Australian aircraft industry has been significantly aided by 
a successful public-private collaborative effort to gain a global niche in the production 
of composites. Composites are important in aerospace and automotive industries 
because they have a similar strength to metals, but are lighter weight with the 
consequent reduction in energy consumption, and also have fewer corrosion problems. 
The recent rapid growth of aircraft parts and component exports from Australia is an 
important success from this investment.   
Over the past 20 years Australia has developed a considerable research capability in the 
design, manufacture and performance of composites, primarily through the Corporate 
Research Centre for Advanced Composite Structures (CRC-ACS). This centre is funded by 
industry partners and the Australian government under the Cooperative Research 
Centre Program. CSIRO, The Australian Future Fibre Research and Innovation Centre and 
a number of Australian universities, including Deakin and RMIT Universities, are active 
partners of the program (ACTSE 1988, Bremer Company 2015).   
The following company case summaries and helps to understand the ongoing changes 
in the aircraft industry against the backdrop of the globalisation of aircraft 
manufacturing.  
 
Boeing Aerostructures Australia 
Boeing Aerostructures Australia (BAA) was formed in 1996 by Boeing USA by acquiring 
Aerospace Technologies Australia (formerly Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC), 
set up in 1936). In 2000 it expanded operations by acquiring Hawker de Havilland 
(established in 1929).  
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BAA is Boeing’s largest manufacturing operation outside North America. It is a Tier 1 
partner of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner program, the sole supplier of its movable trailing 
edges. The Boeing 787 Dreamliner contract with BAA is Australia’s largest aerospace 
contract ever (20 years), and is valued at $5 billion. BAA is also the sole source of B737 
ailerons, moveable leading edges of B747, and cove lip doors, elevators and rudders of 
B777. BAA works with a large number of small Australian companies.  
Airbus Group Australia Pacific 
Australian Aerospace Engineering (AAE), a Brisbane-based company specialising in 
airframe, tail boom and composite structures, has been a supplier of components to 
Airbus Helicopters (formerly Eurocopter), the helicopter manufacturing division of 
Airbus Group, for over two decades. Airbus Helicopters is the world’s largest producer 
of turbine for helicopters. It has four major plants in Europe and two subsidiaries and 
partners around the world.   
In 2014, Airbus Helicopters obtained full ownership of AAE and renamed it Airbus Group 
Australia Pacific (ABAP). ABAP now represents Airbus Group, Airbus Helicopters and 
Airbus Defence and Space in Australia and the Pacific region.   
Mahindra & Mahindra 
The Indian car company, Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M) entered the Australian aircraft 
industry in 2009 by acquiring majority ownership in two Australian companies: Aerostaff 
Australia and GippsAero (formerly Gippsland Aeronautics), both of which have an 
operational history dating back to the early 1970s.  M&M aims to expand the component 
production capacity of the two companies to meet the growing needs of the world’s civil 
and defence aircraft production - this is an attempt to further increase its presence in 
the global aerospace supply chain.       
Aerostaff Australia is a manufacturer of precision close-tolerance aircraft components 
and assemblies for large original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the global aircraft 
industry. GippsAero is a manufacturer of single-engine utility aircraft. The company 
started operations in the 1970s at Latrobe Valley Airport as an aircraft maintenance and 
modification business. The Airvan 8 produced by GippsAero is one of the most rugged 
and versatile aircraft in that class. It is certified in 38 countries, more than 200 Airvan 8s 
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are in service in Australia, Africa, North America, Europe and many other countries. The 
Airvan 8 will soon be joined by Airvan 10, a 10-seater turboprop aircraft. 
Following the acquisition of the two Australian companies, Mahindra Aerospace has 
begun developing a 25,000 sq. m. facility in Gengaluru in India to produce airframe parts 
and assemblies.  The facility was inaugurated in 2013 and is now delivering aerospace 
sheet metal parts and assemblies for global aircraft manufacturers, including Airbus. 
Lovitt Technologies Australia 
This company was founded in 1954 as George Levitt Manufacturing Pty to produce 
cutting tools components for the automotive industry. Located in Montmorency 
(Victoria), today it is a provider of precision machine tools, components, parts and 
assemblies to the aerospace and defence industries. It is a supplier to Boeing Australia, 
Airbus and many other aircraft producers. 
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Table A-1:   Determinants of Manufacturing Exports: Random Effects Estimates1 
Explanatory variables Total 
manufacturing 
Parts & 
components 
Final 
assembly 
Conventional 
(horizontal) 
exports 
Ln Real SBV, reporter2 0.88*** 1.06*** 0.99*** 0.81*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Ln Real SDB, partner3 1.00*** 0.96*** 1.11*** 0.94*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ln Distance (DST) -0.71*** -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.83*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Ln Relative per capital GDP (RPGDP) -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln  Bilateral real exchange rate (RER)  0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln  Technology base, reporter (TECH) 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
FTA membership dummy (FTA) 0.33*** 0.48*** 0.74*** 0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Institutional quality (INST), reporter  -0.04*** 0.13*** 0.04** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Ln Logistic quality (LPI), reporter 1.45*** 2.30*** 3.14*** 1.18*** 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.20) (0.12) 
Contiguity dummy (ADJ) 0.32** -0.03 0.26 0.38*** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) 
Common language dummy (CML) 0.52*** 0.72*** 0.44*** 0.56*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) 
Colony dummy (CLK) 0.05 0.36* -0.02 0.24 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.15) 
European Union dummy (EU) 0.50*** 0.91*** 1.03*** 0.28*** 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) 
East Asia dummy (EAS)d_EAS 1.72*** 2.09*** 1.86*** 1.42*** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) 
Constant -34.11*** -37.75*** -
44.77*** 
-30.01*** 
 (0.75) (0.84) (1.10) (0.76) 
Australia dummy (AD) variables     
AD*SBV, Australia -0.10 0.52 -1.98*** 0.25 
 (0.27) (1.51) (0.52) (0.28) 
AD*SDB, partner  -0.07 -0.17 -0.22 0.04 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.12) 
AD*DST -2.70*** -1.75*** -1.80** -3.21*** 
 (0.51) (0.64) (0.71) (0.52) 
AD*RER 0.05** 0.09** 0.07 0.07*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
AD*RPGDP -0.00 0.02** 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
AD*LPI -0.08 -4.82 2.49 2.69 
 (3.27) (5.29) (6.47) (3.43) 
AD*TECH 0.06 0.45 0.90* 0.34 
 (0.26) (0.51) (0.51) (0.27) 
AD*FTA -0.53*** -0.52** -0.97*** -0.48*** 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.29) (0.15) 
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Explanatory variables Total 
manufacturing 
Parts & 
components 
Final 
assembly 
Conventional 
(horizontal) 
exports 
AD*IST 0.24 0.83*** 0.17 0.14 
 (0.18) (0.29) (0.36) (0.19) 
AD*CLK 0.63 0.73 0.50 0.53 
 (1.18) (1.44) (1.58) (1.19) 
AD*CML 0.22 0.36 0.55 0.12 
 (0.41) (0.54) (0.55) (0.41) 
AD 28.12*** 8.87 64.95*** 15.01 
 (9.13) (32.74) (16.50) (9.46) 
Observations 30,570 24,546 30,100 30,060 
Number of country pairs 1,845 1,672 1,843 1,838 
Notes:  
1. Heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors are given in brackets. The statistical significance of regression coefficients denoted 
as:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.   Real manufacturing output (RMF) for parts and components and GDP for final assembly and total exports of country i. 
3.   Real manufacturing output (RMF) for parts and components and GDP for final assembly and total exports of country j. 
 
Table A-2 Determinants of Manufacturing Exports Using Correlated Random Effects 
VARIABLES PC RCE MNF RCE 
 (1)  (2)  
Lh_Real manufacturing output 1.58*** 1.48*** 
 (11.19) (12.65) 
Lp_Real manufacturing output 1.16*** 1.00*** 
 (14.37) (17.70) 
lh_gdppc_real 1.89*** 1.34*** 
 (2.63) (2.76) 
lh_gdppc_sq -0.16*** -0.13*** 
 (-3.92) (-4.66) 
lh_internetusersper100people 0.07** 0.05** 
 (2.53) (2.48) 
ltotalpa_res 0.16*** 0.02 
 (4.50) (0.98) 
sdinfrate -0.03*** -0.02*** 
 (-4.33) (-2.64) 
lrer -0.01 0.01 
 (-1.35) (0.77) 
llpi_overall 0.34 0.21 
 (1.06) (0.92) 
politicalstabilityandabsence 0.09** 0.05* 
 (2.30) (1.95) 
rta 0.49*** 0.49*** 
 (4.94) (6.86) 
colony 0.39** 0.32** 
 (2.21) (1.97) 
ldistw -1.03*** -0.99*** 
 (-27.40) (-32.38) 
contig -0.11 0.14 
 (-0.61) (0.94) 
comlang_ethno 0.75*** 0.71*** 
 (5.05) (6.00) 
mlh_Real manufacturing output -0.41*** -0.60*** 
 (-2.60) (-4.51) 
mlp_Real manufacturing output -0.30*** -0.20*** 
 (-3.63) (-3.34) 
mlh_gdppc_real -0.02 -2.01*** 
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VARIABLES PC RCE MNF RCE 
 (-0.02) (-3.25) 
mlh_gdppc_sq -0.00 0.14*** 
 (-0.06) (4.08) 
mlh_internetusersper100people 0.72*** 0.24** 
 (5.40) (2.15) 
mltotalpa_res -0.20*** 0.02 
 (-3.44) (0.43) 
mlrer 0.09*** 0.06*** 
 (6.17) (5.34) 
mllpi_overall 6.68*** 4.81*** 
 (10.22) (8.84) 
mpoliticalstabilityandabsence 0.17 -0.16* 
 (1.37) (-1.82) 
mrta -0.29* -0.49*** 
 (-1.96) (-4.28) 
md_aus -1,091.92*** -1,283.62*** 
 (-4.18) (-5.20) 
md_aus_Real manufacturing output 44.45*** 52.28*** 
 (4.25) (5.29) 
md_aus_ Real manufacturing output -0.02 -0.04 
 (-0.14) (-0.43) 
md_aus_lrer 0.05 0.10 
 (0.74) (1.50) 
md_aus_rta 0.69 0.26 
 (0.99) (0.34) 
md_aus_colony 0.67* 0.60* 
 (1.72) (1.76) 
md_aus_ldistw -1.94*** -2.22*** 
 (-4.37) (-5.53) 
md_aus_comlang_ethno 0.19 0.19 
 (0.53) (0.64) 
Constant -44.31*** -22.72*** 
 (-16.41) (-11.58) 
   
Observations 24,629 24,849 
Number of pairid 1,673 1,675 
   
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 5 
Inequality or Poverty: Which is Bad for Growth? 
 
1 Introduction 
Recent research has re-focused attention on the impact of income inequality on 
economic growth. In this paper, we expand upon this by asking whether inequality and 
poverty, either separately or jointly, impact economic growth. We focus on extreme, 
absolute poverty as measured by two or three dollars per day income and we measure 
inequality using the Gini coefficient. 
Inequality has been hypothesised to negatively affect growth through several channels. 
Inequality may result in under-investment in education, health and physical capital 
leading to lower growth. We argue that such under-investments could equally, or 
perhaps even more likely, be the result of poverty60 rather than inequality, per se. 
Poverty and inequality can also interact to have a negative impact on growth. This 
interaction between poverty and inequality may relate to mobility, or the quality of 
institutions, or other factors, which could impact negatively on growth. 
Economic growth regressions which control for average incomes and inequality, but not 
for poverty, may fail to capture the disadvantage of poverty that harms growth. By 
including the percentage of people below the poverty line, we are additionally 
controlling for the concentration of disadvantage in the population. The effect of 
poverty might be distinct from and in addition to effects from low average incomes and 
inequality. 
Empirically, we ask two simple questions: is the negative relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth robust to the inclusion of poverty? And, is the 
relationship between inequality and economic growth related to the level of poverty? 
                                                          
60 We use absolute measures of poverty based on the World Bank’s definition of headcount poverty 
rates. Details of how we measure poverty is explained in the data section.  
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We find that including poverty does matter. Specifically, we find that the negative 
impact of inequality on economic growth is related to the level of poverty. When the 
poverty level is low (less than about 25%), we find a statistically insignificant relationship 
between inequality and economic growth. For higher levels of poverty, we find that 
inequality negatively impacts economic growth. The negative effect of inequality on 
economic growth increases as poverty rises. 
The policy implication is clear: promote growth by attacking poverty rather than by 
redistributing incomes. 
We provide background and briefly review some relevant literature in the next section. 
The standard growth regression approach that we use is reviewed in Section 3. Detail of 
our data is provided in Section 4. We then present regression results and focus on the 
marginal effect of inequality on economic growth at different levels of poverty in 
section 5. We conclude in the final section. 
 2 Background 
There has been a renewed focus on the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth spurred by two recent papers Cingano (2014) and Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides 
(2014). Ostry et al. (2014) use newly compiled data by Solt (2009) to find that lower net 
inequality is correlated with faster and more durable growth. They also find that more 
unequal societies tend to redistribute more, but that redistribution does not have a 
major effect on economic growth. In their baseline regressions, they include initial 
income, inequality and redistribution. They add standard growth determinants such as 
investment, population growth and education to verify if their results hold with a wider 
set of control variables. The final specification of Ostry et al. (2014) is a full set of growth 
determinants including terms of trade shocks, political institutions, openness, debt 
liabilities as well as the covariates mentioned before. 
Cingano (2014) also finds that increases in inequality have a negative impact on 
economic growth. The growth regressions in Cingano (2014) only control for initial 
income, education and investment. His paper further finds that inequality interacts with 
human capital to impede growth. While Ostry et al. (2014) focus on a sample of 
countries from around the world, Cingano (2014) focuses only on the OECD countries. 
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The relationship between inequality and economic growth has been well-studied over 
the past 25 years with papers reporting a range of results including claims that inequality 
harms growth, that inequality is irrelevant for growth and that inequality aids in growth. 
Theory is ambiguous as to the expected effects. Inequality can affect economic growth 
in a number of complex ways and through various channels (Cingano (2014), Halter, 
Oechslin and Zweimu¨ller (2014), Lazear and Rosen (1979), Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
(1992) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006). The empirical literature on economic growth 
and inequality partly reflects this; where some papers find that inequality has a negative 
impact on economic growth, others find a positive relationship between the two 
variables. Simple intuition also leads us to no obvious conclusion. It is clear that 
excessive inequality leading to social conflict and exclusion should harm growth. On the 
other hand, ‘perfect’ equality achieved by redistribution away from the successful to the 
less successful must certainly produce incentives that also harm growth. 
Some previous papers support the claim that inequality reduces economic growth. Galor 
and Moav (2004) and Galor and Zeira (1993) emphasise that inequality affects economic 
growth by depriving the poor the opportunity to maintain their health and accumulating 
human capital. Perotti (1996) shows that more equal societies have lower fertility rates 
and higher investment in education. Both of these factors help to improve economic 
growth. Perotti (1996) also shows that inequality is linked to socio-political instability. 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) add to this literature by finding that increases in inequality in 
land and income ownership have a negative impact on economic growth. 
Halter et al. (2014) find that higher inequality fosters performance and growth in the 
short run, nevertheless, inequality tends to have a negative effect on economic growth 
in the long run. Forbes (2000) finds that inequality can lead to increased economic 
growth in the short run. Increased inequality can also cause better incentives for 
innovation, entrepreneurship and higher profits, see Lazear and Rosen (1979), 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1992) and Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006). 
Establishing a relationship between inequality and economic growth is further 
obstructed by lack of data and, until recently, inadequate econometric techniques. Solt 
(2009) attempts to overcome the first problem by creating an extensive dataset on 
inequality. We make use of this dataset to aid in comparability of our results with others. 
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The application of Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) (Durlauf, Johnson and 
Temple (2005) and Roodman (2009)), specifically system GMM, improves the ability to 
handle endogeneity and reverse causality typically found in economic growth 
regressions. 
The literature on economic convergence asks whether low average incomes are 
associated with higher growth rates. A separate question, less well studied, is the impact 
of the concentration of poverty on economic growth. Theoretically, some authors have 
tried to establish a link between poverty and economic development, by hypothesising 
that low income can confine people to a poverty trap as in Sachs (2005). When people 
are poor, they need their income for subsistence. Due to this, they are unable to invest 
in human capital, physical capital and their own health. As a result, investments in the 
economy are reduced and makes the workforce less productive. Further, often poor 
people do not have access to a pension scheme, so they use children as a means of 
insurance, see Perkins, Radelet, Lindauer and Block (2012). However, higher population 
growth can be bad for economic growth as, for a given income level, higher population 
growth will mean less capital per person resulting in lower growth according to a simple 
Solow-Swan model (Ravallion, 2016). 
The literature has shown that poverty can have a negative impact on investment and 
GDP growth, particularly when financial markets are not well developed; (Perry, 2006, 
chapter 1). Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) survey models of poverty traps and find a 
common theme that poverty impedes the acquisition of physical and human capital and 
also curtails the adoption of modern technology. Lo´pez (2006) endorses the hypothesis 
that poverty retards growth through various channels including education, institutions, 
health and physical capital accumulation. Bowels, Durlauf and Hoff (2006) discuss the 
large role that institutions play in perpetuating poverty traps. Lo´pez and Serv´en (2009) 
empirically show that higher levels of initial poverty reduces economic growth.  
Our contribution in this paper is empirical. The empirical and theoretical literature cited 
above provide the rationale for our consideration of the effect on economic growth of 
poverty and inequality and their interaction. 
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 3 Model and Estimation 
We estimate the impact of inequality and poverty on economic growth as 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 =  ∅ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∅1𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + ∅2𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +  ∅3𝑔𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (1)  
where i indexes country and t indexes 5-year time periods. y denotes the natural log of 
real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. In our empirical specification, we use the 
5-year compound average growth rate of GDP as the dependent variable. g is the Gini 
coefficient and p is the poverty headcount ratio. In our results section, we first impose 
 ∅2 =  ∅3 = 0 to reproduce the standard literature which looks at the effect of inequality 
on economic growth. We then estimate the full model to examine the effect of poverty 
and its interaction with inequality on economic growth. 
X is a vector of growth determinants. In our empirical specification, we use a variety of 
different sets of variables for the growth determinants as summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 : Different combinations of determinants of growth (X) used in empirical specification 
Variables Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
Investment to GDP ratio x x x x 
Years of Schooling x x x x 
Log Population Growth  x x x 
Price of Investment   x x 
Trade Share of GDP   x x 
Relative Redistribution    x 
There are well-established problems of estimating growth equation like (1). The control variables suffer from endogeneity and 
measurement errors, see Roodman (2009), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Cingano (2014). One of the main problems in estimating 
Equation (1) is that applying within transformations or taking first differences creates a correlation between the lagged income 
variable and country fixed effects. Such approaches thus yield biased and inconsistent estimates. 
First difference and system GMM techniques overcome these problems (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). First difference GMM remedies these problems by taking the first 
difference of equation (1) to remove country fixed effects and using appropriately 
lagged values of y and X as internal instruments. However, the first difference 
transformation suffers from the drawback of weak instruments if the right-hand side 
variables are highly persistent, which is likely to be a case for inequality, poverty and 
education variables are also persistent, as recognised by Halter et al. (2014). System 
GMM overcomes this problem by building a system of level and first difference 
equations and using appropriately lagged variables as instruments from both the levels 
and the first difference equations. Further, the first difference methodology has the 
Chapter 5 Inequality or poverty: which is bad for growth? 
145 
problems of magnifying the problems of unbalanced panels, so instead we use 
orthogonal deviations, constructed as in Roodman (2009). System GMM is also better 
than difference GMM in exploiting cross-country variation–Halter et al. (2014). Both 
one-step and two-step methodologies may be used in estimating system GMM 
equations. However, the two-step methodology is more efficient, see Bond, Hoeffler 
and Temple (2001). All the estimates we report, use the two-step GMM procedure. Our 
results do not change significantly when we use the one-step methodology.61 
We use one lag of the internal instruments in all the estimates we report. Our 
substantive results do not change if we use two lags. However, this results in a larger 
number of instruments, which can be problematic. We treat all our right-hand side 
variable as endogenous. Changing persistent variables, including redistribution and 
education, to predetermined does not change our results.  
GMM estimates can suffer from instrument proliferation problems, as discussed by 
Roodman (2009). The Hansen (1982) test can be used to check for the exogoneity of 
instruments and also for the problem of too many instruments, or instrument 
proliferation. The null hypothesis of the test is that instruments are exogenous. When 
the p-value is small, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the instruments are 
invalid, as exogeneity does not hold. On the other hand, Roodman (2009) shows that as 
the number of instruments becomes too large, the p-value of the Hansen test converges 
to one. For each model we estimate, we report the number of instruments. A rule of 
thumb is that when the p-value of the Hansen test is above 0.8, there may be a problem 
of instrument proliferation. In the two-step estimator we use, the Windmeijer 
correction Windmeijer (2005) as well as the small-sample correction Roodman (2009). 
We turn next to a detailed description of our data. 
 4 Data 
For our data, we focus on five-year periods from 1956 to 2011.62 We draw the data from 
a variety of sources. Our full sample of countries for which we have GDP and other basic 
economic data consists of 152 countries. For some countries, we have observations on 
                                                          
61 Results available from authors. 
62 Gini data only starts from 1960 onwards; however, by using GDP values of 1956 we can increase our sample 
size as we use lagged GDP in the growth regressions. 
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all 12 time periods and for some countries we have as few as two observations. (We 
drop countries for which we have valid data for only one five-year period.) 
Our income variable is taken from the Penn World Tables 8.1 (PWT) and is based on real 
gross domestic product (GDP) at 2005 constant national prices. To get the dependent 
variable, we divide GDP by population to create Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDPPC) and take a compound average growth rate over 5 years. This variable is 
different from Ostry et al. (2014) in two ways. First, we use compound average growth 
rates, more typically used in studies of economic growth. Secondly, we use real GDP in 
national constant prices as opposed to GDP calculated by using purchasing power parity 
(PPP) conversion to US dollars. PWT recommends using real GDP in national constant 
prices as it is not distorted by measurement errors in the PPP calculations. 
We use an inequality dataset from Solt (2009) using version 5 of the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIIDv5).63 This data covers, to the best of our knowledge, 
the largest number of countries and spans the longest period for available inequality 
data. To capture inequality, we use the Gini coefficient based on net inequality, which is 
calculated by taking into account taxes and transfers. 
‘Relative redistribution’ is also taken from Solt (2009). Relative redistribution is the 
difference between the market-income and net-income Gini indices divided by the 
market income Gini and then multiplied by 100. Relative redistribution is positive if 
redistribution lowers inequality. It is negative if inequality increases after government 
redistribution. Most countries have positive relative redistribution but a few have 
negative values.  
To capture human capital, we use total years of schooling for ages 15-64 of the 
population, Barro and Lee (2013). Investment (gross fixed capital formation) as a 
percentage of GDP, trade shares and fertility rates are taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The price level of investment data is taken from Heston, 
                                                          
63  We obtained the data at the standardized world income inequality database website (http://myweb. 
uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/FAQ/FAQ.html) That dataset provides 100 multiple imputations for the value of the Gini 
for each country at each point in time. We use the STATA code provided on the website to create point estimates 
for each country at each point in time. We construct the 5-year averages for the Gini and ‘relative redistribution’ 
(see below) from these point estimates. We also create standard errors for each Gini observation to measure 
the precision with which the Gini is estimated. We use this standard error to eliminate imprecisely measured 
values of the Gini coefficient in our robustness checks. 
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Summers and Aten (2011). As there are some gaps in these datasets, and in line with the 
literature on economic growth, 5-year averages are taken for these variables. 
The poverty headcount ratio (2 dollars a day at purchasing price parity) is also taken 
from the WDI. As there are some missing values for the poverty variable and given that 
the poverty rates show a high degree of persistence, 2005 values were carried forward 
to 2011 for the missing observations. WDI has discontinued poverty data for high-
income economies. As a result, data for high-income economies is taken from the CEIC 
database (http://www.ceicdata.com/en) where the data is available. 
Our data and key definitions are summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2 : Variable definitions and sources 
Variables Definition and Source Obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
ln(Income [GDP]) 
Real Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDPPC) at 2005 national prices; Penn 
World Tables 8.1 
1,452 8.41 1.18 
Growth rate 
5 year compound average growth rate 
based on real GDPPC 
1,367 2.11 3.41 
Relative 
redistribution 
Market inequalitya less net inequality 
(Gini), divided by market inequality and 
then multiplied by 100 
424 21.54 15.82 
Investment 
Gross fixed capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP; World 
Development Indicators 
1,233 21.78 7.11 
ln(Years of 
Schooling) 
Average for ages 15-64 of the 
population, Barro and Lee (2013) 
1,506 1.31 0.99 
ln(Population 
Growth) 
Log of population growth; World 
Development Indicators 
1,579 0.34 1.33 
Price of Investment Price level of investmentb; Heston et 
al. (2011) 
1,519 85.38 169.71 
Trade Share of 
GDP 
Trade as a percentage of GDP 1,343 72.96 49.01 
Gini coefficient 
Gini based on income after taxes and 
transfers; Solt (2009) SWIIDv5 
1,041 37.25 9.9 
Poverty 
Headcount ratio based on $2 ($3.10) a 
day on purchasing power parity; 
World Development Indicators 
556 29.32 31.74 
a Inequality (Gini) calculated before taxes and transfers is called market inequality. 
b Calculated over country sample of column 3 of Table B.1, which avoids countries like Zimbabwe that experienced hyperinflation. 
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In section 5.1, we undertake several robustness checks with respect to our definition of 
poverty. We replace poverty with zero for high-income OECD economies.64 These rich 
countries have very few individuals living on less than $2 a day, so zero is a reasonable 
estimate. Recently, the World Bank changed its definition of poverty to $3.10 a day at 
purchasing price parity. As this variable is missing for the high-income economies and 
there are no historical records to fill this gap, we prefer the poverty headcount ratio at 
$2 dollars a day to maximise the sample sizes in our regressions. We use this alternate 
version of poverty to check the robustness of our results in Section 5.1. The correlation 
between the poverty headcount ratio measured using $3.10 a day and that using $2 a 
day is above 97 percent. 
 4.1 Estimation sample 
The panel is unbalanced. There are 16 countries for which we have inequality and gross 
domestic product data for all 12 years from 1956 - 2011. In the simplest growth 
regression, these countries each contribute 11 observations to the estimation (dropping 
one year for the lagged gross domestic product variable). 12 countries only contribute 
one observation as these countries only have two consecutive observations where gross 
domestic product and inequality data are available. In the simplest regression where we 
only include inequality and gross domestic product, we have 950 observations from 
these 152 countries. On average, each country contributes just over 6 observations. 
Appendix B provides more information on which countries are included in our sample 
and how that changes with different sets of control variables. As we add more control 
variables to the regression, sample sizes decrease because of missing values in some of 
the explanatory variables. We estimate all models on the largest possible set of 
observations. We also provide estimates on a smaller set of countries/observations for 
which we have complete data on all required variables. We do this to help disentangle 
the different effects of changing the explanatory variable set from those caused by 
changing the sample composition. These estimates are discussed in Section 5.1. 
As data on poverty is limited, our sample size drops to 128 countries once the poverty 
variables are included in the regressions. As we add the various independent variables 
to the regression, the number of countries drops to 109 (Set 1), 99 (Set 2), 98 (Set 3) and 
                                                          
64 OECD countries with Gross National Income above USD20,000. 
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50 (Set 4). Table B.1 shows the countries that are included in each of the regressions 
that include both poverty and inequality. 
We next turn to a discussion of our results. 
 5 Results 
In Table 3 we present the generalised method of moments estimates from cross-country 
regressions on our full sample of data using the approach of Arellano and Bond (1991). 
In the second column, we include only lagged gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) 
and the Gini coefficient. In columns three through six, we progressively add those 
control variables which are typically used in the literature. (See the definition of Set 1 
through set 4 in Table 1.) 
We find a negative effect of inequality on growth, but it seems fairly fragile. As we add 
additional control variables, its absolute size and statistical significance decreases. Based 
upon the regression with no controls, we can see that a one percentage point increase 
in the Gini coefficient results in a 0.183 percentage point decrease in the five-year 
average compound growth rate. When we add the investment to GDP ratio and years of 
schooling, this falls to -0.144. When we further add log population growth, this drops to 
-0.05. When we add the price of investment and the trade share of GDP, the coefficient 
falls to -0.03 and becomes insignificant. In the last column, when we add relative 
redistribution, there is a dramatic drop in sample size and inequality is again statistically 
significant. 
We find a positive and significant effect of investment on growth. Years of schooling is 
not statistically significant in these regressions. Log population growth is negative, as 
expected, but the t-value is only around 1.25. 
In the model with no controls, the p-value of the Hansen test is very small, indicating 
that we reject the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the instruments. In the last two 
columns, the p-value for the Hansen test for exogeneity of the instruments approaches 
or equals one which is generally a sign of instrument proliferation, as discussed above. 
Only the models which control for the investment to GDP ratio, years of schooling and 
population growth (with or without population growth) generate suitable values for the 
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Hansen test. These two columns (Set 1 and Set 2) are thus our preferred models for this 
specification. 
We also present the tests of Arellano and Bond (1991) for serial correlation in the first-
differenced errors. There is no significant evidence of serial correlation at order two and 
three in the first-differenced errors for our preferred specifications. 
Note that the number of instruments actually decreases when we add relative 
redistribution. The reason for this is that the number of years that we use in the data 
reduces as relative redistribution data is not available for the 1960s and early 1970s. As 
the number of years we use decreases, so does the instrument set. 
In Appendix Table A.1 we present estimates of the simple model with no controls, but 
using the same sample composition from the five columns of Table 3. Recall that sample 
size changes due to missing values in the explanatory variables. The estimates of the 
effect of inequality on economic growth are fairly consistent across all of the sample 
compositions, except for the last column that includes relative redistribution. 
The decreasing effect of inequality as we add additional control variables is caused by 
the additional explanatory variables picking up some of the explanatory power of 
inequality, not the changing sample composition. If anything, when we look at Appendix 
Table A.1, the effect of inequality seems stronger with the smaller sample sizes. We also 
conclude that the restricted sample which we are forced to use when we include relative 
redistribution is very different than the other samples. In this case, the sample 
restriction seems to be contributing substantially to changed parameter estimates. 
In Table 4 we present similar results except that we now add a control for poverty 
(measured as the percentage of people below the poverty line) and we interact poverty 
and inequality. Some care needs to be exercised in interpreting the coefficients in 
Table 4 as the coefficient on lagged GDP can no longer be viewed as a pure ‘convergence’ 
parameter since the correlation between poverty and GDP is quite high - around 84%. 
The correlation between poverty and inequality is 43%, so the inclusion of poverty does 
provide additional information. 
We have fewer observations because poverty data is missing for some countries. 
Looking at Table 4, we again prefer the models that control for investment to GDP ratio 
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and years of schooling (with or without population growth, investment price and trade 
share of GDP) based upon the Hansen test. Looking at the columns labeled Set 1, Set 2 
and Set 3, for example, we see strong evidence of convergence; lagged GDP is negative 
and poverty is positive. Inequality is statistically insignificant on its own, but the 
interaction between poverty and inequality is negative and statistically significant. 
Population growth is negative, but not quite statistically significant in these regressions. 
Investment and years of schooling both contribute positively to economic growth and 
are statistically significant. 
Table 3 : The Effect of Inequality on Growth 
 
Variables 
No 
controls Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
ln(GDPPC)t−1 
−0.0204 
(0.446) 
-0.348 
(0.339) 
-0.588∗ 
(0.318) 
−0.654∗∗∗ 
(0.249) 
0.175 
(0.555) 
Gini coefficient 
−0.183∗∗∗ 
(0.0615) 
−0.144∗∗ 
(0.0568) 
−0.0501∗ 
(0.0281) 
−0.0309 
(0.0332) 
−0.0842 
(0.101) 
Investment to GDP 
ratio 
 0.190∗∗∗ 
(0.053) 
0.197 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0420) 
0.168 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0459) 
0.251 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0620) 
Years of Schooling  -0.508 
(0.673) 
−0.0509 
(0.521) 
0.231 
(0.401) 
0.970 
(1.59) 
Log Population 
Growth 
  -0.341 
(0.286) 
-0.320 
(0.225) 
-0.295 
(0.321) 
Price of Investment    −0.00013 
(0.00059) 
−0.00767 
(0.0232) 
Trade share of 
GDP 
   0.0114 ∗∗∗ 
(0.00290) 
0.00093 
(0.0046) 
Relative 
redistribution 
    -0.123∗ 
(0.0707) 
Sample size 950 823 760 755 347 
Hansen test (p-
value) 0.00 0.28 0.32 0.98 1.00 
Number of 
instruments 36 72 89 125 105 
Serial correlation tests (p-values) for AR(p) in first differences: 
AR(1) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 
AR(2) 0.11 0.25 0.76 0.81 0.22 
AR(3) 0.76 0.76 0.93 0.97 0.12 
Dependent variable: 5-year average growth rate of GDP 
GMM estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at one, five and ten per cent respectively 
All regressions include time dummies 
Set 1: Investment to GDP ratio and log years of schooling 
Set 2: Set 1 and log population growth 
Set 3: Set 2 and price of investment and trade share of GDP 
Set 4: Set 3 and relative redistribution 
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Table 4 : The Effect of Inequality and Poverty on Growth 
Variables 
No 
controls Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
ln(GDPPC)t−1 
−1.99∗∗∗ 
(0.742) 
−1.26∗∗∗ 
(0.431) 
−1.18∗∗ 
(0.568) 
−1.14∗ 
(0.616) 
−0.679 
(0.662) 
Gini coefficient 
−0.136∗ 
(0.0760) 
−0.0359 
(0.0521) 
0.00865 
(0.0408) 
0.00196 
(0.0566) 
0.0308 
(0.129) 
Poverty headcount −0.0773 
(0.132) 
0.0238 
(0.0519) 
0.0605 
(0.0497) 
0.0764 
(0.0614) 
0.129 
(0.0928) 
Gini × Poverty 
−0.00023 
(0.0030) 
−0.00123 
(0.001116) 
−0.00191∗∗ 
(0.00097) 
−0.00231∗ 
(0.00130) 
−0.00309 
(0.00251) 
Investment to GDP 
ratio 
 0.175 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0496) 
0.181 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0476) 
0.171 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0421) 
0.259 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0592) 
Years of Schooling  1.07 ∗ 
(0.606) 
0.997∗ 
(0.604) 
1.13 ∗∗ 
(0.555) 
2.11 
(1.67) 
Log Population 
Growth 
  −0.323 
(0.214) 
−0.361 
(0.266) 
−0.614∗ 
(0.310) 
Price of Investment    −0.0148 
(0.0110) 
−0.0104 
(0.0152) 
Trade share of 
GDP 
   0.00507 
(0.00572) 
−0.00315 
(0.0103) 
Relative 
redistribution 
    −0.0437 
(0.0597) 
Sample size 530 465 410 407 236 
Hansen test (p-
value) 0.02 0.20 0.44 0.41 1.00 
Number of 
instruments 37 61 73 94 104 
Serial correlation tests (p-values) for AR(p) in first differences: 
AR(1) 0.32 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 
AR(2) 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.63 0.95 0.78 
AR(3) 0.57 0.85 0.32 0.55 0.65 
Notes: Dependent variable: 5-year average growth rate of GDP 
GMM estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at one, five and ten per cent respectively 
All regressions include time dummies 
Set 1: Investment to GDP ratio and log years of schooling 
Set 2: Set 1 and log population growth 
Set 3: Set 2 and price of investment and trade share of GDP 
Set 4: Set 3 and relative redistribution 
 
In Figure 165, we plot the marginal effect of inequality on economic growth from the 
estimated coefficients of the column labeled ‘Set 2’ in Table 4. (This is our preferred 
model.) The graph of marginal effects from the columns labeled Set 1 and Set 3 are quite 
similar.66 
                                                          
65 At the End of the chapter. 
66 Results available from the authors. 
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We can see that at low levels of poverty, inequality has an insignificant effect on 
economic growth. When poverty is higher, the negative effect of inequality becomes 
statistically significant. The effect is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level at a 
poverty rate of 29% and significant at the 5 per cent level at poverty rates above 33%. 
Countries such as South Africa, Bhutan and Guatemala have poverty rates around 29 per 
cent in 2011 and countries such as Tajikistan and Georgia have poverty rates around 33 
per cent. 
In Appendix Table A.2, we explore whether or not our results about inequality and 
poverty are driven by the smaller sample sizes. This doesn’t appear to be the case. If we 
estimate the simple model from Table 3 without controls, we find that the effect of 
inequality on economic growth is statistically significant and roughly stable across all the 
sample compositions that we consider. Results from Table 4 do not seem to be driven 
by the restricted sample of countries with available data on poverty. 
Appendix Table A.3 examines the effect on the simple regression without controls of the 
varying sample sizes in Table 4 as we add more variables (and lose observations where 
data is missing). Looking at Table A.3, the coefficients for the simplest model from Table 
4 are very stable across all sample compositions. The basic picture we get across the 
various sample sizes is consistent and the marginal effects are quite similar to those 
shown in Figure 1. 
In the next sub-section, we expand the sample size by treating poverty as negligible in 
rich OECD countries to see whether this alters the results. We also re-estimate our 
model, removing values for the Gini coefficient that have a high degree of uncertainty 
associated with them. The results do not change much. 
 5.1 Robustness checks 
There are 136 country/year observations for wealthy OECD countries where poverty 
data is missing. In all of these countries, for years when we can observe the poverty rate, 
it is below 2 per cent. As a robustness check, we replace these missing poverty values 
with a value of zero, which will be approximately correct given the observed values of 
poverty in the data. 
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Table C.1 presents the results from re-estimating Table 4 using this ‘imputed’ poverty 
data. The results are broadly similar although the statistical significance of the individual 
coefficients decreases. Figure 2 provides the marginal effects from Table C.1. We find 
that the pattern of marginal effects is extremely similar. Inequality begins to have a 
statistically significant and negative impact on economic growth at slightly lower poverty 
rates – the marginal effects are statistically significant at the 10 per cent level at poverty 
rates of about 24 per cent and significant at the 5 per cent level for poverty rates about 
28 per cent. 
Some countries have inequality data which is poorly measured. We remove from the 
data any countries whose standard error of the Gini coefficient estimate is more than 
two standard deviations larger than the mean standard error of the Gini coefficient, as 
measured across all of the country observations. 
We re-estimate Table 4 without these suspect observations (and without the missing 
poverty values that had been replaced with zero in the previous robustness check) and 
report the results in Table C.2 and Figure 3. Inequality begins to have a statistically 
significant, negative effect on economic growth at a poverty rate of 36 per cent at the 
10 per cent significance level. 
The World Bank recently changed its definition of poverty, raising the daily income cut-
off to $3.10. We re-estimate our models using this definition of poverty. Our sample size 
changes slightly because there are fewer countries for which this new definition of 
poverty is available and the set of countries for which it is available is slightly different. 
The results of this investigation are presented in Figure 4. 
The overall results are similar, though we now find that inequality has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on economic growth for poverty rates below about 10 per 
cent. Russia and Turkey have poverty rates about 10 per cent using the $3.10 per day 
measure. Inequality has a negative effect on economic growth at high poverty rates, 
above 60 per cent. This would be similar to the poverty rate in Honduras. 
Note that in the sample which generates Figure 4, 98% of the countries have a gross 
national income less than USD20,000 per day. It would appear that middle-income 
countries with low poverty may benefit slightly from inequality using this definition. 
Chapter 5 Inequality or poverty: which is bad for growth? 
155 
Given the smaller sample sizes, our preference is to exercise caution in pushing the 
interpretation of these results too far. 
If we impute zero poverty values to wealthy OECD countries, we find that significance 
levels drop (as we did before) and the overall pattern is similar to the first 3 figures. 
These results are summarised in Figure 5. 
Both Figure 4 and Figure 5 are based upon the model where we control for investment 
to GDP ratio, Years of Schooling and Log Population Growth. 
Our results do not seem to be driven by the choice of sample size, by missing poverty 
data in rich countries, by poor quality inequality measurement or by the choice of cut-
off in defining poverty. 
 6 Conclusions 
This paper offers new insights into the important relationship between inequality, 
poverty and economic growth. The central findings of this paper suggest that the 
proposition that inequality is harmful to economic growth on its own may be too strong. 
The results in this paper demonstrate that inequality interacts with high levels of poverty 
to negatively and significantly impact economic growth. 
We find that when poverty is low (less than 25%), the relationship between inequality 
and economic growth is statistically insignificant. For higher levels of poverty, inequality 
negatively affects economic growth. This negative impact increases as poverty increases. 
Our results, for the most part, do not suggest that inequality has a positive role to play 
in economic growth. There are a variety of reasons why countries might want to reduce 
inequality (and poverty) even if that has no impact on economic growth. These reasons 
may include inequality’s impact on social cohesion and long-term institutions. 
The policy implication of this paper is that reducing inequality on its own may not 
improve economic growth prospects. Instead, poor countries may find that reducing 
poverty would be more beneficial for economic growth, rather than redistribution that 
does not reduce poverty.  
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 A Appendix: Effect of changing sample sizes 
Table A.1: The effect of inequality on growth 
Simple model with no controls 
Effect of restricting sample size to sub-samples considered in Table 3 
ln(GDPPC)t−1 
−0.0204 
(0.446) 
−0.342 
(0.476) 
−0.748 
(0.523) 
−0.562 
(0.493) 
−0.551 
(0.520) 
Gini coefficient 
−0.183∗∗∗ 
(0.0615) 
−0.275∗∗∗ 
(0.0745) 
−0.269∗∗∗ 
(0.0941) 
−0.246∗∗∗ 
(0.0926) 
−0.0639 
(0.0595) 
Sample size 950 823 760 755 347 
Hansen test (p-
value) 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Number of 
instruments 36 36 36 36 24 
Serial correlation tests (p-values) for AR(p) in first differences: 
AR(1) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 
AR(2) 0.11 0.23 0.86 0.84 0.94 
AR(3) 0.76 0.99 0.90 0.91 0.90 
Dependent variable: 5-year average growth rate of GDP 
GMM estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at one, five and ten per cent respectively 
Regressions include time dummies  
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Table A.2: The Effect of Inequality on Growth 
Simple model with no controls 
Effect of restricting sample size to sub-samples considered in Table 4 
ln(GDPPC)t−1 
−0.0204 
(0.446) 
−0.612 
(0.412) 
−0.648 
(0.483) 
−0.570 
(0.507) 
−1.24∗∗ 
(0.564) 
Gini coefficient 
−0.183∗∗∗ 
(0.0615) 
−0.146∗∗ 
(0.0632) 
−0.138∗ 
(0.0757) 
−0.130∗ 
(0.0797) 
−0.165∗∗ 
(0.0674) 
Sample size 950 465 410 407 236 
Hansen test (p-
value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Number of 
instruments 36 19 19 19 19 
Serial correlation tests (p-values) for AR(p) in first differences: 
AR(1) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.00∗∗∗ 
AR(2) 0.11 0.49 0.91 0.92 0.65 
AR(3) 0.76 0.35 0.80 0.83 0.60 
Dependent variable: 5-year average growth rate of GDP 
GMM estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at one, five and ten per cent respectively Regressions include time dummies 
 
Table A.3: The Effect of Inequality and Poverty on Growth 
Simple model with no controls 
Effect of restricting sample size to sub-samples considered in Table 4 
ln(GDPPC)t−1 
−1.99∗∗∗ 
(0.742) 
−1.56∗ 
(0.835) 
−1.78∗ 
(0.935) 
−1.83∗ 
(0.928) 
−1.24 
(0.823) 
Gini coefficient 
−0.136∗ 
(0.0760) 
−0.113 
(0.0704) 
−0.121∗ 
(0.0715) 
−0.124∗ 
(0.0724) 
−0.130∗∗ 
(0.059) 
Poverty headcount −0.0773 
(0.132) 
0.0484 
(0.104) 
0.0405 
(0.102) 
0.0464 
(0.104) 
0.0347 
(0.0736) 
Gini × Poverty 
−0.00023 
(0.0030) 
−0.00261 
(0.00233) 
−0.00235 
(0.00207) 
−0.00261 
(0.00212) 
−0.00032 
(0.0020) 
Sample size 530 465 410 407 236 
Hansen test (p-
value) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.13 
Number of 
instruments 37 37 37 37 37 
Serial correlation tests (p-values) for AR(p) in first differences: 
AR(1) 0.32 0.02∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 
AR(2) 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.97 0.98 0.79 
AR(3) 0.57 0.54 0.62 0.65 0.50 
Dependent variable: 5-year average growth rate of GDP 
GMM estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at one, five and ten per cent respectively 
Regressions include time dummies. 
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B   Appendix: Sample composition 
Table B.1: Country list of sample composition for regression models 
Baseline 
Baseline & 
poverty variable 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & Set 
1 
Baseline & poverty 
variable & Set 2∗ 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & 
Set 4 
Albania Albania Albania Argentina Argentina 
Angola Angola Argentina Australia Australia 
Argentina Argentina Armenia Austria Austria 
Armenia Armenia Australia Bangladesh Belgium 
Australia Australia Austria Belgium Brazil 
Austria Austria Bangladesh Belize Canada 
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Belgium Benin Chile 
The Bahamas Bangladesh Belize Bolivia China 
Bangladesh Belarus Benin Botswana Colombia 
Barbados Belgium Bolivia Brazil Costa Rica 
Belarus Belize Botswana Burundi 
Czech 
Republic 
Belgium Benin Brazil Cambodia Denmark 
Belize Bhutan Bulgaria Cameroon 
Dominican 
Republic 
Benin Bolivia Burundi Canada El Salvador 
Bhutan 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Cambodia 
Central African 
Republic 
Finland 
Bolivia Botswana Cameroon Chile France 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Brazil Canada China Germany 
Botswana Bulgaria 
Central African 
Republic 
Colombia Greece 
Brazil Burkina Faso Chile Republic of Congo Guatemala 
Bulgaria Burundi China Costa Rica Honduras 
Burkina Faso Cambodia Colombia Cote d’Ivoire Iceland 
Burundi Cameroon 
Republic of 
Congo 
Croatia India 
Cambodia Canada Costa Rica Czech Republic Ireland 
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Baseline 
Baseline & 
poverty variable 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 1 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 
2∗ 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 4 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Cote d’Ivoire Denmark Israel 
Canada Chad Croatia 
Dominican 
Republic 
Italy 
Central African 
Republic 
Chile Czech Republic Ecuador Kazakhstan 
Chad China Denmark 
”Egypt, Arab 
Rep.” 
Kenya 
Chile Colombia 
Dominican 
Republic 
El Salvador 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
China Comoros Ecuador Fiji Mexico 
Colombia Republic of Congo Egypt Finland Netherlands 
Comoros Costa Rica El Salvador France Norway 
Republic of Congo Cote d’Ivoire Estonia Gabon Panama 
Costa Rica Croatia Fiji Gambia Paraguay 
Cote d’Ivoire Czech Republic Finland Germany Philippines 
Croatia Denmark France Ghana Poland 
Cyprus Djibouti Gabon Greece Romania 
Czech Republic 
Dominican 
Republic 
Gambia Guatemala Slovak Republic 
Denmark Ecuador Germany Honduras Slovenia 
Djibouti Egypt Ghana Iceland South Africa 
Dominica El Salvador Greece India Spain 
Dominican 
Republic 
Estonia Guatemala Indonesia Sri Lanka 
Ecuador Ethiopia Honduras Iran Sweden 
Egypt Fiji Hungary Ireland Switzerland 
El Salvador Finland Iceland Israel Tajikistan 
Estonia France India Italy Thailand 
Ethiopia Gabon Indonesia Jamaica United Kingdom 
Fiji Gambia Iran Jordan United States 
Finland Georgia Ireland Kazakhstan Uruguay 
France Germany Israel Kenya Venezuela, RB 
Gabon Ghana Italy Kyrgyz Republic Vietnam 
Gambia Greece Jamaica Lao PDR  
Georgia Guatemala Japan Lesotho  
Germany Guinea Jordan Liberia  
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Baseline 
Baseline & 
poverty variable 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 1 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 
2∗ 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 4 
Ghana Guinea-Bissau Kazakhstan Malawi  
Greece Honduras Kenya Malaysia  
Grenada Hungary Kyrgyz Republic Maldives  
Guatemala Iceland Lao PDR Mali  
Guinea India Latvia Mauritania  
Guinea-Bissau Indonesia Lesotho Mauritius  
Honduras Iran Liberia Mexico  
Hong Kong Ireland Lithuania Morocco  
Hungary Israel Malawi Mozambique  
Iceland Italy Malaysia Namibia  
India Jamaica Maldives Nepal  
Indonesia Japan Mali Netherlands  
Iran Jordan Mauritania Niger  
Ireland Kazakhstan Mauritius Norway  
Israel Kenya Mexico Pakistan  
Italy Kyrgyz Republic Morocco Panama  
Jamaica Lao PDR Mozambique Paraguay  
Japan Latvia Namibia Peru  
Jordan Lesotho Nepal Philippines  
Kazakhstan Liberia Netherlands Poland  
Kenya Lithuania Niger Romania  
Republic of 
Korea 
Macedonia, 
FYR 
Norway Rwanda  
Kyrgyz Republic Madagascar Pakistan Senegal  
Lao PDR Malawi Panama Sierra Leone  
Latvia Malaysia Paraguay Slovak Republic  
Lebanon Maldives Peru Slovenia  
Lesotho Mali Philippines South Africa  
Liberia Mauritania Poland Spain  
Lithuania Mauritius Romania Sri Lanka  
Luxembourg Mexico 
Russian 
Federation 
Sudan  
Macedonia, 
FYR 
Moldova Rwanda Swaziland  
Madagascar Montenegro Senegal Sweden  
Malawi Morocco Sierra Leone Switzerland  
Malaysia Mozambique Slovak Republic 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
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Baseline 
Baseline & 
poverty variable 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 1 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 
2∗ 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 4 
Maldives Namibia Slovenia Tajikistan  
Mali Nepal South Africa Tanzania  
Malta Netherlands Spain Thailand  
Mauritania Niger Sri Lanka Togo  
Mauritius Nigeria Sudan 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 
Mexico Norway Swaziland Tunisia  
Moldova Pakistan Sweden Turkey  
Mongolia Panama Switzerland Uganda  
Montenegro Paraguay 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
United Kingdom  
Morocco Peru Tajikistan United States  
Mozambique Philippines Tanzania Uruguay  
Namibia Poland Thailand 
”Venezuela, 
RB” 
 
Nepal Romania Togo Vietnam  
Netherlands 
Russian 
Federation 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
”Yemen, Rep.”  
New Zealand Rwanda Tunisia Zambia  
Niger 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Turkey   
Nigeria Senegal Uganda   
Norway Serbia Ukraine   
Pakistan Sierra Leone United Kingdom   
Panama Slovak Republic United States   
Paraguay Slovenia Uruguay   
Peru South Africa 
”Venezuela, 
RB” 
  
Philippines Spain Vietnam   
Poland Sri Lanka ”Yemen, Rep.”   
Portugal St. Lucia Zambia   
Romania Sudan    
Russian 
Federation 
Suriname    
Rwanda Swaziland    
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Sweden    
Senegal Switzerland    
Serbia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
   
Sierra Leone Tajikistan    
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Baseline 
Baseline & 
poverty variable 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 1 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 
2∗ 
Baseline & 
poverty 
variable & set 4 
Singapore Tanzania    
Slovak Republic Thailand    
Slovenia Togo    
South Africa 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
   
Spain Tunisia    
Sri Lanka Turkey    
St. Lucia Turkmenistan    
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Uganda    
Sudan Ukraine    
Suriname United Kingdom    
Swaziland United States    
Sweden Uruguay    
Switzerland Venezuela    
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Vietnam    
Tajikistan 
Republic of 
Yemen 
   
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Republic of 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Zambia    
∗Set two and three are the same except for Namibia which gets dropped in set 3 
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C Appendix: Robustness checks 
Table C.1: The Effect of Inequality and Poverty on Growth Rich 
countries set to zero poverty 
Variables 
No 
controls 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
ln(GDPPC)t−1 
−2.17∗∗∗ 
(0.530) 
−1.57∗∗∗ 
(0.478) 
−1.86∗∗∗ 
(0.674) 
−1.76∗∗∗ 
(0.586) 
−0.681 
(0.768) 
Gini coefficient 
−0.0768 
(0.0568) 
−0.0448 
(0.0458) 
−0.0305 
(0.0478) 
−0.0513 
(0.0445) 
−0.0595 
(0.0928) 
Poverty headcount −0.0326 
(0.112) 
0.0153 
(0.0522) 
0.0208 
(0.0587) 
0.0319 
(0.0528) 
0.0916 
(0.101) 
Gini × Poverty 
−0.00158 
(0.00267) 
−0.00133 
(0.00118) 
−0.00148 
(0.00114) 
−0.00176 
(0.00116) 
−0.00235 
(0.00260) 
Investment to GDP 
ratio 
 0.204 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0509) 
0.219 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0516) 
0.194 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0418) 
0.254 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0600) 
Years of Schooling  1.10 ∗∗ 
(0.455) 
1.07 ∗∗ 
(0.537) 
1.07 ∗ 
(0.616) 
0.960 
(1.59) 
Log Population 
Growth 
  −0.403 
(0.265) 
−0.308 
(0.221) 
−0.190 
(0.363) 
Price of Investment    −0.0132 
(0.00964) 
−0.0132 
(0.0152) 
Trade share of 
GDP 
   0.00379 
(0.00488) 
−0.00080 
(0.00855) 
Relative 
redistribution 
    −0.0589 
(0.0438) 
Sample size 666 590 532 529 313 
Hansen test (p-
value) 0.07 0.60 0.91 1.00 1.00 
Instruments 56 92 109 145 125 
Serial correlation tests (p-values) for AR(p) in first differences: 
AR(1) 0.04∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 
AR(2) 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.58 0.98 0.59 
AR(3) 0.48 0.51 0.45 0.79 0.50 
See footnotes in Table C.2 
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Table C.2: The Effect of Inequality and Poverty on Growth Removing 
Gini Coefficients with High Standard Errors 
Variables 
No 
controls 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
ln(GDPPC)t−1 
−1.11 
(0.790) 
−1.16∗ 
(0.456) 
−1.14∗ 
(0.665) 
−0.605 
(0.542) 
−0.518 
(0.660) 
Gini coefficient 
−0.0440 
(0.0965) 
0.0159 
(0.0615) 
0.0213 
(0.0501) 
0.0642 
(0.0577) 
0.172 
(0.177) 
Poverty headcount 0.00348 
(0.112) 
0.106 
(0.0722) 
0.0712 
(0.0576) 
0.130 ∗∗ 
(0.0618) 
0.243∗ 
(0.126) 
Gini × Poverty 
−0.00174 
(0.00266) 
−0.00326∗ 
(0.00175) 
−0.00229∗ 
(0.00118) 
−0.00335∗∗ 
(0.00132) 
−0.00592∗ 
0.00349 
Investment to GDP 
ratio 
 0.192 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0535) 
0.205 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0468) 
0.182 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0441) 
0.274 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0693) 
Years of Schooling  1.33 ∗ 
(0.683) 
0.716 
(0.737) 
0.831 
(0.596) 
2.11 
(1.43) 
Log Population 
Growth 
  −0.363 
(0.286) 
−0.410 
(0.261) 
−0.689∗∗ 
(0.297) 
Price of Investment    −0.0154 
(0.0122) 
−0.0121 
(0.0146) 
Trade share of 
GDP 
   0.00003 
(0.00582) 
0.00745 
(0.00902) 
Relative 
redistribution 
    0.0172 
(0.0971) 
Sample size 472 423 371 370 229 
Hansen test (p-
value) 0.02 0.16 0.53 0.72 1.00 
Number of 
instruments 37 61 72 92 102 
Serial correlation tests (p-values) for AR(p) in first differences: 
AR(1) 0.21 0.05∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 
AR(2) 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.35 0.90 0.69 
AR(3) 0.28 0.58 0.15 0.27 0.50 
Dependent variable: 5-year average growth rate of GDP 
GMM estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at one, five and ten per cent respectively 
All regressions include time dummies 
Set 1: Investment to GDP ratio and log years of schooling 
Set 2: Set 1 and log population growth 
Set 3: Set 2 and price of investment and trade share of GDP 
Set 4: Set 3 and relative redistribution 
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Figure 1 :  Marginal Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth at Different Levels of Poverty Based upon 
Parameter Estimates of Column 3 of Table 4. 
 
 
Figure 2 : Marginal Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth at Different Levels of Poverty Based upon 
Parameter Estimates of Column 3 of Table C.1. 
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Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth at Different Levels of Poverty Based upon 
Parameter Estimates of Column 3 of Table C.2. 
 
Figure 4 : Marginal Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth at Different Levels of Poverty Based upon 
$3.10 Per Day Definition of Poverty Controls for Investment, Years of Schooling and Population 
Growth 
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Figure 5 : Marginal Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth at Different Levels of Poverty  Based upon 
$3.10 Per Day Definition of Poverty (Rich Country Poverty Set to 0). Controls for Investment, Years of 
Schooling and Population Growth 
 168 
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